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Organized interests do not have direct control over the fate of their policy agendas 
in Congress.  They cannot introduce bills, vote on legislation, or serve on House 
committees.  If organized interests want to achieve virtually any of their legislative goals 
they must rely on and work through members of Congress.  As an interest group seeks to 
move its policy agenda forward in Congress, then, one of the most important challenges it 
faces is the recruitment of effective legislative allies.  Legislative allies are members of 
Congress who “share the same policy objective as the group” and who use their limited 
time and resources to advocate for the group’s policy needs (Hall and Deardorff 2006, 
76).  For all the financial resources that a group can bring to bear as it competes with 
other interests to win policy outcomes, it will be ineffective without the help of members 
of Congress that are willing to expend their time and effort to advocate for its policy 
positions (Bauer, Pool, and Dexter 1965; Baumgartner and Leech 1998b; Hall and 
Wayman 1990; Hall and Deardorff 2006; Hojnacki and Kimball 1998, 1999).    
Given the importance of legislative allies to interest group success, are some 
organized interests better able to recruit legislative allies than others?  This question has 
received little attention in the literature.  This dissertation offers an original theoretical 
framework describing both when we should expect some types of interests to generate 
more legislative allies than others and how interests vary in their effectiveness at 
mobilizing these allies toward effective legislative advocacy.  It then tests these 
theoretical expectations on variation in group representation during the stage in the 
legislative process that many scholars have argued is crucial to policy influence, interest 
representation on legislative committees.  The dissertation uncovers pervasive evidence 
that interests with a presence across more congressional districts stand a better chance of 
having legislative allies on their key committees.  It also reveals that interests with 
greater amounts of leverage over jobs and economic investment will be better positioned 
to win more allies on key committees.  In addition, interests with a policy agenda that 
closely overlaps with the jurisdiction of just one committee in Congress are more likely 
to have legislative allies on their key committees than are interests that have a policy 
agenda divided across many committee jurisdictions.  In short, how groups are distributed 
across districts, the leverage that interests have over local jobs and economic investment, 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
Organized interests vary in the amount of resources that they can bring to bear in 
any policy battle.  Some groups have far more financial assets than others.  Some spend 
more on elections than others.  Some invest more in direct lobbying, grassroots 
organizations, and public relations.  Scholars have investigated how variation in these 
types of resources affects the success groups have in the legislative process.  Many 
scholars have hypothesized that interests with more resources will have greater leverage 
over the legislative process.  Campaign contributions have been studied more than any 
other type of resource (see selected studies by Bronars and Lott 1997; Frendreis and 
Waterman 1985; Grenzke 1989; Langbein and Lotwis 1990; Stratmann 1991; Wawro 
2001; Wilhite and Thielman 1987; Wright 1985).  In addition to the amount of money 
that interests spend in elections, scholars have also examined the impact of direct 
lobbying, grassroots operations, as well as organizations’ total assets (Baumgartner et al. 
2009; Hall and Wayman 1990; Wright 1990).  The findings in this whole body of 
research, however, have been mixed at best (Baumgartner and Leech 1998a).   
Yet for all the work examining variation in group influence, there is an important 
resource that has largely been overlooked.  Organized interests also vary in the number of 
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legislative allies that they have in Congress.  Legislative allies are members of Congress 
who “share the same policy objective as the group” and who use their limited time and 
resources to advocate for the policy needs of the group (Hall and Deardorff 2006, 76).  
Some interests have a large number of legislative allies, while others have very few. 
Interest groups must recruit and work with legislators in order to move their 
policy agendas forward (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Mahoney and Baumgartner 2015).  
Groups lack the power to introduce legislation or vote for bills.  They cannot sit on, make 
legislative decisions in, or vote on House committees.  For all their monetary resources, 
interests without allied legislators in Congress will consistently be on the outside of the 
policymaking process looking in.  To be effective, interest groups must rely on 
lawmakers who will actively push for their agenda in the legislative process.  There is a 
rich literature which finds that groups primarily work through their legislative allies in 
Congress (Bauer, Pool, and Dexter 1965; Baumgartner and Leech 1998b; Hall and 
Wayman 1990; Hall and Deardorff 2006; Hojnacki and Kimball 1998, 1999).  By 
comparison, we know almost nothing about whether some organized interests can recruit 
more legislative allies than others.  Throughout this dissertation my aims will be to better 
understand the systematic factors that predict when some groups will generate more allies 
than others and to thereby learn more about which interests are likely to win and which 
are likely lose in the legislative process. 
Interests with more allies in Congress possess a number of advantages.  They will 
have access to a larger number of legislators, many who may be actively enlisted in their 
agenda.  Groups with more allies stand in a better position to have the assistance they 
need at key points in the legislative process, such as on committees relevant to their 
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interests.  Groups with more allies are also likely to be better represented in general 
compared to groups with fewer allies.  Understanding (1) how organized interests gain 
legislative allies, (2) what factors predict which interests will generate more legislative 
allies than others, and (3) whether some interests are better able to mobilize their allies 
towards effectively advocating for their policy agendas may therefore offer advance our 
understanding about which interests have more influence over the legislative process.   
 
Constituency Presence, Ally Generation, and Group Influence 
This dissertation rests upon two key assumptions:  The number of allies that 
interest groups have in Congress will affect the representation that they receive in the 
legislative process.  And the number of legislative allies interest groups are able to recruit 
will be tied to constituency presence.   The logic underlying these assumptions is simple.  
Members of Congress advocate strongly for the interests in their districts (Baldwin and 
Magee 2000; Cragg and Kahn 2009; Hall 1998; Hall and Wayman 1990; Hojnacki and 
Kimball 1998; Welch 1982; Wright 1990).  Interest groups are also constituents.  Their 
members, employees, and firms make up important parts of the districts that legislators 
represent.  The number of effective legislative allies that a group is able to recruit in 
Congress is therefore likely to be tied to constituency related factors like the number of 
districts where it has a constituency presence.  As such, some organized interests will 
recruit more legislative allies than others.    
While the idea that constituency presence is somehow important to group 
influence has rarely been directly studied, it is not new.  Richard Fenno offered an insight 
about group influence that went largely unnoticed in subsequent scholarship.  Citing 
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survey evidence he argued that “whatever the technique they use, the ultimate source of 
clientele (interest group) influence is local” (Fenno 1973, 43).  The lack of empirical 
work in this area is glaring when one examines the basic profiles of members of 
Congress.  CQ Politics in America (2016), for example, lists a handful of the most 
important facts about each legislator.  Among these facts is their party, their state or the 
location of their district, a brief biography, and the major industries in their district.  
Despite the prominent listing of local economic interests in member profiles, political 
scientists have rarely investigated how the distribution of organized interests across 
congressional constituencies affects their prospects for legislative success in Congress.  
Coming up with examples of local interests that have won strong advocacy from 
representatives is not particularly difficult.  Constituents in and around the Seattle area 
are said to “bleed Boeing blue” (Robison and Ray 2013).  Boeing and other defense 
contractors are major employers in the area.  Defense industry jobs make up a substantial 
proportion of employment of Boeing’s former Representative Norm Dicks’s district.  
Dicks was the chair of the House Appropriations Subcommittee in charge of defense 
appropriations.  His alliance with the company was so strong that people started to call 
him “Mr. Boeing” (Song 2012).  John Dingell of Michigan represented a district that 
houses concentrations of auto manufacturers and auto related unions.  Dingell was the 
chairman and longtime member of Energy and Commerce Committee, which has 
jurisdiction over several policies of interest to both constituencies.   
Congress member Anna Eshoo’s advocacy provides yet another illustration of the 
lengths representatives can go to represent local interests.  Representative Eshoo 
represents major Silicon Valley companies like Facebook, Hewlett Packard, Apple, and 
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Google.  In 2006 she was a member of an important subcommittee for Google’s 
legislative needs, the Telecommunications Subcommittee of the House Energy and 
Commerce Committee.  While a bill was being adjusted in a markup session a 
Republican peer proposed what became known as the “Google killer” amendment.  In 
response to this threat to a local economic interest Representative Eshoo “leapt into the 
fray, on a committee that had a majority of the other party, and convinced her colleagues 
not to vote on what would have been a very bad piece of legislation for [Google]” 
(Google Policy Talks 2008).   
Representative Eshoo’s advocacy for the interests in her district provokes several 
unanswered questions that, with closer examination, could reveal evidence of systemic 
bias towards some interests over and above others.  First, she demonstrated elevated 
legislative action on behalf of a salient local interest in her constituency.  If Eshoo’s 
behavior is common in Congress, then we will find that interests with a local presence in 
more districts will generate more legislative allies and consequently receive greater 
legislative advocacy.  District presence could therefore predict ally generation.  Second, 
among the many organized interests with a local presence in her district, Representative 
Eshoo decided to advocate particularly strongly for politically active business interests.  
Are some types of local interests, such as local businesses or interests that are more 
politically active, more likely to generate legislative allies than others?  And third, Eshoo 
managed to gain a position on a committee with leverage over the issues of importance to 
an industry in her district.  Are some interests better at mobilizing legislative allies like 
Eshoo toward winning representation on particular House committees than others?  If 
other members of Congress are motivated to join committees in order to support local 
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interests, then this could lead to biased institutional representation for some interests.   
Moreover, some interests may be more effective at mobilizing allies like Eshoo than 
others.  Interest groups with a policy agenda that closely aligns with one committee may, 
for example, be more likely to have allies on that committee than are interests with a 
policy agenda that is divided across many committee jurisdictions.   The key question, 
then, is what types of interest groups will have strong congressional advocates serving on 
the committees that are most important to their interests.   
When we start to think about groups as constituents, the list of constituencies that 
could receive particularly strong legislative advocacy from their representatives could go 
on and on.  The districts of representatives from West Virginia have large concentrations 
of coal firms.  Districts in Texas and Oklahoma are home to concentrations of oil 
interests that other states lack.  The finance industry has a stronger presence in 
Connecticut and New York districts than districts in other states.  The variation in 
constituency interests in these districts and others, and the advocacy that their 
representatives have the potential to demonstrate in support of their constituents’ policy 
agendas, suggests that our knowledge of group influence would be well served by 
exploring the impact of various constituent related factors on who wins more allies in 
Congress. 
The lack of scholarly attention to the importance of groups as constituencies is 
also surprising given the virtual kaleidoscope of variation that organized interests 
demonstrate in how they are distributed across the 435 House districts.   Each organized 
interest has a unique geographic distribution as a constituency across congressional 
districts.  Some interests will have a local presence in each of the 435 districts, while 
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others will have a presence in very few.  Moreover, holding the overall size of any 
particular interest group constant, groups will also vary in how concentrated or dispersed 
this presence is within particular districts.  Some constituencies tied to particular interests 
will be largely concentrated within a few districts and sparsely present in many districts.  
Others will be more evenly dispersed across all of the districts where they have a local 
presence.  On the whole then, there is a dramatic amount of variation in where groups 
maintain a constituency presence across House districts.  This variation provides a new 
source of empirical data that is relevant to the search for answers about which interests 
have more control over the fate of their policy agendas as they flow through the 
legislative process.  With this in mind, one of the core objectives of this project will be to 
gain a better understanding of how interest groups generate allies in Congress via their 
unique spatial distribution across House districts. 
 
Potential for Theoretical Contribution to Our Knowledge of Group Influence 
There are a number of reasons why political scientists should think seriously 
about organized interests as constituents.  The most prominent is that this approach could 
make a strong contribution to current theories of interest group influence.  Scholars who 
study interest group influence on legislative behavior have offered two principal 
explanations for why organized interests might sway policy outcomes.  The first 
explanation is called exchange theory.  Exchange theory argues that organized interests 
contribute money to legislators and that this money causes legislators to advocate for 
their policy interests (Baumgartner and Leech 1998a; but see also Bronars and Lott 1997; 
Frendreis and Waterman 1985; Grenzke 1989; Langbein and Lotwis 1990; Stratmann 
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1991; Wawro 2001; Wilhite and Thielman 1987; Wright 1985).  The normative 
implication of exchange theory is that the legislative process is corrupt.  Organized 
interests who have the most money on any given policy will be more likely to win their 
desired outcome.   
The second explanation for group influence, offered by Hall and Deardorff 
(2006), views the majority of lobbying as a legislative subsidy to representatives with 
aligned policy interests.  They point out that because organized interests consistently 
approach legislative allies rather than trying to change the behavior of fence-sitters or 
opponents, exchange theory does not match the reality of how groups influence policy 
outcomes.  Instead Hall and Deardorff argue that groups subsidize the activity of their 
allies in Congress by offering the legislative resources needed to advocate for the group’s 
policy needs.  For example, groups may provide information about who is voting for or 
against a bill, they may give evidence in support of a policy position, or they may even 
write entire pieces of legislation.  Legislative subsidies to policy allies have the potential 
to increase a group’s influence over policy outcomes as the participation of allies is 
increased as a result of the group´s legislative assistance.   
The normative implications of the theory of lobbying as a legislative subsidy are 
less clear.  Policy outcomes may still be biased, but the level of bias depends on which 
groups can give policy-makers with similar policy goals the legislative resources 
necessary to advocate on their behalf.  The theory of lobbying as a legislative subsidy 
emphasizes the dyadic relationship between interest groups and particular legislative 
allies in Congress.  It argues that legislative participation will be increased for particular 
legislative allies to the extent that interest groups subsidize their effort by acting like 
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extended legislative staff.  An important question that this project will consider that is 
one step removed from Hall and Deardorff’s theory is, which organized interests are the 
most likely to gain allies in Congress prior to the act of lobbying?   
If some interests can recruit more legislative allies than others, then they are likely 
to be better represented in Congress, they will receive greater access to legislators, and 
they will thus be better positioned to gain leverage over legislative policy outcomes.  
Expanding our knowledge about whether some interests generate more allied legislators 
than others therefore has the potential to shift our understanding about group influence in 
substantial ways.  If we reconceive of organized interests as being part of each 
representative’s constituency as well as having a varied presence across districts, then the 
causal story and the empirical approach to analyzing interest group influence shifts.  
Rather than measuring the effects of campaign contributions or lobbying behavior on 
legislative activity, it becomes more important to study how constituency related factors 
influence the recruitment and collective mobilization of legislative allies.    
 
Group Influence Via Ally Generation and Mobilization: Three Key Research 
Questions 
 
 This goal of this project is to contribute to our knowledge about (1) how 
organized interests gain legislative allies, (2) what factors predict which interests will 
generate more legislative allies than others, and (3) whether some interests are better able 
to mobilize their allies towards effectively advocating for their policy agenda.  To this 
end, there are three questions that motivate the following chapters.   
The initial question that drives this project is whether the geographic distribution 
of a constituency relates to the number of allies that it is able to recruit.  This question 
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motivates several hypotheses that may influence ally generation.  First, groups may win 
more allies in Congress by maintaining a constituency presence in a larger number of 
House districts.  A large body of research finds that representatives will advocate strongly 
for constituent interests (Baldwin and Magee 2000; Cragg and Kahn 2009; Hall 1998; 
Hall and Wayman 1990; Hojnacki and Kimball 1998; Kingdon 1989; Welch 1982; 
Wright 1990).  Groups that are constituents in many districts should therefore win more 
allies than groups that are constituents in few districts.  Commercial banks are present in 
every district while industries involved in resource extraction (e.g., oil and gas, mining) 
are in substantially fewer districts.  Does variation in district presence matter? 
Second, the concentration or dispersion of a constituency within the districts 
where it is present may also affect ally recruitment.  Holding constant the number of 
districts where an interest group has a presence, groups can still demonstrate variation in 
how their members or employees are dispersed.  Fast food restaurants and department 
stores tend to be distributed fairly evenly across districts.  Other interests, such as heating 
oil dealers, have a concentrated presence in some districts and a sparse presence across 
many.  How does the concentration of a constituency within the districts where it has a 
local presence affect ally generation? 
A third factor that may affect the number of constituency motivated allies that a 
group generates is the extent to which it is geographically concentrated or dispersed.  
Contemporary work by political economists indicates that legislators advocate 
particularly strongly for economic sectors that are geographically concentrated in 
particular parts of the country (Busch and Reinhardt 1999, 2000, 2005).  Computer and 
cigarette manufacturers are located in a similar number of districts.  Yet cigarette 
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manufacturers are largely concentrated in Mid-Atlantic states like Virginia and North 
Carolina while computer manufacturers are spread more randomly across districts.  Does 
this kind of geographic concentration affect the number of allies that interests generate? 
Another question that may reveal important sources of ally variation is whether 
some types of constituents are more effective at recruiting legislative allies than others.  
Business interests have often been thought to have a “privileged place in the 
policymaking process” (Lindblom 1977).  Charles Lindblom (1977, 1982) has argued 
that business interests have greater leverage over policy outcomes because they control 
jobs and economic investment.  But the empirical evidence in support of this hypothesis 
has been mixed (Allen and Campbell 1994; Campbell and Allen 1994; Hicks and Swank 
1984; Jacobs 1988; Quinn 1988; Quinn and Shapiro 1991; Smith 1999, 2000).  The 
methodological focus in the body of work that tests theses for business influence has been 
on how national economic indicators, rather than local factors, relate to business 
advantage.  The literature has never studied business advantage through the lens of 
constituency representation.  It may be that business interests in the district are more 
likely than other types of interests to generate legislative allies because businesses have 
control over local jobs and economic investment.  This dissertation will therefore test the 
hypothesis that local business interests win systematically larger numbers of allies than 
nonbusiness interests. 
Local interests that are more politically active may also win more legislative 
allies.  Kristina Miler’s (2010) work indicates that interests in the district which actively 
contact their members of Congress are both more likely to be recognized by, and have 
their interests advocated for, by their representative.  She also found that interests that 
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donated more political money to their representative were more likely to be seen as 
constituents in the district.  Groups that are politically active in the district may therefore 
have an edge over politically disengaged local interests in ally generation.  As a result, 
this dissertation will also examine whether politically active interests secure more allies 
than other interests. 
The final research question that motivates this project is not concerned with the 
number of allies that interests generate.  Once groups recruit legislative allies they will 
still need to communicate their policy needs in ways that mobilize them toward effective 
legislative action.  One factor that is likely to affect how successful groups will be at 
mobilizing their allies is the nature of their policy agendas.  The nature of group policy 
agendas is particularly relevant as their allies choose which committees to request to 
better serve constituency interests. 
Committees have jurisdiction over clearly defined policy issue areas.  Some 
organized interests will have diverse policy agendas that span several major issue areas.  
Their policy agendas will therefore be under the jurisdiction of, and thus fragmented 
across, many committees.  Interests with narrow policy issue agendas, on the other hand, 
will focus on few major policy issue areas.  As a consequence, their policy agendas will 
flow through fewer committees.  Groups with narrow policy agendas will have clear 
information about the committees that they would like their legislative allies to request.  
They will find it much easier to provide clear and strong messages to their allies about 
which committees they wish them to join.  With a strong message about which 
committees to request, and with fewer committees to choose from, their allies will win 
comparatively better committee representation.  Thus this dissertation will also examine 
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how variation in the nature of organized interests’ policy agendas affects how well they 
are able to mobilize their allies toward effective policy advocacy. 
 
 
Testing a Theory of Group Influence Through Ally Generation: Unequal Allies and 
Interest Representation on House Committees 
  
The final important task before setting forth with this project is to choose an 
effective means of testing the potential effects that variation in constituency ally 
generation and mobilization will have on who wins and who loses in Congress.  If 
variation in constituency motivated legislative allies is central to the story of group 
influence, then we should observe evidence of its effects during the most important points 
in the legislative process.  Groups that recruit systematically larger numbers of allied 
legislators may receive increased advocacy for their policy needs when their allies 
introduce bills, when they build coalitions, when they take roll call votes, and when they 
advocate for the group on legislative committees.   
In selecting which point in the legislative process to analyze in this dissertation, 
my goal is to focus my empirical attention on the stage where interest groups will be the 
most likely to affect policy outcomes.  The bulk of the empirical literature focused on 
organized interests influence on roll call voting behavior (Bronars and Lott 1997; 
Frendreis and Waterman 1985; Grenzke 1989; Langbein and Lotwis 1990; Stratmann 
1991; Wawro 2001; Wilhite and Thielman 1987; Wright 1985).  However, this approach 
has been criticized because roll call votes take place after most of the important 
legislative work has already concluded (Hall 1996; Hall and Deardorff 2006; Powell 
2013).  This project centers its empirical attention instead on how variation in group 
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efficacy at recruiting and mobilizing legislative allies affects their representation on 
legislative committees.    
Recent interest group scholarship increasingly describes legislative committees as 
crucial to any theoretical explanation of group influence in Congress (Hall 1996; Hall and 
Deardorff 2006; Powell 2013).  Committees are where the majority of bills are written 
(Adler and Wilkerson 2008).  The preponderance of bills that become law are written by 
members of reporting committee members (Adler and Wilkerson 2008).  Committee 
members also have gatekeeping powers that other legislators lack (Baumgartner et al. 
2009).  The literature therefore suggests that groups with more allies on legislative 
committees will be better positioned to affect policy outcomes.   
Recent empirical work has further emphasized the importance of committee level 
allies to which interests win and which interests lose in the legislative process.  In a 
comprehensive study of nearly every type of resource that could affect policy outcomes 
Baumgartner et al. (2009) found that groups with more legislative allies on House 
committees were systematically more likely to win policy outcomes.  This was a novel, 
but puzzling finding in their study.  Financial resources did not have a clear relationship 
with policy outcomes, but groups with a larger number of allies on legislative committees 
did.  Building on this discovery, this project seeks to fill in the theoretical and empirical 
gaps that explain when some interests will win greater amounts of committee 
representation than others.  
Committee representation is, for these reasons, highly relevant to who wins and 
who loses in the legislative process.  Committees have jurisdiction over clearly defined 
policy issue areas.  To the extent that a group’s allies can win membership on the 
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committees of primary importance to their its needs, the group will be more likely to gain 
greater control over both the content of legislation it cares about and it will have 
increased gatekeeping power over whether bills move forward in the legislative process.  
Studying the factors that predict variation in committee representation will therefore offer 
a strong foundation for a theory of group influence via constituency motivated ally 
generation and mobilization. 
 
Overview and Organization of this Study 
Do some interest groups have greater leverage over the legislative process than 
others? A large body of interest group scholarship has tested the hypothesis that moneyed 
interests buy policy outcomes.  The collected findings of these studies have, however, 
been mixed (Baumgartner and Leech 1998a).  As such, they are unable to provide a 
strong empirical foundation for the assertion that some groups influence the legislative 
process more than others.  By contrast, a substantial number of studies have found that 
groups work primarily through their legislative allies in Congress (Bauer, Pool, and 
Dexter 1965; Baumgartner and Leech 1998b; Hall and Wayman 1990; Hall and 
Deardorff 2006; Hojnacki and Kimball 1998, 1999).  Building on these findings, this 
project emphasizes the importance of legislative allies to group influence.   The following 
chapters will set up a theoretical framework for and then test whether groups with more 
allies and groups that are more effective at mobilizing these allies are better represented 
on the committees of importance to their policy needs.    
Chapter two offers a theoretical framework for when we ought to expect 
constituency motivated ally generation and mobilization to influence interest 
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representation on House committees.  It begins with a review of the literature detailing 
what we know about interest groups and their allies in Congress.  It then builds a 
theoretical framework that explains when we ought to expect (1) that some interests will 
generate more allies than others and (2) that some interests will mobilize these allies 
toward more effective legislative advocacy than others.  And finally it lays out 
hypotheses that test when variation in constituency motivated ally generation and ally 
mobilization will affect variation in the representation organized interests receive on the 
committees of importance to their policy needs.   
Chapter three details how the data used to test the hypotheses set forth in chapter 
one were created; it describes the three major policy issue areas that are the focus of this 
study; and it explains which committees are examined in the project.  After identifying all 
the organized interests active in lobbying on three landmark laws in the 111th Congress 
(covering energy, financial regulation, and health care), I assemble an original database 
identifying how these interests are distributed across the 435 districts in the House of 
Representatives (as in, precisely where they have firms, employees, and members).  I 
then use bill referral data to determine the committees of primary jurisdiction for each 
major issue area studied.  Lastly, I present descriptive analysis to illuminate the variety of 
interests, and corresponding constituencies, examined in the analytical chapters of this 
study. 
Chapter four explores the geography of interest representation.  This chapter 
parses out precisely which types of constituency distributions are relevant to ally 
generation and its corresponding effects on interest representation on House committees.  
The number of districts where a group maintains a local presence, the unique 
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concentration of the constituency within the districts where it is located, and the 
geographic concentration (i.e.-spatial proximity) of the constituency are all measured 
against the number of allies a group generates and their corresponding effects on 
committee level representation. 
Chapter five examines whether some types of constituents are better than others at 
generating legislative allies and consequently winning more representation on the 
committees of importance to their policy needs.  This chapter, entitled Business 
Advantage and Interest Representation, offers empirical analysis testing whether business 
interests generate systematically more allies than nonbusiness interests.  In addition, this 
chapter tests the hypothesis that groups who are more politically active will generate a 
larger number of allies, which results in them receiving better representation on 
committees of interest to their policy needs. 
The final analytical chapter studies whether predictable variation exists in how 
effective groups are at mobilizing their allies toward policy advocacy.  Chapter six 
examines how variation in the nature of group policy agendas affects the behavior of 
allied legislators as they request committee membership.  This chapter tests whether 
groups with narrow policy issue agendas win more representation on committees of 
importance to their policy needs than interests with diverse policy agendas.  As 
previously discussed, my expectation is that the allies of interest groups with diverse 
policy issue agendas will be referred to multiple committees while the policies of interest 
to groups with narrow policy agendas will be referred to few committees.  As such, 
groups with narrow agendas will find it easier to communicate with their allies about 
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which committees to join.  And these interests are therefore likely to win systematically 
better committee representation. 
The project concludes with a chapter that summarizes the findings of this study 
and discusses what they mean for interest representation and the role that interests play in 
the legislative process.  Popular accounts hold that well-financed interests are able to buy 
policy outcomes in Congress.  The results presented here indicate that even in a world 
where politicians receive no contributions from moneyed interests there would still be a 
substantial amount of predictable bias towards some organized interests and against 
others.  Chapter seven concludes with a detailed discussion of both the theoretical and 




Chapter 2:  Group Influence via Constituency Representation: 
Rethinking Who Wins, Who Loses, and Why. 
 
 
Organized interests do not have direct control over the fate of their policy agendas 
in Congress.  They cannot introduce bills, vote on legislation, or serve on House 
committees.  If organized interests want to achieve virtually any of their legislative goals 
they must rely on and work through members of Congress.  As an interest group seeks to 
move its policy agenda forward in Congress, then, one of the most important challenges 
that it faces is the recruitment of effective legislative allies.  Legislative allies are 
members of Congress who “share the same policy objective as the group” and who use 
their limited time and resources to advocate for the policy needs of the group (Hall and 
Deardorff 2006, 76).  For all the financial resources that a group can bring to bear as it 
competes with other interests to win policy outcomes, it will be ineffective without the 
help of members of Congress who are willing to expend time and effort to advocate for 
its policy needs.    
Interest group scholarship has increasingly found that groups primarily work 
through their legislative allies in Congress (Bauer, Pool, and Dexter 1965; Baumgartner 
and Leech 1998b; Hall and Wayman 1990; Hall and Deardorff 2006; Hojnacki and 
Kimball 1998, 1999).  By comparison, we know almost nothing about whether some 
organized interests can recruit more legislative allies than others.  The following chapter 
lays out a theoretical framework that explains how allies are generated, when we should 
expect some interest groups to win more allies than others, and when some interests will 
be better positioned to mobilize these allies toward effective legislative action. 
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This chapter begins with a discussion about how the literature on group influence 
has evolved to emphasize the importance of legislative allies to the role that interest 
groups play in the legislative process.  After establishing that groups predominantly work 
with legislators who share mutual policy interests (Hall and Deardorff 2006), I offer an 
original theoretical framework describing both when we should expect some types of 
interests to generate more legislative allies than others and how interests vary in their 
capacity to mobilize these allies toward effective legislative advocacy.  I then set up tests 
of these theoretical expectations on variation in group representation during the stage in 
the legislative process which many scholars have argued is crucial to policy influence, 
legislative committees.   
While there are a number of pathways for groups to find legislative allies, I argue 
that constituency presence ought to be a reliable predictor for when some groups will 
gain more legislative allies than others.  The logic of constituency-motivated ally 
generation is simple.  Members seek to serve constituency interests in ways that help 
them win future elections (Mayhew 1974).  They have strong incentive to serve the 
policy needs of interests that have a local presence in their district.  Groups that have a 
constituency presence in a greater number of congressional districts will, consequently, 
generate more legislative allies.  And among interests that do have a presence in the 
constituency, interests that are more politically active or that possess greater control over 
local jobs and economic investment should also be more likely to generate allies.   
After groups recruit their allies, some interests may be more effective at 
mobilizing the advocacy of their allies.  When thinking through the possible causes for 
systematic differences in group effectiveness at ally mobilization, one key factor stands 
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out: variation in the nature of group policy agendas.  The nature of a group’s agenda is 
particularly important to how effective it will be at mobilizing its allies toward effective 
advocacy as its agenda flows through legislative committees.  Committees have 
jurisdiction over targeted policy issue areas.  And interest groups will vary in the number 
of major policy issue areas that are on their policy agendas.  Depending on the shape of 
an interest group’s policy issue agenda, then, its legislative priorities will be referred to 
many committees or few.  Interests with diverse policy agendas that include many policy 
issue areas will find that their agenda is fragmented across many different congressional 
committees.  As a consequence, their allies will have unclear information about which 
committee to join to best serve the needs of the group such they request and receive 
membership on many different committees.  Consequently, variation in the nature of 
group policy agendas should therefore predict which interests are better positioned to 
mobilize allied legislators toward effective policy advocacy for their mutual policy goals. 
The presence of interests across House districts, the fact that they have control 
over local jobs or are more politically active, and the nature of their policy agendas make 
up several testable causal factors that have the potential to affect the number of allies they 
will generate in Congress, as well as their allies’ capacity to advance favored policy 
outcomes.   
After reviewing the literature and building a broad theoretical framework that 
explains both when we should expect some interests to generate more allies than others 
and when some interests will be better able to mobilize the advocacy of their allies, I then 
apply this framework to predict variation in group representation at a key stage of the 
legislative process, congressional committees. While group variation in legislative allies 
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may affect their representation in important ways at other stages of the legislative 
process, the demonstrable evidence indicates that committee representation is particularly 
relevant to group influence (Adler and Wilkerson 2008; Baumgartner et al. 2009; Hall 
and Deardorff 2006; Hall and Wayman 1990; Miler 2010).     
Committees are where bills are shaped (Hall and Wayman 1990).  Committees 
also have gatekeeping powers such that they can restrict which bills move forward in the 
legislative process (Adler and Wilkerson 2008; and Baumgartner et al. 2009).  Recent 
work also indicates that committee level allies are vital to who wins and who loses in the 
policymaking process.  Groups with more committee level allies win systemically greater 
policy influence (Baumgartner et al. 2009).  While recent interest group scholarship 
indicates that groups with more committee representation will have greater leverage over 
policy outcomes, we know little about the factors that might predict when some interests 
will gain more committee representation than others. 
The final section of this chapter applies the theory of constituency motivated ally 
generation and ally mobilization to predict systematic variation in the amount of 
representation that particular groups receive on House committees.  It begins by 
highlighting the importance of committee level representation to group influence in 
Congress.  It then lays out detailed hypotheses for when we should expect ally generation 
and ally mobilization to affect the amount of representation that interests receive on the 
committees of importance to their policy needs. 
 
The Importance of Legislative Allies to Our Understanding of Group Influence 
The empirical work on group influence offers a mixed set of results and often 
counterintuitive conclusions.  Popular accounts of special interests tend to highlight the 
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relationship between campaign contributions and legislative advocacy in Congress.  The 
empirical work on group influence, however, tells a much different story.  In parallel with 
the popular concern that special interests exchange money for legislative favors, the 
hypothesis that money buys votes in Congress has been tested by over 35 studies 
(Baumgartner and Leech 1998a; Smith 1995).  This is an exceptionally large number of 
studies for a single hypothesis in any subfield of American politics.  The results of these 
studies have been labeled as inconsistent and mixed at best (Baumgartner and Leech 
1998a).  Some studies conclude that political action committee (PAC) contributions 
affect legislative voting behavior (Frendreis and Waterman 1985; Langbein and Lotwis 
1990; Stratmann 1991; 1995; Wilhite and Thielman 1987), while other studies find little 
or no support for the vote-buying hypothesis (Bronars and Lott 1997; Grenzke 1989; 
Wawro 2001; Wright 1985). 
Perhaps the most damning summary of the evidence against the theory that moneyed 
interests buy salient legislative behavior has been put forth by Richard Hall and his 
coauthors (Hall and Deardorff 2006; Hall and Wayman 1990).  Hall and his coauthors 
reasoned that the evidence runs contrary to the money-buys-votes hypothesis for two 
principal reasons.  First, the total amount of money that PACs give members of Congress 
is too small to realistically “buy” behavior.  In one study interests were found to alter 
voting behavior by increasing campaign contributions to legislators by a few hundred 
dollars (Stratmann 1998).  Second, organized interests primarily donate to members of 
Congress who were already likely to have similar policy objectives (Brownars and Lott 
1997; Grenzke 1989; Grier and Munger 1986, 1991; Hall and Wayman 1990; Witko 
2006).  Giving to one’s legislative allies rather than to undecided members or those with 
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a position adverse to one’s favored policy positions does not comport well with a theory 
that organized interests use campaign contributions in efforts to induce legislators to 
change their behavior. 
Reinforcing these patterns in campaign contributions, other studies have found 
that organized interests advance their goals primarily by working through their legislative 
allies.  Bauer, Pool, and Dexter (1965) found that interests often provided assistance to 
legislators who were predisposed to advocate for their policy goals.  Hojnacki and 
Kimball (1998, 1999) established that when organizations lobby committee members, 
they primarily target allies with mutual policy interests.  Additionally, Hall and Wayman 
(1990) demonstrated that interests who contributed to the members of House committees 
with similar policy goals could affect the level of effort the legislator put into 
participating on a given bill.  Kingdon (1989) and Denzau and Munger (1986) also point 
out that groups rely on their allies in Congress.  More recent work finds that one of the 
few predictors of systematic policy success for organized interests is the number of mid-
level allies (e.g.-legislators on House Committees, particularly ranking members and 
committee and subcommittee chairs) that they have (Baumgartner et al. 2009).  The 
empirical work therefore offers a substantial amount of evidence that organized interests 
predominantly achieve their goals by working through their existing allies in Congress.  
With mixed evidence for the hypothesis that campaign contributions change 
legislative behavior and a growing number of studies pointing out that groups work 
through their allies in Congress, scholars put forth and debated new explanations of the 
ways that groups may influence the legislative process.  Organized interests are thought 
to work through legislators with mutual policy interests because organized interests have 
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policy expertise and legislators require information to make policy decisions (Austen-
Smith and Wright 1992, 1994); because it is extraordinarily difficult for interest groups to 
get attention for most policy issues, so interests must work through motivated policy 
champions to build momentum for their legislative agendas (Baumgartner et al. 2009; 
Mahoney and Baumgartner 2015; DeGregorio 1997; and Hall and Deardorff 2006); and 
because interests can increase advocacy for allied legislators by acting as extended staff 
or service bureaus (Bauer, Pool, and Dexter 1965; Hall and Deardorff 2006).   
 
Interest Groups Work Through Their Legislative Allies in Congress 
Extending upon a number of these explanations, Hall and Deardorff’s (2006) 
theory of lobbying as a legislative subsidy offered a detailed model that accounts for the 
tangled complexity of mixed empirical findings in the interest group literature.  They 
argue that groups sometimes attempt to persuade legislators to change their voting 
behavior through the exchange of contributions or information, but this behavior is 
relatively rare.  Instead, interest groups primarily work through legislators in Congress 
who are the most likely to advocate for their policy needs.   
Further, they emphasize that the policy agenda in Congress is not limitless.  
Members of Congress have a limited amount of time and resources to dedicate to a subset 
of issues.  It is therefore exceedingly difficult for any group to get members to pay 
attention to their policy needs, much less to spend time advocating for their policy 
positions.  A fruitful strategy for most groups, then, is to bolster the advocacy of 
legislators who have mutual policy goals.  In line with Bauer, Pool, and Dexter’s (1965) 
view that interests act as service bureaus to legislative allies, Hall and Deardorff describe 
26 
 
interest group lobbying behavior as an attempt to increase legislative advocacy for their 
policy agendas by subsidizing the effort of their allies in Congress.  Groups can subsidize 
the effort of their natural allies in Congress by offering policy expertise, writing 
speeches, amendments, or entire pieces of legislation, and assisting with coalition 
building, among other actions.    
Legislative allies are therefore clearly central to the policy endeavors of most 
organized interests.  Recent work has even argued that “virtually all of the applications of 
other sorts of resources are made in an effort to increase an organization’s supply of these 
allies” (Leech et al. 2007).  Yet for all the studies that point out the importance of allies in 
Congress, we know very little about (1) how organized interests recruit legislative allies, 
(2) whether some interests generate a larger pool of legislative allies than others, and (3) 
whether interests with a larger number of legislative allies receive stronger advocacy for 
their policy agendas than groups with fewer allies in Congress.  Further, we also have 
little knowledge about the mobilization of allies after they are recruited.  It may be that 
some interests will be more effective at mobilizing the advocacy of their allies than 
others.   
One way we might gain new empirical leverage over the question of group 
influence is therefore to examine whether some interests are better than others at 
recruiting legislative allies prior to the act of lobbying.  Scholars have demonstrated that 
legislative allies are at the center of interests’ policy endeavor, but we know little about 
how allies are generated before lobbying takes place.  It is possible that some interests 
generate systematically larger numbers of legislative allies than others.  If some interests 
consistently have greater numbers of legislative allies advocating for their policy goals in 
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Congress, then they may have an advantage in the legislative process over and above 
other groups. 
 
Interest Groups and their Natural Allies in Congress 
Hall and Deardorff (2006, 76) define legislative allies as members of Congress 
who “share the same policy objective as the group” and who use their limited time and 
resources to advocate for the policy needs of the group.  They also argue that organized 
interests will subsidize the effort of legislators who are likely to be the strongest 
advocates of their policy needs.  From the perspective of an organized interest, then, they 
should seek to recruit members of Congress who will be the most likely to take action in 
support of mutual policy objectives.   
Building on Hall and Deardorff (2006) and Hojnacki and Kimball (1998, 1999) I 
expect interest groups to target potential legislative allies based on the likelihood that 
they will act to move the group’s policy agenda forward in Congress.  Members of 
Congress have been found to take action in support of specific policies for three primary 
reasons: to support their party, to advocate for their ideological beliefs, and in support of 
constituents.  Along with party and ideology, scholars have underscored the importance 
of constituency preferences to roll call voting, agenda setting, coalition building, and 
committee level behavior. (See selected studies by Evans 2004; Hall and Wayman 1990; 
Kingdon 1984; Miler 2010; Welch 1982.)  Interest groups are also constituents.  Given 
that legislators will advocate particularly strongly for their constituents, the constituency 
connections that groups maintain ought to be highly relevant as they seek out new 
legislative allies to advocate for their policy needs.  
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Constituency Presence, Mutual Policy Goals, and Ally Generation 
Hojnacki and Kimball’s (1998) work highlights the importance of constituency 
presence to ally generation.  Their research indicates that the strongest predictor of whom 
interests lobby on House committees is whether the interest has ties to a member’s 
district.  Interests with ties to the district are over twice as likely as interests without a 
constituency connection to lobby committee members.  Because constituency related 
factors are central to whom interest groups choose to lobby, I expect to find that district 
ties are particularly important to ally generation in Congress. 
Constituency presence has consistently been found to increase legislative activity 
at varied points in the legislative process (Baldwin and Magee 2000; Cragg and Kahn 
2009; Hall 1998; Hall and Wayman 1990; Hojnacki and Kimball 1998; Welch 1982; 
Wright 1990).  Given the abundance of findings that underline the effect of constituency 
presence on legislative behavior, when organized interests have a local presence in a 
district they should expect to receive stronger legislative advocacy from the district’s 
representative.  Interests with a presence in the district should therefore find it much 
easier to generate an ally in, and receive advocacy from, a district’s representative than 
interests with no district presence.   
Mayhew’s (1974) much-cited electoral motive explains why local interests will 
find it easier to recruit an ally in, and receive policy advocacy from, their representatives.  
Mayhew reasons that legislators will work for the policy needs of constituents to ensure 
that they win future elections (but see also Arnold 1990; Fiorina 1974; Hall 1996; and 
Kingdon 1989).  Legislators actively communicate work on behalf of constituency 
interests to future voters by taking policy positions, advertising success, avoiding blame, 
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and seeking out ways to claim credit (Hall 1996; and Mayhew 1974).  Legislators are also 
thought to advocate for constituent policy needs in ways that make policy success 
traceable to voters in the district (Arnold 1990).  Organized interests who have a presence 
in the district are therefore more likely to win advocacy from, and recruit an ally in, their 
representative because these legislators are primed by the electoral motive to attend to 
their policy needs.     
 
Unequal Allies and Constituency Representation in Congress 
 With legislators motivated to advocate for organized interests in their districts, 
constituency presence is likely to be critical to the recruitment of effective legislative 
allies.  Viewing ally generation through the lens of constituency representation therefore 
has the potential to offer a substantial amount of insight into the role that groups play in 
the legislative process.  As groups gain more legislative allies as a result of having a local 
presence in more districts, they may also gain representational advantages in Congress.  
This section introduces four broad expectations that build a foundation for a number of 
new hypotheses about how groups gain representation in the legislative process.  It begins 
with a discussion of precisely when we should expect some interests to generate more 
constituency-motivated legislative allies than others.  After detailing how groups 
systematically vary in ally generation, it then discusses how the nature of an interest 
group’s agenda can also affect its ability to harness the advocacy of legislative allies.   
District Presence and Ally Generation.  When should we expect interests to vary 
in the number of constituency-motivated allies that they generate?  First, organized 
interests who have a local presence in a given district will be more likely to gain an ally 
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in the district’s representative than interests without a local presence, all else being equal.  
Moreover, as the number of districts where an interest has local presence increases, we 
should also expect them to generate a larger pool of legislative allies.  Organized interests 
demonstrate wide variation in how they are distributed across the 435 House districts.  
Some interests will have a local presence in many districts, while others will have a local 
presence in few districts.  Interests with a local presence in more districts should, as a 
result, generate a larger number of allies than interests with a local presence in fewer 
districts.  
Politically Mobilized Interests in the District and Ally Generation.  Organized 
interests that have a local presence in more districts should generate a larger pool of 
legislative allies, but there is also reason to expect that some types of constituencies are 
more effective at winning advocacy for their policy needs from their representatives than 
others.  Districts are not composed of monolithic constituencies (Fenno 1978; and Miler 
2010).  Rather, multiple constituencies (or subconstituencies) exist within each district.  
The amount of representation that a given subconstituency receives depends in large part 
on the interests that the legislator “sees” in the district (Fenno 1978; Hall 1996; and Miler 
2010).  Miler (2010) argues that interests who are more politically mobilized in the 
district will be more likely to be recognized as constituents by their representatives and 
their staff.  She finds that within the district, interests who either contact their legislator 
more frequently or contribute more to their representative’s campaign coffers receive 
systematically stronger representation than other local interests.  In line with Miler’s 
findings, I expect to find evidence that politically mobilized subconstituencies will 
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generate a systematically larger number of allies than interests that are less politically 
active. 
 Business Interests in the District and Ally Generation.  Charles Lindblom’s 
(1977, 1982) work offers a second hypothesis for another distinct subset of interests that 
may be better positioned to receive legislative advocacy from their representatives.  The 
foundation of his argument rests on the control that business interests have over jobs and 
economic investment.  He reasons that because voters care about the economy and 
representatives wish to win future elections, members of Congress are likely to work 
particularly hard on behalf of local business interests.  Lindblom’s thesis has been tested 
multiple times using national indicators to mixed results (Allen and Campbell 1994; 
Campbell and Allen 1994; Hicks and Swank 1984; Jacobs 1988; Quinn 1988; Quinn and 
Shapiro 1991; Smith 1999, 2000).  However, no studies currently exist that have 
examined whether local business interests are better represented than nonbusiness 
interests in Congress.   
 Following Lindblom’s hypothesis I expect to find that, within a given district, 
local business interests will be more likely to generate political advocacy from, and 
become legislative allies with, their representative than nonbusiness interests.  Given 
business’s advantages in recruiting legislative allies, I also expect to find evidence that 
business interests will have a systematically larger pool of legislative allies than 
nonbusiness interests, which will translate into better representation in Congress. 
 Interest Group Policy Agendas and the Effectiveness of Legislative Allies.  The 
number of allies that an interest can generate is likely to affect how well it is represented 
in Congress.  But once an interest’s pool of legislative allies is set, other factors may 
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influence how effectively its allies are able to advocate for its agenda.  The scope of an 
interest’s policy agenda may be narrow with a focus on a limited number of policy issue 
areas.  Or it could be diverse, encompassing several different types of policy.  When 
organized interests communicate their policy needs to their legislative allies, groups with 
narrow policy agendas should find it easier to focus the time and resources of their 
legislative allies on their agenda than interests with diverse policy agendas.  Legislative 
allies who are asked to advocate on behalf of such diverse policy issue areas as finance, 
taxes, trade, and healthcare policy will need to split time and resources across multiple 
issues.  They are likely to find it more difficult to advocate effectively on any one issue 
by joining committees of importance to the issue, gaining expertise on the issue, building 
effective coalitions, and lobbying for advocacy from other allies. 
 In contrast, interests that have narrow policy agendas are better able to focus the 
time, energy, and resources of their legislative allies to more effectively advocate for the 
policy needs of the group. These legislators should find it easier to join the committees of 
primary importance to the interest’s policy needs.  They may also be better able to build 
coalitions with other legislators through their increased experience working on a limited 
subset of policy areas.  After controlling for an interest group’s number of legislative 
allies, I therefore expect other factors, such as the nature of the group’s policy agenda, to 
affect the policy advocacy it receives in Congress. 
 
 
Unequal Allies and Interest Representation on House Committees 
 The above sections outline a broad theoretical framework for when we should 
expect some interests to generate more allies than others.  This section will apply the 
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same framework to explain how unequal allies can affect systematic variation in interest 
representation on House committees.  Variation in ally generation is likely to affect 
interest representation at many points of the legislative process.  Groups that generate 
systematically larger numbers of legislative allies ought to see greater advocacy than 
groups with fewer allies as these allies introduce bills, make speeches in Congress, 
participate on Committees, and build coalitions.  Among these many potential points to 
examine the effects of unequal ally generation, it makes sense to begin with a study of the 
effects of unequal ally generation on interest representation on House committees for a 
few important reasons.   
First, many interest group scholars have argued that committees need attention 
because they have a larger effect on policy outcomes than other stages of the legislative 
process (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Hall and Wayman 1990, 1996; and Powell 2013).  
Adler and Wilkerson’s (2008) work underscores this assertion.  In a study of the power of 
committees to set agendas Adler and Wilkerson demonstrate that “a mere 1% of bills 
circumvent (the committee) process.”  And that “members of the committee of referral 
sponsor about 80% of the bills that their committee reports, and these bills have about an 
80% chance of passing the chamber, compared to a 7% chance of passage for bills in 
general” (Adler and Wilkerson 2008, 33, but see also Adler et al. 2003).  Committees 
therefore play a strong role in devising much of the final content of bills, and they also 
have substantial gatekeeping power over the policy agendas under their jurisdiction. 
The second reason why it is important to study interest representation on House 
committees is that the legislative allies serving on the committees most important to an 
interest’s agenda are more likely than other allied lawmakers to actually influence policy 
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outcomes (Baumgartner et al. 2009).  Baumgartner et al. (2009) demonstrated that 
lobbying organizations with more committee level allies are more likely to win legislative 
benefits.  Interest groups are often “not strong enough by themselves to force a proposal 
onto the agenda of a committee or agency” (2009, 245).   Baumgartner et al. suggest that 
the importance of committee level allies to group leverage in the legislative process is at 
least partly due to the gatekeeping powers of committees.  The interests in their study 
reported that a major obstacle to policy success was “active opposition from committee 
chairs, ranking members, and regular committee members” (2009, 81).   
Further, Baumgartner et al. found that “having mid-level government allies 
(subcommittee and committee chairmen in Congress, or department-level officials in an 
agency) helped a side get the policy outcome it sought in three of the four types of 
outcome measures” (2009, 206).  These findings are further bolstered by Miler’s finding 
that “committee membership and committee leadership significantly increase legislative 
participation in the policy-making debate” (2010, 128).  Interest groups who gain 
committee level allies are therefore well-positioned to win more policy outcomes over 
and above interests who lack this resource.   
Finally, it is important to examine the committee stage of the legislative process 
because there is simply no work that has directly studied whether, in a representative 
sample of interests that lobby an issue area, some interests are better represented than 
others on House committees.  The literature studying the composition of committees has 
largely focused on a set of research questions that examine how and why the committee 
system was created.  Within this academic debate some scholars have argued that 
committees are organized to subset Congress into groups of legislators who are the most 
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knowledgeable about a policy issue area in part to more efficiently move policy through 
the legislative process (Krehbiel 1990, 1992).  Others have argued that committees are 
organized to help members get reelected and to maintain the party brand (Cox and 
McCubins 2007).  Still others have found evidence that members of Congress often 
request committees in order to serve constituents such that they will be better positioned 
to win future elections (Adler 2000, 2002; Adler and Lapinski 1997; Shepsle 1978; 
Shepsle and Weingast 1987).       
Within the varied explanations for the legislative organization of committees, the 
literature studying the importance of the electoral motive to committee organization 
offers the strongest foundation for an explanation of how constituency-motivated allies 
might influence interest representation.  Adler and Lapinski (1997) argue, for example, 
that members often self-select onto committees that help them get elected in future 
elections.  To this end, legislators will request and gain membership onto committees that 
allow them to claim credit in their districts for policy advocacy in support of local 
constituencies (Adler 2000, 2002; and Adler and Lapinski 1997).  And this self-selection 
process causes some committees to be unrepresentative of the full democratically elected 
House membership.  As such, these authors argue that these committees may skew policy 
away from the desires of the full House membership and towards the constituency 
motivated desires of a subset of legislators.  This literature finds pervasive evidence that 
committees are often composed of “preference outliers,” meaning that committees are 
disproportionately composed of members with a strong constituency stake in the policies 
over which the committee has jurisdiction.  While Adler and Lapinski and others argue 
that electoral motives affect the composition of House committees, this is the first study 
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to examine which interests win and which interests lose representation as their legislative 
allies self-select on to committees of interest to their policy needs.   
In other words, this project looks at the composition of congressional committees 
from the vantage point of societal interests.  Which types of interests are more likely to 
be overrepresented in the districts of members serving on congressional committees?  To 
say that a committee is “overrepresented” means that the interest has a markedly stronger 
presence in the constituencies of a committee’s members than it does in the 
constituencies represented in Congress generally.  Meanwhile, which interests fail to be 
represented in the districts of members serving on their key committees?  In the analyses 
that follow, I am particularly interested in discovering which interests are overrepresented 
in the districts of members serving on important House committees, such as Energy and 
Commerce, Financial Services, and Natural Resources. 
 
Predicting the Effects of Variation in Ally Generation on Interest Representation on 
House Committees 
 Members of the House request committees to gain prestige, to advance for their 
policy goals, and to advocate for constituency interests (Adler 2000, 2002; Adler and 
Lapinski 1997; Deering and Smith 1997; Fenno 1978; Maltzmann 1998).  This section 
extends upon Adler and Lapinksi’s (1997) reasoning that members often request 
committees to better represent constituency interests.  As the constituency-motivated 
legislative allies of particular interests request membership on committees, I expect that 
some interests will be over or under-represented on committees relative to their presence 
in House districts more generally.  This section uses the theory of constituency-motivated 
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ally generation to construct several hypotheses that predict when groups will demonstrate 
systematic variation in the committee representation they receive. 
 Organized interests that have a presence in more districts should generate a larger 
number of legislative allies than interests in fewer districts.  Interests with a large number 
of allied legislators requesting membership on committees of importance to their policy 
needs will also win comparatively greater levels of committee representation.  
Conversely, organized interests who generate fewer legislative allies will have fewer 
legislators requesting committees of importance to their policy agendas and will win 
fewer committee level allies.  Therefore, I expect to find evidence in support of the 
hypothesis that as an interest’s district presence increases, it is also likely to become 
overrepresented on key House committees compared to its presence in House 
constituencies generally. 
Hypothesis 1: As an interest’s constituency presence in the 435 Congressional 
districts increases, it is more likely to be overrepresented on key House 
committees relative to its presence in congressional districts generally. 
 Within the district some types of constituencies will be more likely to elicit policy 
advocacy from their representatives than others. Two categories of constituencies are 
more likely than others to generate a larger number of allies: politically active local 
interests and local business interests.  Interests that contact their legislators in person or 
via the telephone, mail, or email are more likely to be salient and seen by their legislator.  
Interests also become more salient to their representatives by donating to their electoral 
campaigns or by lobbying them directly.  Constituents must be perceived before their 
interests can be advocated for (Miler 2010).  Thus, I expect to find evidence that local 
interests who are more politically active will, on average, generate a larger pool of 
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constituency-motivated allies in Congress.  And with a larger pool of allies requesting 
membership on committees of importance to their policy needs, these interests ought to 
win stronger levels of committee representation. 
Hypothesis 2: Politically active constituencies are more likely to be 
overrepresented on key House committees compared to constituencies that 
are not politically active. 
Local business interests will also have an edge over other interests in the district 
at receiving advocacy from their representatives.  Representatives care about jobs and 
economic investment in their districts.  Because local business interests have leverage 
over local jobs and investment, congressional representatives are likely to pay special 
attention to and often prioritize the policy needs of local business interests.  
Consequently, business interests will generate a larger pool of constituency-motivated 
legislative allies than nonbusiness interests.  And with a larger number of allies 
requesting membership onto committees with jurisdiction over their policy needs, 
business interests should receive comparatively more representation. 
Hypothesis 3: Business constituencies are more likely to be overrepresented 
key House committees than nonbusiness constituencies. 
 Lastly, after generating a pool of legislative allies in Congress, interests will vary 
in their effectiveness at communicating their policy agendas to allied legislators.  For 
interests that have narrow policy agendas limited to a handful of policy issue areas, their 
allied legislators will have clear information about the issues where they should focus 
their time and resources.  However, for interests that have diverse policy agendas, it will 
be more difficult to corral their allied legislators toward specific policy goals.  Their 
legislative allies’ time and resources may be split among several policy areas and as a 
result, these interests will receive less effective policy advocacy.   
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 Committee jurisdictions structure which committees consider bills under whole 
policy issue areas.  For interests with diverse policy agendas, then, their legislative 
agenda will be more likely to be fragmented across a larger number of committees.  
Allied legislators will thus face more complicated decisions about which committees to 
request.  Because multiple committees are relevant to the interest’s policy needs, their 
legislative allies will request varied committees and the interest will have fewer allies on 
any one committee.  Interests with narrow policy agendas will therefore have a larger 
number of allies requesting membership on fewer committees.  And, consequently, they 
will be more likely to receive better representation on committees of interest to their 
policy needs. 
Hypothesis 4: Organized interests with narrow policy agendas are more 
likely to be overrepresented on important House committees than organized 
interests with diverse policy agendas. 
Conclusion 
This chapter offers a fresh theoretical perspective on who wins, who loses, and 
why in the legislative process.  It has presented a new foundation for group influence that 
is centered on predictable variation in the number of constituency-motivated allies that 
groups generate. Interest groups are also constituents.  Legislators advocate particularly 
strongly for constituent interests because they are motivated to win future elections 
(Mayhew 1974).  Representatives will naturally ally with interest groups who have a 
local presence in their district.  As such, as the number of districts where an interest has a 
constituency presence increases, the number of natural policy allies that they have in 
Congress who advocate for mutual policy interests should also increase.  Groups that 
have more legislative allies in Congress will be better situated to gain advantages over 
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groups with fewer allies in access to legislators, in the amount of advocacy for their 
policy agendas that they receive in Congress, and in the amount of representation that 
they receive at key points in the legislative process.   
With a host of new hypotheses in hand, the following chapters develop an original 
dataset and then systematically test whether (1) groups with a local presence in more 
districts win greater numbers of allies and consequently become better represented on 
House committees, (2) whether some types of constituencies generate more allies than 
others such that they are better represented on House committees, and (3) after an 
interest’s pool of allies are set, whether groups with narrow policy agendas can more 
effectively focus the advocacy of their legislative allies such that they become better 
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Constituency representation matters to our knowledge about who wins and who 
loses in the legislative process because constituency presence is likely to affect the 
number of legislative allies that groups have in Congress.  As such, knowledge about 
constituency representation may be an important missing piece of the group influence 
puzzle.  This chapter takes several essential steps toward building the datasets necessary 
to analyze the argument that constituency motivated ally generation and mobilization 
causes some interests to become better represented at key points of the legislative process 
than others.   
The following sections describe the context of the study, the issue areas 
examined, and how the constituencies were identified that will be used to test the 
hypotheses set forth in all analytical chapters in this project.  The chapter begins with a 
discussion of the three issue areas that are the focus of this study and it explains why they 
offer a conservative test for the effects of constituency motivated ally generation and 
mobilization on variation in how groups are represented on committee representation.  
The second section lays out the process of creating samples of interests to study under 
each issue area.  After the samples of interests have been identified, the third section 
describes the data used to measure constituency presence for these interests across House 
districts.  In section four, I determine the committees of primary jurisdiction over each 
issue area studied.  And lastly, I detail the substantial amount of variation in interest 
representation that exists for each committee studied. 
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A Conservative Context to Test Group Influence: Salient Issues in an Anti-Business 
Congress 
 
The three bills and the corresponding issue areas analyzed in this chapter are all 
landmark legislation enacted by the 111th Congress (2009-10): the Dodd–Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (H.R. 4173), the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (H.R. 3590), and the American Clean Energy and Security Act 
(H.R. 2454).  Each of these bills encompasses major, highly salient policy issues.  Prior 
scholarship has shown that as bills become more salient more groups will engage the 
policy debate.  Group competition for policy outcomes consequently tends to become 
more intense (Baumgartner and Leech 2001; Baumgartner et al. 2009; Caldeira et al. 
2000; Collins 2007; Hansford 2004; Hojnacki and Kimball 1998; 1999; Holyoke 2009; 
Mahoney 2008; Smith 2000; Strolovitch 2006; Witko 2006).  A competitive environment 
thus makes it more difficult for particular groups to influence policy outcomes (Collins 
2007; Mahoney 2008; Smith 2000; Witko 2006).  Given the expansive number of interest 
groups involved in each of these bills, they collectively offer a tough proving ground for 
identifying advantaged and disadvantaged groups in the legislative process.  Based on the 
prior scholarship, policy issues that are narrower and less salient would offer better 
opportunities for group influence than do the kind of broad, highly salient issues 
addressed in these three major legislative enactments.  
 The political environment when these bills were considered also presents a 
conservative context to demonstrate evidence of business influence.  Following in the 
immediate wake of the 2008 financial crisis, the public mood, as well as that prevailing in 
Congress, was more skeptical of business than usual. .  In American Business and Public 
Power Smith (2000) argues that business interests should be disadvantaged to the extent 
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that their issues are salient to the public and the public mood is against them. The issue 
areas examined in this chapter were highly salient and were considered during one of the 
strongest anti-business environments since the Great Depression.   
Survey data consistently support the assertion that the 2009-2010 legislative 
sessions took place during a time with strong anti-business public opinion.  In an annual 
Gallup poll Americans were asked the question, “Would you like to see major 
corporations have more influence in this nation, less influence, or keep their influence as 
it is now?”  Nearly seven of ten Americans, the largest anti-business response over the 
eleven year period of the survey, said that major corporations should have less influence 
(Jones 2015).  The American public has also been asked whether they trust big business 
in annual surveys since 1973.  In 2009, the first year of the 111
th
 Congress, public trust in 
big business was at its lowest point since the question was first surveyed (Jones 2015).   
The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (H.R. 4173), 
known simply as Dodd-Frank, was the legislative response to the financial crisis of late 
2008.  After the mortgage-related banking collapse, the public had less confidence in the 
 
Figure 3.1:  Percent of Public Who Think That Major 
Corporations Should Have Less Political Influence 
Note: Each January Gallup asked respondents whether corporations 





banking industry than at any time over the last three decades.  Gallup has polled whether 
respondents had confidence in particular institutions since for over three decades.  In the 
first year of the 111
th
 Congress the public had less confidence in banks as an institution 
than at any point over the thirty years that the question has been polled (Jones 2015).  
Polling numbers are similar for institutions related to the healthcare system.  The Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (H.R. 3590), which came to be known as Obamacare, 
was highly salient and politically polarizing, and it also passed during a climate that was 
distinctly unfriendly to health-related economic sectors like health maintenance 
organizations and the health insurance industry.  Consistent with the anti-business polling 
data above, public trust for health maintenance organizations (HMOs) as an institution 
were at their lowest levels since Gallup started polling HMO trust in 1999.    
The financial collapse of 2008 was a key factor in the election of strong majorities 
of Democrats to the House and Senate.  The public mood was anti-business largely as a 
result of the crash of the finance industry.  Because the public mood was strongly anti-
business during 2009 and 2010 when these bills were introduced and debated, and 
because Democrats won large majorities in both the House and the Senate, Smith’s work 
indicates that we should expect no business advantage (or perhaps even business 
disadvantage) over other groups as these bills progressed through the policy-making 
process. Therefore both the context of the 111
th
 Congress and the salience of the bills 
studied below are likely to provide conservative tests for any analysis of interest-group 





Identifying the Constellation of Interests with Policy Concerns Before Congress 
Related to Each Issue Area  
 
In this section, I explain how I identified groups active in lobbying in the issue 
areas addressed by these three pieces of legislation.  Once all these groups were 
identified, I then calculated each interest’s presence in all congressional districts across 
the United States.  To clarify the process, I first lay out the steps taken to create the list of 
groups studied in table 3.1, and then I discuss each of these steps in greater detail below.   
Table 3.1:   
Process for Identifying the Interests Concerned with these Policy Areas: 
 
1. Identify broad issue areas for each of the three bills and then pull all the 
bills introduced in the 111
th 
Congress under each of these issue areas.   
2. Identify all organizations that lobbied on each bill for each issue area. 
3. Link these organizations to the constituency interests present in 
congressional constituencies and then calculate measures of the presence 
of these interests within each congressional district. 
Step 1. Identify broad issue areas for each of the three bills and then pull all 
bills introduced in the 111
th
Congress under each of these issue areas.  The 
Congressional Bills Project is a relatively new source of data for Congressional scholars 
(Adler and Wilkerson 2013; see also Adler and Wilkerson 2008; Hillard et al. 2008; 
Sulkin 2011).  It is a comprehensive dataset of all introduced bills, and it includes a 
wealth of variables describing each bill.  Most importantly for this project, the 
Congressional Bills Project categorizes bills by issue area.  The Dodd–Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (H.R. 4173) is listed under the issue category 
“1501: U.S. Banking System and Financial Institution Regulation”; the Patient Protection 
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and Affordable Care Act (H.R. 3590) is under the issue category “301: Comprehensive 
Health Care Reform”; and The American Clean Energy and Security Act (H.R. 2454) is 
under the issue category “803: Natural Gas and Oil (Including Offshore Oil and Gas)”.  
Using these categories, I was then able to identify all bills in the 111th Congress that 
dealt with each of these issue areas. 
Step 2:  Create database with all organizations that lobbied on each bill for 
each issue area.  My next goal was to identify all the interest groups active in these three 
issue areas.  To do so, I drew on data from the Center for Responsive Politics 
(https://www.opensecrets.org/).  The Center for Responsive Politics lists every 
organization that filed a lobbying report on a given bill.  For each of the bills in these 
three issue areas
1
, I pulled all organizations that filed at least one lobbying report.  This 
master dataset included 1,104 unique organizations under the issue category U.S. banking 
system and financial institution regulation, 724 unique organizations under the issue 
category comprehensive health care reform, and 770 unique organizations under the issue 
category natural gas and oil.  A total of 2,598 organizations lobbied across the three issue 
areas studied during the 2009-2010 legislative session.  
Step 3: Link these organizations to the types of constituencies present in the 
congressional constituencies and then calculate measures of the constituency presence 
for of each of these interests within each congressional districts.  Steps 1 and 2 allowed 
me to identify the constellation of active/lobbying interests within each issue area. The 
next task was to generate measurements of local presence for all these active/lobbying 
interests across all House districts.   
                                                          
1
 There were 122 bills introduced during the 111
th
 Congress under the category U.S. Banking System and 
Financial Institution Regulation, 76 bills introduced under the category Comprehensive Health Care 
Reform, and 108 bills introduced under the category Natural Gas and Oil (Including Offshore Oil and Gas). 
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Of the 2,598 active/lobbying organizations identified, the overwhelming majority 
were business interests.  To merge data for business related organizations with 
corresponding constituency data I first categorized them by their six-digit Census Bureau 
NAICS industry code.  The six-digit code is the most specific industry category in the 
Census Bureau’s survey coding scheme.  The Census bureau provides annual 




Using the NAICS industry codes, I was then able to develop an estimate of local 
employment in each industry drawing on data from the Census Bureau’s County Business 
Patterns survey. The County Business Patterns survey provides data on business 
establishments, meaning firms at a specific location with one or more employees.  The 
data is provided at the zip-code level for each NAICS industry category.
 3
   Estimates of 
employment in each industry at the zip code level were then generated by taking the 
median of each establishment’s employment estimate and then summing these estimates 
for all firms in that industry at the zip code level.
4
 Data for each industry code were then 
aggregated to the congressional district level.
5
   
Nonbusiness interests were consistently active across each issue area studied, but 
they lobbied much less than business interests.  They made up 410 of the 2,598 
organizations lobbying in these issue areas.  Nonbusiness organizations required a varied 
                                                          
2
 When an organization’s NAICS code was not clear I referred to business directories such as Hoovers.com 
for NAICS information. 
3 
Local presence for business interests was operationalized as 2009 district level employment. 
4
 Firm employment is classified into groups:  1-4 employees, 5-9 employees, 10-19, 20-49, 50-99, 100-249, 
250-499,500-999, and 1000 or more.  Note that these estimates are precise, but imperfect.  Because the 
final employee category is 1000 or more employees the employee estimate will usually underestimate the 
number of employees in zip-codes with the largest concentration of each industry.   
5
 Zip-codes were overlaid with Congressional districts using GIS. Employee estimates for zip-codes located 
in more than one district were multiplied by the percentage of the total population area within the zip-code 
that was a part of the district.   
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approach to calculating measurements of local presence.  I was able to categorize a few 
organizations using NAICS codes and calculate local presence in the same manner as 
business interests, but most required other sources of local data.  Groups with clear 
demographic categories (such as groups representing the elderly, African-Americans, or 
Hispanic/Latinos) were labeled as such.  District level demographic data was collected 
per demographic category from the Census Bureau.
6
  These data were operationalized as 
total population of the demographic group per district.  For data in non-demographic 
categories of organizations such as consumer groups or the uninsured, I calculated the 
most germane measurement of district presence possible given available data per 
category.  Local presence for labor unions, for example, was operationalized using 
membership data aggregated from the zip code level to the district level.  Local presence 
for interests representing the uninsured was calculated simply by determining the number 
of uninsured residents per district.  For a complete list of all measurements of district 
level local presence see appendix B-1.
7
 
Table 3.2 lists the total number of constituencies associated with the interest 
groups lobbying in each of these issue areas.  I calculated the presence across 435 House 
districts for 875 unique constituencies.  The overwhelming majority of the interests in the 
sample are business related constituencies.
8
  There were 267 unique group related 
                                                          
6
 Examples of demographic data used include the total African-American, Hispanic/Latino, elderly, and 
Native-American population per district.   
7
 Appendix B-1 is available via the online supplementary materials. 
I was able to categorize 94 percent of the 2598 organizations that lobbied on all issue areas studied.  Data 
for local governments were left out of this analysis because I could not determine an accurate level of 
measurement for the large variation in the cities that lobbied the federal government on the issues studied. 
8
 For the analysis presented throughout this dissertation I used an expansive definition of business interests.  
All interests that could be categorized as having control over local jobs and economic investment were 
labeled as business interests.  This definition is admittedly very broad.  To ensure that the results presented 
here and in the following chapters were accurate I reran models using varied definitions for business 
interests and the results remained consistent despite alternative ways of operationalizing this variable.  For 
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constituencies identified under the U.S. banking and financial institution regulation issue 
area; there were 296 unique group related constituencies were identified under 
comprehensive healthcare reform; and 312 unique group related constituencies were 
identified under the natural gas and oil issue area.  Business constituencies made up over 











To present an overview of what types of interests were active in each issue area 
Figure 3.2 places each constituency into a broad two-digit NAICS industry code (with 
nonbusiness constituencies in a separate category).  As one might expect, finance and 
insurance constituencies constitute one of the largest group of constituencies active on 
banking and finance regulation issues.  Similarly, health care and social assistance 
constituencies are also one of the largest categories of interests active in lobbying on 
comprehensive health care.  Oil and gas interests, utilities, construction and 
                                                                                                                                                                             
example, some authors prefer to exclude healthcare sectors from business categories (Holyoke 2014).  
When I exclude all healthcare related economic sectors from models the results for this variable become 
slightly stronger. 
Table 3.2: Number of Group Related 
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manufacturing interests are the largest categories of constituencies active in lobbying on 
natural gas and oil issues.  Additionally, manufacturing interests were largest category of 
constituencies active on each of these issue areas.
9





Figure 3.2: Number of Unique Constituencies Studied per Two-Digit Industry 
Sector Code, Sorted by Frequency of Interests in Each Category  
 













                                                          
9
 Though manufacturing interests stand out in comparison to other constituencies in each sample it is 
important to note that within the broad category of manufacturing there are a large variety of constituencies 
that differ across each issue area.  For example, manufacturing of surgical tools is a part of the broader 
manufacturing category for the comprehensive healthcare reform sample, but it is not a part of the sample 
for oil and gas. 
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301: Comprehensive Healthcare Reform 
 
 
803: Natural Gas and Oil (Including Offshore Oil and Gas) 
 
 
What Are the Committees of Primary Jurisdiction Over Each Issue Area? 
For all bills under each issue area, the committee of primary jurisdiction was 
identified using the following process.  First, I used the official website for federal 
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legislative information, Thomas.gov, to find all committees of referral for each bill.  The 
total number of bills was then divided by the total number of referrals for each of the 
twenty standing committees of the House.   The committee with the largest percent of 
referrals for all bills under the issue area was considered to be the committee of primary 
jurisdiction.  Table 3.3 lists the top three committees of referral for all bills under each 
issue area for the 111
th
 Congress.  The Financial Services committee was the committee 
of primary jurisdiction for issue area “1501: U.S. Banking System and Financial 
Institution Regulation”; the Energy and Commerce committee was the committee of 
primary jurisdiction for issue area “301: Comprehensive health care reform”; and Natural 
Resources committee was the committee of primary jurisdiction for “803: Natural Gas 










Constellations of Interests, Committee Jurisdictions, and Competition Among Allied 
Legislators for Limited Committee Seats 
 It is important to make note of the differences in the jurisdictional context of the 
committees studied here.  The fact that there are wide differences in the policy issue areas 
Table 3.3: Committees of Referral Per Issue Area 







1501: U.S. Banking 
System and Financial 
Institution Regulation 
Financial Services 81 66.39 
Ways and Means 26 21.31 
Small Business 17 13.93 
301: Comprehensive 
Healthcare Reform 
Energy and Commerce 64 84.21 
Ways and Means 49 64.47 
Education and Labor 21 27.63 
803: Natural Gas and 
Oil (Including Offshore 
Oil and Gas) 
Natural Resources 48 44.44 
Energy and Commerce 38 35.19 
Ways and Means 31 28.7 
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under the jurisdictions of these committees is likely to affect the constellation of 
interested groups in ways that can impact group competition for committee membership.  
These three committees demonstrate wide differences in the policy issue areas under their 
respective jurisdictions.  The majority of the bills that flow through the Financial Services 
committee are related to financial issues.  Similarly, the majority of bills that flow 
through the Natural Resources committee are related to either natural resources or public 
lands.  In contrast, the Energy and Commerce committee has jurisdiction over a very 
diverse number of major policy issues areas.  The Financial Services and Natural 
Resources committees therefore have more narrow issue jurisdictions, while the Energy 
and Commerce committee has a highly diverse issue jurisdiction.   
As policy issue areas under the jurisdiction of the committee become more 
diverse there is likely to be much more competition for limited committee seats among 
interested groups.  To illustrate the likelihood that more group competition exists when 
committees have jurisdiction over diverse issue areas, assume that each issue area has a 
unique corresponding constellation of organized interests.  When a committee has 
jurisdiction over multiple major issue areas, there will be competition among whole 
constellations of groups related to each issue area under the jurisdiction of the committee 
for limited committee seats.  When organized interests seeking to influence policy 
outcomes related to healthcare reform, they will want their allied legislators to win 
membership on the Energy and Commerce committee.  But in doing so, health care 
interests will also be in competition with a multitude of other interests within 
constellations tied to issues like energy, environmental regulation, trade, and technology.  
Competition for seats on the Energy and Commerce committee should be much more 
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intense than for committees with narrow issue jurisdictions.  Thus, we should expect it to 
be particularly difficult for some groups to win representation on this committee than for 
the other committees in this study.   
 
Do Some Interests Receive More Representation on House Committees Than 
Others? 
Here I calculate and present measures of committee overrepresentation for all the 
constituencies identified above.  For each interest, I compare its mean presence in the 
districts of committee members to its mean presence across all House districts. An 
interest is overrepresented on the committee when it has a larger presence in the districts 
of committee members than it does in House districts generally.  An interest is 
underrepresented on the committee when it has a smaller presence in the districts of 
committee members than it does in House districts generally.  Put differently, if the mean 
of the constituency group’s presence in the districts of committee members is larger and 
statistically different from the mean in House districts generally, then the interest studied 
is considered to be overrepresented on the committee under examination.
10
 
I begin by comparing the districts represented on each of these three committees 
with all House districts.  Table 3.4 shows the number of interests that have a constituency 
presence in committee members’ districts that is statistically different and larger than its 
constituency presence in House districts at large.  Across all committees a substantively 
                                                          
10
 Though the mean value is a commonly used statistic, outliers can sometimes pull it in misleading 
directions.  I decided to stick with the mean value in this chapter because it is a simple descriptive starting 
point before moving on to multivariate analysis of alternative measurements of representation in the next 
chapter.  Single sample t-tests were calculated testing the difference between mean of the House 
distribution for each constituency against the value of the committee mean.  Single sample t-tests were 
calculated rather than independent samples t-tests because committee members are not an independent 
sample separate from House members (see Hall1990 for similar explanation and approach).  Appendix B-1 
(available online with all other supplementary documents) provides comparison of committee and House 
distributions at their median values. 
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large number of the interests have a mean constituency presence that is larger than those 
interests’ presence in House districts across the board. 
Table 3.4: Number of Interests with an Average Constituency Presence for Committee 












Financial Services  123 267 46% 
Energy & Commerce  52 296 18% 
Natural Resources  77 312 25% 
All Constituencies, All Committees  252 875 29% 
Note: P-Values for t-tests used to calculate statistical significance were two-tailed.  Committee means were 
considered to be statistically significant at or below a p-value of .05. 
Chart Summary: Across all committees a substantively large number of interests have a mean 
constituency presence within districts represented on the committee that is higher than in House 
districts at large.  This variation in representation across particular groups reveals that some types 
of group related constituencies are overrepresented on House committees while others are not.   
Table 3.4 demonstrates that there is a substantial amount of variation among 
interests in committee representation.  Some types of interests have larger and 
statistically significant mean values of local presence than what we would expect from 
committees randomly chosen from the House at large, while other interests do not.  For 
all interests studied, 252 of 875 unique group related constituencies (about one-third of 
the sample) had mean committee values that were statistically higher than the mean for 
House districts.  For the Financial Services committee, 123 of 267 unique interests (or 
46%) had mean values that were higher than the House at large.  The membership of the 
Energy and Commerce committee had mean values for 52 of the 296 (or 18%) unique 
group related constituencies studied.  And 77 of the 312 interests studied (or 25%) had 
mean values of local presence for Natural Resources committee members that were 
statistically larger than the House.  The following sections describe which types of 
interests were overrepresented for each committee studied. 
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Examples of Interests Who Were Overrepresented on the Financial Services 
Committee 
 
To illuminate which types of interests were better able to gain heightened 
representation on the Financial Services committee Figure 3.3 groups the total number of 
interests that were overrepresented by their two-digit NAICS industry codes (with 
nonbusiness interests listed in a separate category).  The categories of groups with the 
largest counts of overrepresented interests are finance and insurance, manufacturing, and 
professional sciences and technical services.   
The economic sectors with perhaps the most to win or lose from policies under 
the jurisdiction of the Financial Services committee had a strikingly strong presence in 
the districts of committee members. Sixteen unique finance and insurance interests were 
overrepresented on the committee (or 58% of all finance and insurance interests studied).  
These findings are especially potent given the context of this study.   In the wake of the 
2008 financial collapse public sentiment was strongly against the financial industry.   
Figure 3.3: Number of Overrepresented Interests on Financial Services Committee 




Commercial banks, investment banks, and mortgage lenders--all business interests that 
were central in the debate over the Dodd-Frank financial reform bill--were among the 
most disliked industries as the 2009-2010 session of Congress began.  Yet even in this 
extremely anti-banking and finance environment, each of these industries still enjoyed 
overrepresentation on the financial services committee.  In contrast to finance and 
insurance interests, only 25% (5 of 20) of nonbusiness interests active in this area were 
overrepresented in the districts of committee members.  The nonbusiness interests that 
were overrepresented on the committee do not appear to be the direct result of the 
advocacy of group related legislative allies.   Some examples of overrepresented 
nonbusiness constituencies are junior colleges, grantmaking foundations, religious 
organizations, and all other miscellaneous schools and instruction.  More telling are the 
types of nonbusiness interests that were not found to be overrepresented.  Consumers 
with foreclosed homes, for example, did not have a stronger presence in the districts of 
committee members than they did in House districts at large. 
Examples of Interests Who Were Overrepresented on the Energy and Commerce 
Committee 
 
The proportion of interests overrepresented on the Energy and Commerce 
committee within each two-digit category tells a slightly different story than the 
proportions for the financial services committee.  As previously discussed, the Energy 
and Commerce committee handles a wider variety of different policy issues than the 
Financial Services or Natural Resources committees.  Given that this committee handles 
many more policy issue areas, we should expect much more competition across groups 
for limited committee seats than on committees that have more focused policy domains.  
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Therefore, the proportions of interests that are overrepresented on the Energy and 
Commerce committee within a given issue area ought to be lower than committees with 
more focused policy jurisdictions.  This is in fact the case.  While 46 percent of the 
constituencies active on financial services issues were overrepresented in the districts of 
members on the Financial Services committee, only 18 percent of interests concerned 
with policies under the jurisdiction of Energy and Commerce were overrepresented in the 
districts of committee members. 
Figure 3.4: Number of Overrepresented Interests on Energy & Commerce Committee 
Grouped  by Two-Digit NAICS Industry Code 
 
Though the amount of overrepresentation was not as pronounced on this 
committee as it was for the Financial Services committee, systematic committee 
overrepresentation is still taking place for nearly 20 percent of the interests that lobbied 
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bills related to comprehensive healthcare reform.  Figure 3.4 presents the number of 
interests overrepresented on the Energy and Commerce committee by their two-digit 
NAICS codes (with nonbusiness interests in a separate category).  Manufacturing, health 
and social assistance, and finance and insurance are among the categories with the 
highest counts of overrepresented interests.  Examples of economic interests within these 
categories that have means of constituency presence in the districts of committee 
members that are higher than House means include pharmaceutical manufacturers, 
hospitals, and direct health and medical insurance providers.  These results are similar to 
the findings for the financial services industry.  Despite a very tough political climate for 
business interests in the 111th Congress, several interests at the center of the debate on 
the Affordable Care Act were overrepresented on the committee of primary importance to 
this bill’s passage.  Nonbusiness interests, on the other hand, were much less likely to 
gain overrepresentation on this committee.  Only 2 of the 23 nonbusiness interests studied 
were overrepresented.  Groups that were central to the debate on the Affordable Care Act 
such as the elderly, the poor, unions and the uninsured were not overrepresented in the 
districts of committee members relative to their presence in the House as a whole. 
Examples of Interests Who Were Overrepresented on the Natural Resources 
Committee 
 
Figure 3.5 lists the number of interests with overrepresentation on the Natural 
Resources committee by their two-digit codes.  The types of interests that are 
overrepresented here include manufacturing, retail and wholesale trade, resource 
extraction, and construction.  The industrial sector with the highest proportion of interests 
on the Natural Resources committee was agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting.  
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Several interests germane to the comprehensive energy reform bill of 2010 had means of 
constituency presence in the districts of committee members that were higher than the 
means of their presence in House districts generally.  These include oil drillers, natural 
gas distributors, and underground coal mining interests.   
Figure 3.5: Number of Overrepresented Interests on Natural Resources Committee 
Grouped  by Two-Digit NAICS Industry Code 
 
The major difference between the Natural Resources committee and the previous 
committees studied is that nonbusiness interests were more successful at joining this 
committee than several types of business interests.  I think that natural resources 
committee stands out for a few reasons.  First, as I discuss briefly above, the constellation 
of groups active in the issues under this committee’s jurisdiction includes a number of 
economic sectors that are present in only a small number of House districts.  Interests 
involved in resource extraction and agriculture as well as complimentary industries in 
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manufacturing, wholesale distribution, and construction are concentrated in and around 
the areas where resources like oil, coal, and natural gas, as well as agricultural 
commodities are located.  The result is that these industries are likely 
to have fewer legislative allies than interests with local presence in a greater number of 
districts.  Having a smaller pool of potential allies in Congress is likely to mean having 
less representation on committees.   
 A second reason why there is a less overrepresentation of the interests actively 
lobbying this committee than the other committees studied is that energy policy is often 
referred to three different committees.  Energy bills are referred to the Ways and Means 
committee and the Energy and Commerce committee at roughly the same rate as they are 
referred to the Natural Resources committee.  When issue areas are consistently referred 
to multiple committees, group allies will be forced to request a larger subset of 
committees to serve these constituents’ interests.  As a result, group allies become less 
concentrated on any one committee such that their constituents receive weaker 
representation on any one committee.   
 
Do Some Interests Receive Less Representation on House Committees Than Others? 
 The results in the previous section indicate that some constituencies are more 
likely to be overrepresented on House committees, but overrepresentation is only half of 
the story.  In order to fully explain variation in the committee representation of group 
related constituencies it is also important to analyze whether some constituencies are 
underrepresented on committees of importance to their policy concerns.  Here I make the 
same comparisons as the previous section, but with a focus on committee means that are 
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lower than the average of all House members.  Instead of tabulating committee means 
that are larger and statistically different from all districts in the House at large, I examine 
means of constituency presence in committee members’ districts that are smaller and 
statistically different from the average of the House overall.   
 
Table 3.5: Number of Interests with an Average Constituency Presence for Committee 












Financial Services  38 267 14% 
Energy & Commerce  41 296 14% 
Natural Resources  99 312 32% 
All Constituencies, All Committees  178 875 20% 
Note: P-Values for t-tests used to calculate statistical significance were two-tailed.  Committee means were 
considered to be statistically significant at or below a p-value of .05. 
Chart Summary: Across all committees a substantively large number of interests have a mean 
constituency presence within districts represented on the committee that is lower than in House 
districts at large.  This variation in representation across particular groups reveals that some types 
of group related constituencies are underrepresented in the districts of the members of their key 
House committees while other groups are not.   
 Table 3.5 demonstrates that there are many constituencies that are systematically 
underrepresented on House committees.  One in five of the constituencies across all 
committees studied and all constituencies studied were underrepresented.  For both the 
Financial Services and Energy and Commerce committees 14 percent of the interests 
within the respective constellations of interests studied were underrepresented.  And 
nearly one third of all interests in the sample of interests studied for the Natural 
Resources committee were also underrepresented.  These data further substantiate the 
argument that there is a large amount of measurable variation that exists in the amount of 
committee representation that interests receive in Congress.  The final sections of this 
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chapter briefly explain which types of interests were underrepresented on each committee 
studied. 
 
Examples of Interests Who Were Underrepresented on the Financial Services 
Committee 
 
Figure 3.6 aggregates the number of underrepresented constituencies to their two-
digit NAICS codes with nonbusiness interests in a separate category.  Nonbusiness 
interests were tied for the largest category of underrepresented constituencies.  Examples 
of interests that were underrepresented on the Financial Services committee included the 
elderly, the poor, veterans, Native-Americans and environmental organizations.  This  
Figure 3.6: Number of Underrepresented Interests on Financial Services Committee 
Grouped  by Two-Digit NAICS Industry Code 
 
means that districts with large shares of these constituencies obtain less representation on 
this committee than would be expected in a committee randomly drawn from the House 
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as a whole.  In direct contrast to nonbusiness interests, only one of the 26 finance and 
insurance interests (or 3 percent) was underrepresented on the committee.   
 
Examples of Interests Who Were Underrepresented on the Energy and Commerce 
Committee 
 
Figure 3.7 breaks the results for the Energy and Commerce committee down by 
two-digit NAICS industry codes with nonbusiness in a separate category.  As previously 
discussed, the diversity of policy issues that this committee has under its jurisdiction 
should increase competition among groups and their legislative allies for limited 
committee membership.  So we should expect to see fewer differences in representation 
on this committee than on committees with narrow policy jurisdictions.   
Figure 3.7: Number of Underrepresented Interests on Energy & Commerce Committee 
Grouped  by Two-Digit NAICS Industry Code 
 
Nonbusiness interests active on issues before Energy and Commerce are among 
the most underrepresented types of constituencies.  Examples of nonbusiness interests 
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that were underrepresented in the districts of committee members include universities, 
junior colleges, human rights organizations, civic and social organizations, and 
environmental organizations.  Figure 3.7 also shows that constituencies classified as 
Healthcare and Social Assistance had a substantial amount of underrepresented interests.  
Examples of interests in this category included outpatient centers for mental healthcare, 
substance abuse centers, other outpatient care and kidney dialysis centers.  Variation in 
political mobilization offers one explanation for why these groups received less 
committee representation.  These interests may well be less politically mobilized than 
economic sectors like major hospitals, pharmaceutical companies, and insurance 
providers.  
 
Examples of Interests Who Were Underrepresented on the Natural Resources 
Committee 
 
Nonbusiness interests were again among the most underrepresented categories of 
groups.  Examples of nonbusiness interests active in this issue areas that were 
underrepresented on this committee included labor unions, universities, and African-
Americans.  Like the previous two committees examined, many nonbusiness 
constituencies represented on this committee have a lower presence of these interests than 
their presence in the 435 House districts at large.  The economic sectors that were 
underrepresented on the Natural Resources committee, however, are often unlikely to 
benefit from committee membership.  These include interests involved in finance and 
insurance and manufacturing interests with little identifiable connection to issues related 




Figure 3.8: Number of Underrepresented Interests on Natural Resources Committee 




The previous chapter presented a new theoretical approach to the study of group 
influence in Congress. Building on Richard Hall’s view that interest groups lobby 
primarily to mobilize the participation of their allies, the theory centers on the question of 
which types of interests are able to generate and mobilize legislative allies. I expect that 
groups will vary in the number of allies that they generate largely as a result of how they 
are distributed across congressional districts and how their interests align with the 
jurisdictions of congressional committees.   
This chapter describes the dataset that allows me to test whether constituency 
motivated ally generation affects interest representation on House committees.  After 
identifying all the organized interests active in lobbying on three landmark laws in the 
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111th Congress (covering energy, financial regulation, and health care), I assembled an 
original database identifying how these interests are distributed across the country (as in, 
precisely where they have employees and members).  I then used this constituency data to 
document variation in interest representation on House committees.   
This chapter has presented evidence that some constituencies are overrepresented 
and some constituencies are underrepresented on the committees with jurisdiction over 
their policy needs.   Committee overrepresentation was calculated for each constituency 
by measuring the mean of the constituency for committee member districts against the 
mean of constituency in the districts of the full House membership.  When the 
constituency’s average presence in the districts of committee members was larger than its 
average presence in House districts at large, the constituency was considered to be 
overrepresented on the committee.  For all constituencies and all committees studied, 
nearly one out of three constituencies tied to particular interests were overrepresented on 
committees with jurisdiction over their policy needs.  Furthermore, the number of 
constituencies that were overrepresented varied by committee.  Forty-six percent of the 
interests active in lobbying for bills related to financial regulation were overrepresented 
on the Financial Services committee.  Twenty-five percent of the interests active in 
lobbying on energy legislation were overrepresented on the Natural Resources 
committee.  Eighteen percent of the interests who lobbied on healthcare reform 
legislation were overrepresented on the Energy and Commerce committee.   
A large number of interests therefore received more representation than we should 
expect if committee membership mirrored the House at large.  But interest 
overrepresentation only tells part of the story.  Many constituencies that are tied to 
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particular interests received substantially less representation on these committees than we 
would expect if committees were randomly selected from the full House membership.  
Similar to calculations for overrepresentation, when the average of the constituency 
presence in committee members’ districts was smaller than its average presence in  
House districts at large, the constituency was considered to be underrepresented on the 
committee.  For all constituencies and all committees studied, 20 percent of 
constituencies tied to particular interests were underrepresented on committees with 
jurisdiction over their policy needs.  At the committee level, 14 percent of the interests 
active in lobbying for bills related to financial regulation were overrepresented on the 
Financial Services committee.  Thirty-two percent of the interests active in lobbying on 
energy legislation were overrepresented on the Natural Resources committee.  Fourteen 
percent of the interests who lobbied on healthcare reform legislation were 
overrepresented on the Energy and Commerce committee.  Thus, there is plenty of 
evidence that interest representation varies on House committees.   
The 111
th
 session of Congress took place in a highly anti-business political 
environment.  Public opinion was strongly against business interests and the Democratic 
Party held strong majorities in both the House and the Senate.  Yet even in this strong 
anti-business climate many economic sectors that were prominent in the policy debates 
on financial, healthcare, and energy reform were overrepresented on the committees with 
primary jurisdiction over these issue areas. Fifty-eight percent of the economic sectors 
under the broad industry label of finance and insurance were overrepresented in the 
districts of the members of the Financial Services committee compared to their presence 
in House districts overall.  These include industries that were deeply involved in the 2008 
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financial crisis such as commercial banks, investment banks, and mortgage lenders.  
Consumers who had mortgage issues, however, were not overrepresented in committee 
members’ districts compared to their presence in House districts overall.   Pharmaceutical 
manufacturers, hospitals, and direct health and medical insurance providers were 
prominent industries in the debate over healthcare reform and they were also 
overrepresented on the Energy and Commerce committee.  Yet the elderly, the poor, 
unions and the uninsured did not receive comparable levels of representation.  And lastly, 
interests on different sides of the debate over energy reform, such as industry interests 
like oil drillers, natural gas distributors, and underground coal mining interests as well as 
environmental interests, were overrepresented on the Natural Resources committee.  The 
fact that these types of interests were overrepresented on the committees of jurisdiction to 
their policy needs, even during a political environment that ought to predict little group 
influence over legislative advocacy, leads me to think that there may be systematic 
factors that predict when some interests will win more committee representation than 
others. 
Baumgartner et al.’s (2009) findings indicate that when groups have more allies 
on House committees they are systematically more likely to win policy outcomes.  There 
is no research to date, however, that (1) documents whether some interests have more 
committee representation than others and (2) can account for when some interests will 
win more committee representation than others.   In the preceding pages I have 
demonstrated that variation exists in interest representation on House committees.  The 
remaining chapters will measure this variation against several hypotheses in order to test 
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whether a theory of constituency motivated ally generation and mobilization can predict 



















Chapter 4: The Geography of Interest Representation 
 
Organized interests that are similar in size and that have a similar impact on the 
national economy can differ dramatically in how they are distributed across the 435 
congressional districts.  Because the federal legislature is strongly tied to geographically 
defined districts, the various ways that particular interests are distributed can have a 
substantial impact on the amount of representation they receive in Congress.  At one 
extreme, an interest can be wholly concentrated within the borders of a single 
congressional district.  At the other extreme, an interest could be present in each of the 
435 districts.  If some interests are constituents in few districts and some are constituents 
in many, this could translate into significant variation in the amount of representation that 
they receive.  Organized interests with a presence in a large number of districts, such as 
banks, retailers, and hospitals, could receive systematically greater representation than 
organized interests with a presence in a small number of districts, such as industries 
involved in resource extraction, agriculture (crop production) or interests tied to densely 
populated areas like urban transit.  
In addition to being present in a greater or lesser number of districts, interests can 
also vary in how they are concentrated within the districts where they are constituents.  
Two interests could, for example, both be present within all 435 districts, but they could 
vary considerably in how they are concentrated or dispersed across these districts.  The 
proportion of the total constituency tied to a particular interest can therefore vary in how 
it is distributed across the 435 districts for each interest. This kind of variation is 
henceforth described as the political concentration of constituencies.  For example, one 
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interest could be heavily concentrated in a few districts and sparsely present in many, and 
the other could be more evenly spread across all districts.  Wal-Mart, like many other 
national retail companies, offers a good illustration of a highly dispersed constituency 
distribution.  It is present in every district, and its employment is also highly dispersed 
across the districts where it is located.  The same is true of limited service restaurants like 
McDonald’s, Subway, and Taco Bell.  These groups have presence in a large number of 
districts, but their total employment is dispersed quite evenly across the districts where 
they have a constituency presence.   
In contrast to these interests, other constituencies can be present in a large number 
of districts, but also be highly concentrated in a subset of congressional districts.  
Investment banks and public relations firms are good examples of economic sectors that 
have high values of concentration within a subset of particular districts, but that are also 
present in a large number of total districts.  All else equal, does this kind of variation in 
the concentration of interests within the districts where they are present influence the 
amount of legislative advocacy they receive from members of Congress?   
Finally, interests could have the same amount of district presence and the same 
level of political concentration, but have decidedly different amounts of geographic 
concentration.  If two interests have a presence in the same number of districts and 
display the same amount of political concentration, one could be clustered spatially 











































distribution that is more randomly located across districts.  For example, coal mining 
interests and the urban transit economic sector are both present in similar numbers of 
districts, but coal producers are geographically concentrated within particular parts of the 
country while urban transit is spread more randomly in densely populated areas around 
the country.  How, if at all, does geographic concentration affect the representation of 
particular interests?  
This study will focus on the stage of the legislative process where bias in 
representation can have the highest impact on policy outcomes - representation on House 
committees.  Baumgartner et al.’s (2009) study indicates that groups with more allies on 
House committees are systematically more likely to win policy outcomes.  Scholars of 
legislative behavior and interest group influence have not attempted to analyze which 
particular economic or societal interests are over or underrepresented on the House 
committees of importance to them.  After controlling for alternative explanations for 
variation in the committee representation of particular interests, this chapter will examine 
the ways that variation in geographic factors such as the number of districts where an 
interest is present, its political concentration, and the extent of its geographic 
concentration or diffusion can affect its  over or underrepresentation on House 
committees.   
 
Geography and the Representation of Particular Interests: A Review of Relevant 
Literature 
 
In an article written more than 15 years ago Wendy Schiller wrote that “the use of 
geography as an explanatory variable has been underutilized in theories of interest group 
politics… [and] this is a serious omission because geographic borders still exert a great 
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deal of influence in legislative democracies like the United States” (1999, 770).  Scholars 
have demonstrated repeatedly that constituency presence is among the most prominent 
predictors of legislative behavior.  A number of studies have emphasized the relevance 
that geographic borders have to the study of American politics (see Atlas et al. 1995; and 
Lee 1998, 1999, 2000).  Even so, very little work exists on how variation in the 
constituency distribution of particular interests affects which interests are overrepresented 
and which are underrepresented in Congress.    
Scholarship that studies how political geography affects legislative behavior is 
hard to find. The few studies that do exist suggest that the political geography of the 
federal system can shape representation and ultimately influence policy outcomes (Atlas 
et al. 1995; Lee 1998, 1999, 2000, 2003; Mcubbins and Schwartz 1988).  The work that 
has analyzed the effects of political geography on representation in Congress has largely 
focused on Senate apportionment.  The emphasis of these studies is on the 
disproportionate influence of states with small population sizes on policy outcomes in the 
Senate (Atlas et al. 1995; Lee 1998, 1999, 2000).  
Even fewer studies have examined how geographic explanatory variables 
influence legislative outcomes in the House.  In contrast to the Senate, the House is 
composed of electoral districts with roughly equal population that are represented by 
single rather than multiple members.  But even when electoral units have similar levels of 
population, geographic boundaries can still influence who wins and who loses in terms of 
representation in Congress.  McCubbins and Schwartz (1988), for example, found 
evidence that redistricting led to the overrepresentation of metropolitan areas in the 
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House.  Political geography has also been found to influence how coalitions are built in 
the House (Lee 2003).   
Few studies have examined how geographic borders influence policy outcomes, 
but even less work parses out the effects of geography on the representation of particular 
interests.  Outside the area of trade policy, the few studies that even tangentially study the 
geography of interest representation in Congress have looked at only a small subset of 
interests and have not utilized multivariate models (see Adler 2000; Adler and Lapinski 
1997; Schiller 1999).
11
  These studies do not attempt to parse out and explain which 
particular groups are advantaged or disadvantaged in committee representation. 
 
Building on the Work of Political Economists 
Most of the work that examines the effects of the spatial distribution of interests 
on legislative behavior focuses on one category of interests and one policy area – 
manufacturers and trade policy.  This literature is particularly relevant to the analysis in 
this chapter because political economists have developed a foundation for theorizing 
about political geography, and they have also worked out how to accurately measure 
some key geographic variables.   
Political economists have tested geographic hypotheses that follow from two 
theoretical arguments.  The first argument is that manufacturing interests concentrated in 
particular geographic areas will find it easier to overcome Mancur Olsen’s (1971) 
collective action problem.  When groups find it easier to overcome the collective action 
                                                          
11
 The maximum number of constituencies that these studies evaluate for a particular committee, for 
example, is five, and the minimum number of constituencies is one.   
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problem they are better able to work together towards common political goals, and they 
therefore become more effective at winning policy outcomes in Congress.  This approach 
is discussed in several articles and is commonly referred to as the close group hypothesis 
(see Busch and Reinhardt 1999; 2000; 2005; Hansen 1988; Lavergne 1983; Pincus 1975; 
Porter 1990; Schonhardt-Bailey 1991; Trefler 1983).   
The second theoretical argument is that manufacturing interests that have a 
constituency distribution that is dispersed across more districts will win greater 
representation in Congress.  Rogowski (1999) described this explanation as the dispersed 
group hypothesis.  The dispersed group hypothesis attempts to test whether groups that 
are dispersed across greater numbers of electoral districts have a stronger positive effect 
on legislative (and/or political) behavior.  Dispersed groups are “thought to receive 
greater [policy benefits] because of their greater political representation in Congress” 
(Busch and Reinhardt 1999).   
 
A New Theoretical Perspective:  Constituency Motivated Ally Generation 
The view of group influence tested in this study is a logical extension of Hall and 
Deardorff’s theory of lobbying as a legislative subsidy.  According to this theory, groups 
mobilize the effort of their “natural allies to assist their own coincident objectives” (Hall 
and Deardorff, 2006, 69).  Interests subsidize the advocacy of their legislative allies 
toward mutual policy goals by writing legislation, building coalitions, offering 
information, and essentially working as an extension of their legislative ally’s staff.  
While Hall and Deardorff’s work emphasizes the importance of natural allies in 
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Congress, it does not explore variation in the number of natural allies groups have prior 
to the act of lobbying.  To reveal the systematic factors that influence the representation 
of particular interests in Congress, I argue that we first need to think about which 
interests are better able to win legislative allies in the first place. 
The logic for why constituency presence will lead to bias in ally generation for 
particular interests is straightforward.  Organized interests either have local presence in a 
given district or they do not. A formidable amount of work demonstrates that legislators 
advocate for constituents (see for example Baldwin and Magee 2000; Cragg and Kahn 
2009; Hall 1998; Hall and Wayman 1990; Hojnacki and Kimball 1998; Welch 1982; 
Wright 1990).  It follows that, for any legislator, interests that are also constituents will 
be a higher priority than interests that are not constituents.  And further, that the greater 
the number of districts where a group has a local presence, the greater the number of 
legislative allies it will generate.  Bias in representation is generated as some groups gain 
more natural allies than others.  Viewing group influence through the lens of constituency 
representation therefore offers a clear hypothesis about biased representation:  All else 
equal, organized interests with a local presence in more districts will be better represented 
in Congress than organized interests with a local presence in fewer districts. 
 
Where do the Findings of Political Economists Fit in to the Theory of Ally 
Generation? 
Geographic concentration can influence the number of allies that an interest 
generates, but it can also influence the strength of advocacy for a particular ally.  This is a 
key distinction, because strong individual allies may affect legislative outcomes that do 
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not require House majorities (or even committee majorities).  The studies that connect 
policy benefits to geographic concentration have focused on trade protection policy, 
which targets benefits to particular interests while imposing little or no direct costs on 
other interests.  Geographically concentrated interests could have strong allies that push 
through some distributive policy benefits, but in a host of other contexts they will be at a 
disadvantage compared to other groups.   
What this body of work has missed, I would argue, is that geographically 
concentrated interests are typically confined to particular parts of the country, and this 
can limit the overall representation that they receive.  Examples of economic sectors that 
are geographically concentrated include coal, iron, petroleum, and other types of resource 
extractors, as well as agricultural interests like crop producers.  These interests are tied to 
areas with specific resources or climates.  The problem for these interests is that when 
they are clustered in specific geographic areas, they are also likely to be located in 
systematically fewer electoral districts than other interests.  If an interest is a constituent 
in a smaller number of districts, it is likely to generate fewer total allies, which will 
influence the amount of representation it receives.  This muddies the waters of previously 
clear findings in the political economics literature that interests who are geographically 
concentrated will receive greater policy benefits.  For policy issue areas outside 
distributive trade protection policy, I do not expect to find consistent evidence for all 
issue areas studied that geographically concentrated interests are better represented than 
other interests.  There are many policy battles where groups with more legislative allies 
will be in a better position to win be better positioned to win policy outcomes than 
interests with fewer allies. 
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Testing a Theory of Constituency Motivated Ally Generation - Methodology 
Creating a Precise Measurement of Committee Representation 
Chapter 3 measured over or underrepresentation on House committees using t-
tests of differences in means.  Constituencies that had mean values of constituency 
presence in committee members’ districts that were larger and statistically different from 
their mean presence in House districts at large were considered to be overrepresented on 
committees.  Similarly, constituencies that had mean values of constituency presence in 
committee members’ districts that were smaller and statistically different from their mean 
presence in House districts generally were considered to be underrepresented on 
committees.  Dichotomous measurements of committee representation such as those used 
in the previous chapter are unable to reveal the magnitude of representation, however.  It 
may be that the uninsured and insurance companies are overrepresented on the Energy 
and Commerce committee, but that insurance companies have extremely high 
overrepresentation while the uninsured only have mild overrepresentation.  In order to 
capture the magnitude of committee over- or under-representation for all constituencies 
studied I utilize the commonly used Monte Carlo experiment approach (Adler and 
Lapinski 1997, 2000, 2002; Groseclose 1994; Sprague 2008). 
For each constituency studied I calculate the magnitude of committee over- and 
under-representation in the following manner.  I begin with constituency data for a 
particular interest for all 435 House districts.  Next, I randomly select districts to recreate 
a single hypothetical committee of the same size as the committee under examination.  
For this hypothetical committee I calculate the median of the constituency for the 
membership of the hypothetical committee.  I repeat the process of randomly selecting 
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hypothetical committees from the House at large and calculating the median of the 
constituency for hypothetical committee member districts 10,000 times.  This leaves me 
with a distribution of 10,000 hypothetical committee medians for committees randomly 
selected from the House membership.   
The Monte Carlo experiment process allows me to calculate and compare the 
percentile of committee representation for each constituency studied to what we would 
expect if the committee was randomly selected from the House at large.  Table 4.1 
presents examples of this dependent variable for selected interests.  As the percentile of 
committee representation for a particular constituency increases above the 50
th
 percentile, 
the group is overrepresented compared to a committee that is similar to the distribution of 
the constituency in the 435 districts of the House.  Constituencies such as the commercial 
banking industry with a percentile of committee representation in the 98
th
 percentile on 
the Financial Services committee are extremely overrepresented when compared to the 
level of representation that would be expected from a committee that had been randomly 
selected from House districts.  Constituencies like labor unions with committee 
representation in the 42
nd
 percentile on the Energy and Commerce committee are slightly 
underrepresented compared to the level of representation that would be expected from a 




Geographic Explanatory Variables.  Legislators are the natural allies of their 
constituents.  Groups who are a part of a representative’s constituency are more likely to  
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receive advocacy from the legislator than groups with no local presence.  As a group 
becomes present in more districts they have a greater pool of potential legislative allies.  
Groups with higher local presence will have more legislators seeking committee 
membership to as a result of being in greater numbers of districts, which will lead to 
heightened committee representation compared to groups with less local presence.  I 
therefore expect to find evidence that groups with a local presence in more districts will 
be more likely to be overrepresented on important congressional committees than groups 
with a local presence in fewer districts.  The first two geographic explanatory variables, 
described in the following section, gauge the effects that being in greater or fewer 
numbers of districts has on an interest’s committee representation.   
Table 4.1: Examples of Committee Overrepresentation for Selected 
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Representation 




















Direct Health and Medical 
Insurance Carriers 
89th Very high 
General Medical and 
Surgical Hospitals 











Oil and Gas Pipeline and 
Related Structures 
Construction 
93rd Very high 
Industrial Gas 
Manufacturing 73rd Moderately high 
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High District Presence is a dichotomous variable that is labeled one for all 
interests with a constituency presence in 90 percent or more of the 435 House districts.
12
  
And Low District Presence is a dichotomous variable that is labeled 1 for all interests 
with a constituency presence in 10 percent or fewer of the 435 House districts.  I expect 
to find that interests with a local presence in a large number of districts are better 
represented on House committees than interests with a presence in few districts.  The first 
two geographic explanatory variables measure the effect that being a constituent in many 
or few districts has on the generation of committee level allies.  But they do not capture 
variation in the concentration or dispersion of constituencies within the districts where 
groups are present.   
Across the 435 districts a constituency can be highly concentrated within 
particular districts or it can be evenly dispersed across districts.  To measure 
concentration within the 435 districts I included two variables: political concentration and 
geographic concentration.  Political Concentration—when a larger proportion of a 
constituency is concentrated in few districts rather than spread more evenly across many 
districts—is measured for each constituency using a Herfindahl-Hirschman index.  The 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index was developed to measure market concentration for 
particular industries.  However, it is often utilized to measure the concentration of other 
metrics across different units of analysis (see Reinhardt and Bush 1999, 2000, 2005).  
Here I use the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) in the same manner as Reinhardt and 
Busch.  The HHI is used to capture the concentration of each constituency within 
particular districts compared to the share of the total constituency across all districts.  
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When a group has a high HHI (high political concentration) it has large amounts of the 
constituency in a handful of districts and little or no constituency presence in a large 
number of districts.  In contrast, when a group has a low HHI the constituency is 
dispersed more evenly across districts.  The formula used to calculate the HHI is the 
following: 
 
Where s is the share of the constituency in a particular district related to 
the share of the total constituency across all districts.   
The Herfindahl-Hirschman index has a range of zero to one.  Here I transform the 
measure by multiplying it by 100.  This ensures that the results in the following 
regression models are not shockingly large as a result of moving from the minimum value 
of zero to the maximum value of one.   
Figure 4.2 presents a map of the distribution of district level employment for a 
constituency with high political concentration, urban transit systems.  This constituency 
 
Figure 4.2: Economic Sector with High Political 
Concentration, Urban Transit Systems 
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is highly concentrated in a limited number of districts.  Note that in measures of political 
concentration the constituency can be concentrated within a few districts irrespective of 
whether the districts are geographically near or far from one another (the distinction 
between political concentration here and geographic concentration discussed below).   
Geographic concentration is distinct from political concentration because it 
measures the spatial proximity of the constituency across all districts where it has a local 
presence.  Geographic concentration is a measurement of constituencies that are 
concentrated in particular parts of the country.  It captures the extent to which the 
constituency is clustered within districts nearby one another.  Geographic concentration is 
operationalized by calculating the weighted standard distance of the variation of each 
constituency across congressional districts in the contiguous United States.  The standard 
distance is utilized by geographers to capture the compactness of a spatial distribution.  
Features that are concentrated in nearby units of analysis have smaller standard distances 
than those which are dispersed from one another across units on a map.  Reinhardt and 
Busch’s (1999, 2000, 2005) method of calculating geographic concentration for 
industries across counties was almost identical to using the standard distance.  They 
measured the average distance from the weighted centroid of the industry to the weighted 
centroids of counties where the industry had a local presence.  The weighted standard 
distance is used rather than Reinhardt and Busch’s metric because in the years since their 
article was published it is has been accepted within the field of geography as a standard 
measurement of spatial dispersion (see Mitchell 2005). The formula for weighted 




The weighted standard distance captures how dispersed across districts a 
particular constituency is from its weighted spatial mean.   The final calculation is the 
spatial standard deviation, or how far one spatial standard deviation of the constituency is 
from its weighted spatial mean.  Spatial statistics are often made clear by their 
illustrations. Figure 4.3 presents the geographic distribution of the Cigarette 
Manufacturing economic sector. This industry is geographically concentrated within a 
subset of districts in North Carolina and Virginia. As a constituency is more clustered 
Figure 4.3: Economic Sector with High Geographic 
Concentration, Cigarette Manufacturing 
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within a particular geographic area in this way the measurement for geographic 
constituency gets smaller.   In contrast, when constituencies are more geographically 
distant from one another, the measurement of geographic concentration gets larger. 
 
Bivariate Summary of Relationships Between District Presence and Committee 
Representation 
 
The bivariate results in Figure 4.4 demonstrate preliminary evidence for the 
hypothesis that being a constituent in more congressional districts matters for committee 
representation.  The direction of the correlation coefficient for nearly every geographic 
explanatory variable indicates that as an interest’s constituency presence within a larger 
number of districts increases they receive more representation on these important House 
committees.  There is a positive correlation between the number of districts where 
interests have a local presence and their committee representation.  There is also a 
tendency for constituencies that are dispersed across more districts to win greater 
amounts of committee representation.   
 
Control Variables 
The first two control variables included in each model gauge the effects of the 
size of the group studied.  The total size of the group is an important control variable 
because group size is likely to influence how many allies the group has irrespective of the 
number of districts where the group can claim to be a constituent.  Groups could gain 
allies in Congress as a result of their importance to the national economy or because they 




The variable Total Receipts measures the amount of money each group received 
in 2008.  It includes the total sales, shipments, receipts, and revenue for each group 
studied.  Total Receipts is an aggregate variable that is gathered by NAICS industry code 
from the 2007 economic census.  For constituencies that were not generated from NAICS 
data I calculated Total Receipts using data from nonprofit 990 tax forms for 2008 from 
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Guidestar.com.  Total receipts were gathered from 990 forms for all organizations that 
filed at least one lobbying report per issue area studied.   Then the total receipts were 
aggregated by constituency.  
The variable Total Membership is the total number of members a group has 
nationally.  For constituencies that are economic sectors, this variable is the total national 
employment for the group.  And for groups that are not economic sectors, this variable is 
the total number of national constituents that fall under the group type studied.  I use the 
term membership broadly here to indicate the number of citizens that are affiliated with 
the group.   
The next control variable, Business, is labeled one for all business constituencies 
and zero for all nonbusiness constituencies.  In this chapter I focus on geographic 
explanatory variables explicitly.  Business interests and other types of constituencies are 
empirically analyzed in much greater detail in chapter 5.  In this chapter, however, they 
are included in models as important control variables only.  I expect legislators to be 
stronger advocates for local business interests than nonbusiness interests because 
business interests have control over local jobs and economic investment.  Legislators 
should therefore, on average, make more effort to gain membership on committees to 
serve the policy interests of local business than nonbusiness interests.  This elevated 
legislative effort on behalf of local business should result in business constituencies 
having higher levels of committee representation than nonbusiness interests, all else 
being equal. 
 The final control variable included in the model, Committee Ranking for Group's 
Policy Agenda measures the committee’s importance to the total policy agenda of a 
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particular interest when compared to the 20 standing committees of the House.  For each 
interest in the dataset the committee under examination (be it the Financial Services, 
Energy and Commerce, or the Natural Resources committee respectively) is ranked by its 
proportion of jurisdiction over the total policy agenda of the group.  Committee Ranking 
for Group's Policy Agenda is labeled “1”, for example, when the committee under 
examination is the least important to the total policy agenda of the group (i.e.- it had 
jurisdiction over the smallest proportion of the group’s policy agenda compared to all 
other standing committees) and it is labeled “20” when it is the most important to the 
group’s policy agenda.   
Committees, especially committees with narrow policy jurisdictions, tend to 
overrepresent constituencies with the highest demand for the policies that these 
committees oversee (Adler 2000; Adler and Lapinski 1997).   Constituencies that spend 
the most time lobbying issues under the jurisdiction of a particular committee can send a 
clear message about which committee has jurisdiction over their policy concerns to their 
legislative allies.  When legislative allies receive clear information about which 
committee would best serve the needs of their constituents they become more 
incentivized to join the committee.  Therefore, groups that are high demand 
constituencies for the committee under examination ought to gain greater amounts of 
membership on the committee than groups that are not high demand constituencies.  Like 
business interests, this variable is considered a control variable here, but is discussed in 






Models that Parse Out Effects of Variation in Constituency Distributions 
 
The models presented in this chapter utilize linear regression.  I begin with a base 
model that measures the impact of each independent and control variable described above 
on the committee over or underrepresentation of particular interests relative to their 
presence in House districts generally.  For each issue area studied I excluded 
constituencies that demonstrated very little lobbying activity.  All interests that filed two 
or fewer lobbying reports across all bills identified under each issue area described in the 
previous chapter were dropped from each constellation of interests studied.
13
  In the 
following chapter I run a model on each of these three sets of observations identified by 
policy subsystem.  This base set of models is used to discuss results for all control 
variables and preliminary results for geographic explanatory variables.   
The base model, however, is unable to capture the unique impact of all 
constituency distributions of interest.  Political and geographic dispersion are correlated 
with district presence.  To gain a more complete understanding of the role of constituency 
concentration and dispersion I hold high and low district presence constant using 
interaction terms.  A separate set of models are calculated to interact high and low district 
presence with political and geographic concentration to test the varied effects that 
geographic or political concentration have on committee representation.  This approach 
also allows me to parse out the effect of the four spatial distributions described at the 
outset of this chapter that may further affect who wins and who loses committee level 
                                                          
13
 These interests were in the bottom 5th percentile or less in the number of lobbying reports that they filed 
across all bills for each issue area studied.  These interests were not consistently a part of each constellation 
of interests per issue area studied.  As such, they were less likely to demonstrate predictable behavior.  
Dropping these observations did not change the substantive results of the models throughout this 
dissertation.  However, it did decrease the noise in models substantially such that the amount of variation in 
committee representation explained by the models (i.e.-r-squared values) was much higher. 
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representation (see Figure 4.1).  I discuss the nature of the interaction terms prior to 
describing the impact of each distribution in the section detailing results for geographic 
explanatory variables below. 
 
Table 4.2:  
What Factors Predict Variation in Constituencies’ Over- and Underrepresentation 
on Congressional Committees? 
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(2.898) (6.266) (5.049) (4.817) 
Low District Presence -1.231 -5.488 3.009 0.047 
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(0.246) (0.434) (0.650) (0.523) 
Total Receipts 0.016 -0.076 -0.005 0.214 
 
(0.041) (0.170) (0.039) (0.206) 











(10.792) (20.513) (19.954) (17.919) 
Observations 532 143 186 203 
R
2
 0.054 0.255 0.145 0.080 
Adjusted R
2








Note b: One tailed significance tests used for Local Presence, Business, and Committee Ranking for Group’s Policy  
Agenda.
 
Note c:  
+
 High District Presence is substantively meaningful and statistically significant when political and 




Results for Control Variables 
Two variables, Total Receipts and Total Membership, measure the total size of the 
interest studied.  If committee membership is selected based on the importance of a 
particular interest to the nation as a whole, then we should see evidence that these 
variables predict stronger committee representation.  The results generated in the base 
model do not support this line of thinking.  Large interests that are likely to be the most 
important to the United States as a whole are not systematically better represented on 
House committees.  The first measure of group size, Total Receipts, gauged whether the 
amount of money that the group takes in affects the amount of committee representation 
it receives. Two of the three coefficients on this variable were actually negative, 
signifying potential for underrepresentation.  Further, none of the coefficients for Total 
Receipts in the three committee models were statistically significant.   
Similar results were generated for the second measurement of group size.  The 
total number of constituents affiliated with each interest, labeled Total Membership in the 
model, was not statistically significant in two out of the three committee models.  Like 
Total Receipts, the coefficient was not consistently positive.  The only committee where 
group size had a positive and statistically significant impact was Energy and Commerce, 
but substantively even this result only has a slight impact on committee representation.  
Moving from the mean value of Total Membership for all interests active in the issue area 
examined for Energy and Commerce to the third quartile results in an increase of six 
percentage points of an interest’s percentile of representation.  Therefore, group size, 
measured using an interest’s total receipts or its total affiliated constituents, does not tend 
to affect the amount of committee representation it receives.   
94 
 
It is rather shocking to find that the importance of an interest to the national 
economy has little bearing on the amount of committee representation that it receives.  
This finding underscores the impact of political geography to U.S. representation.  
Interests are not over- or underrepresented in proportion to their importance to the nation 
as a whole.  As is revealed in the following empirical analysis, representatives advocate 
for the interests that are housed within the geographic borders of their districts.  
Legislators advocate for particular interests more strongly when interests make up a part 
of their local constituency.  The spatial distribution of the constituency and the type of the 
constituency are both factors that can affect ally generation and advocacy.  The next two 
control variables offer truncated findings (that will be discussed at much greater length in 
the following chapters) about how some types of constituencies are better represented 
than others and in support of the hypothesis that some interests will mobilize their allies 
toward more effective advocacy than others. 
Business constituencies, for example, received greater representation than 
nonbusiness constituencies in two of the three House committees studied.  Additionally, 
coefficients for all committee models were in the expected direction.  These results tend 
to support Charles Lindblom’s theory of business influence over policy outcomes.  Local 
business interests have control over jobs and economic investment in ways that 
nonbusiness interests do not.  This seems to translate into better representation from their 
representatives.  These findings will be retested and analyzed in detail in the following 
chapter. 
The final control variable, Committee Ranking for Group's Policy Agenda, was 
also telling about the types of constituencies that are the most likely to gain membership 
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on House committees.  The coefficients for Committee Ranking for Group's Policy 
Agenda were in the expected direction (positive) for all committees studied.  They were 
also statistically significant for all committee models.  These results again underline the 
importance of viewing group influence through the lens of constituency representation.  
Groups that are more incentivized to join committees will win greater committee 
representation than groups that are less incentivized to join committees.  Theories of 
group influence that do not consider constituency representation cannot uncover these 
kinds of systematic differences in group related committee representation.  This variable 
will also be analyzed in greater detail in a separate chapter, which focuses on the 
relationship between interest group policy agendas and committee representation. 
 
Results for Geographic Explanatory Variables 
Do Interests With a Local Presence in More Districts Receive More Committee 
Representation? 
 Legislators work on behalf of their constituents.  Groups that have a local 
presence within a particular district are more likely to generate a legislative ally in the 
district’s representative than groups without a local presence.  Further, when a group has 
a local presence in a larger number of districts it will be able to generate more legislative 
allies.  And with more allies seeking to advocate on the group’s behalf, it is more likely 
to receive more representation in Congress.  According to this logic, the coefficients for 
High District Presence for each committee model will be positive and statistically 





Table 4.3: Do Groups with a Constituency Presence in More 
Districts Receive Better Representation on House Committees?  
Statistically significant effects from committee models. 




High District Presence All Committees, All Groups 11*** 
 
Financial Services 31*** 
 
Energy & Commerce 7* 
 
Natural Resources - 
Low District Presence All Committees, All Groups - 
 
Financial Services - 
 
Energy & Commerce - 
  Natural Resources - 
Note a:                                                                   *p<0.1; **p<0.05; **p<0.01 
Note b: Energy & Commerce effects calculated from restricted model that 
does not include political or geographic concentration. 
 
The coefficients for High District Presence were statistically significant across 
two of the four full models.  And they were also statistically significant in a restricted 
Energy & Commerce model that excludes political or geographic concentration, which 
correlate strongly with high levels of district presence.  In contrast, I find no statistically 
significant findings that Low District Presence impacts the amount of representation that 
interests receive.  Substantively these findings indicate that groups with a presence in 
larger numbers of House districts will, on average, have greater representation on House 
committees than groups with a local presence in fewer districts.  Even the Natural 
Resources committee model, which failed to show statistically significant results for the 
coefficient measuring high district presence, is positive and significant for the coefficient 
measuring geographic dispersion.  Geographic dispersion positively correlates with high 
district presence and large values of either variable are indicative of a group being present 
in many districts.  Therefore, this model also yields evidence that suggests that 
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constituency presence in more districts can lead to better representation on important 
House committees. 
Interests with a constituency presence in a large number of districts received 
increased levels of committee representation for three of the four committee models.  In 
the Financial Services model, all else being equal, being an interest with high district 
presence increased the percentile of group representation by 31 percentage points.  For 
the Energy and Commerce committee the effect was not significant in the full model, but 
it was significant after excluding from the model variables that correlate with high district 
presence.  High district presence increased the percentile of representation for groups by 
5 percentage points. 
The evidence for district presence was less clear for the Natural Resources 
committee.  The coefficient for high district presence in the Natural Resources committee 
model was not significant, but the coefficient for Geographic Dispersion, which 
correlates with high district presence, was positive and statistically significant.  Moving 
from the minimum to the maximum amount of geographic dispersion for this committee 
increased an interest’s level of committee representation by 34 percentage points.  For 
each committee, I therefore find evidence that suggests that interests who are constituents 
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 Alternative measures of district presence also support this conclusion.  For example if the dummy 
variable for high presence is set to include 80% rather than 90% of districts the results of the model are not 
noticeably different.  The same is true when low presence is set to include 20 % of all districts.  The models 
in the following two chapters also test whether the number of districts where a group has a constituency 
presence affects committee representation (e.g.-1 to a maximum of each of the 435 House districts).  The 
results are consistently strong from models testing all groups and all committees, the Financial Services 
committee, and the Energy and Commerce committee.  I present results for dichotomous variables here 




Which groups have high district presence and which groups have low district 
presence?   
Groups with a local presence in more House districts will gain systematically 
greater committee representation than groups that have a presence in fewer districts, but 
the substantive impact of these results will be made clearer by a discussion of exactly 
which types of groups have high district presence within the context of each policy 
subsystem studied here.   
In the policy subsystem related to U.S. banking system and financial institution 
regulation the commercial banking industry has a local presence in each of the 435 
Congressional districts.  Commercial banks have high district presence, but the regulation 
of the commercial banking industry is important to many economic sectors that are active 
in this policy community and have low district presence.  Because the health of the 
commercial banking industry affects so many other economic sectors many other 
industries also have a stake in how banks are regulated.  Yet a wide variety of economic 
sectors that participate in this policy subsystem are underrepresented on the committee 
relative to their presence in House districts generally.  Examples of sectors in this policy 
subsystem that have a limited amount of district presence include many manufacturers, 
industries involved in resource extraction, and other sectors that are limited to particular 
geographic areas such as port and harbor operations or casino hotels.  Examples of 
sectors with a district presence in less than half of all House districts include auto 
manufacturers, aircraft manufacturers, and computer manufacturers; as well as resource 
extractors like the coal mining industry.  While these interests will have less committee 
                                                                                                                                                                             
out the effects of constituency concentration for interests that have high and low district presence using 
interaction terms in the next sections. 
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representation (and therefore less impact on the shape of policies flowing through the 
committee of primary importance to banking and financial reform) many groups that 
were central players in the financial crisis have levels of district presence that lead to 
higher committee representation and higher leverage over this policy area. 
Groups that are in many districts include several economic sectors that the 
majority of the public was vehemently angry with throughout the financial crisis.  Groups 
with a district presence in the maximum number of districts include the following 
economic sectors: Commercial banks, Real Estate Credit, Securities Brokerage, 
Miscellaneous Intermediation, Portfolio Management, Investment Advice, and Lessors of 
Residential Buildings and Dwellings.  Furthermore, other sectors involved in the crisis 
such as Consumer Lending and Investment Banking and Securities Dealing have a local 
presence in over 95 percent of House districts.  In 2009 and 2010 public opinion was 
running strongly against many of these interests.  However, in part because they were 
constituents in larger numbers of districts compared to other sectors that were not a part 
of the financial crisis, these economic sectors enjoyed greater representation on the 
Financial Services committee.   
Having high district presence is also important for committee representation 
because it can give groups that face a highly competitive environment for seats on 
particular committees an edge over other interests in gaining committee membership.  
The committee of primary importance to groups that participate in the policy subsystem 
Comprehensive health care reform is the Energy and Commerce committee. This 
committee has jurisdiction over bills affecting a diverse number of policy issue areas.  
This means that groups that seek to affect policy outcomes by positioning their allies on 
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committees that can shape comprehensive health care reform face competition for 
committee representation from the allies of groups that are a part of many other policy 
subsystems outside of the health care sector.   
With all this competition, any edge a group has to get its allies on its key 
committee is helpful to maximizing its policy impact.  Being a constituent in a large 
number of districts is one way to gain this competitive edge in committee representation.  
Examples of business interests that are constituents in 95 percent or more districts that 
participated in this policy subsystem include Hospitals, Insurance agencies, Direct Life 
insurers, Health and Medical Insurers, Nursing Care Facilities and Law Offices.  
Business interests that were in fewer than half of districts in this policy area fall under 
similar categories to those seeking representation on the Financial Services industry.  
They include manufacturing interests such as auto, aircraft, defense weaponry, and 
computer manufacturers.  They also include industries that involve resource extraction 
and the refining of resources such as gold mining, petroleum refining, iron foundries, 
aluminum production and coal mining.  Other interests with policy interests before 
Energy and Commerce are confined to specific geographic areas and thus have limited 
district presence, such as urban transit systems, port and harbor operations, deep sea 
travel, distilleries, and motion picture and video distributors.   
In this chapter I focus on a particular policy area that flows through the Energy 
and Commerce committee, but the effect of district presence may be stronger for other 
policy areas.  For example, when free trade agreements are considered by this committee, 
the results presented here suggest that the legislative allies of industries with presence in 
many districts, like retailers, are likely to have enhanced committee representation, while 
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industries present in fewer districts presence, such as many manufacturers and resource 
extractors, are likely to be underrepresented.  Retailers may, as a result, be better able to 
tilt the scales of free trade policy towards open international markets so that they can 
produce cheaper goods.  Manufacturers and resource extractors, in contrast, may have 
less impact on trade restriction as a result of having less district presence and therefore 
less representation. 
The effect of having a local presence in a large number of districts is even more 
relevant to the National Resources Committee, a committee with jurisdiction over policy 
issue areas with large numbers of interests that have a presence in only a limited number 
of districts.  The Natural Resources committee has jurisdiction over policy areas that 
affect a high number of groups with a local presence in a limited number of congressional 
districts.  Groups with limited district presence include raw materials extractors such as 
industries that mine metals and coal and those that drill oil and extract natural gas.  
Groups with limited district presence also include agricultural interests such as logging 
companies and many crop producers. 
Examples of business interests that are constituents in 95 percent or more districts 
that participated in this policy subsystem include many economic sectors involved in 
construction, transportation of raw materials, and the sale of raw materials via retailers 
and wholesale distributors.  Economic sectors with a local presence in nearly all 435 
congressional districts include many construction-related industries such as New Single-
Family Housing Construction (except Operative Builders); Residential Remodelers; 
Commercial and Institutional Building Construction; Highway, Street, and Bridge 
Construction; Architectural Services; Engineering Services; New Multifamily Housing 
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Construction (except Operative Builders); and Other Heavy and Civil Engineering 
Construction.  Transportation industry interests with a large district presence included 
both local and long haul truckers as well as freight transportation.  Economic sectors 
selling raw materials were also ubiquitous across districts, including Home Centers; 
Lumber, Plywood, Millwork, and Wood Panel Merchant Wholesalers; Supermarkets and 
Grocery Stores; Nursery, Garden Center, and Farm Supply Stores; and Other Building 
Materials Dealers.  Differences in district presence could therefore bias committee 
representation towards distributors of raw materials and against interests that produce raw 
materials. 
District presence is therefore an understudied, but important factor that begins to 
explain which types of groups are better represented on House committees.  But this 
variable does not capture variation in a group’s constituency presence within the districts 
where it is located.  To shed more light on the effects of variation in constituency 
presence within the districts where a group can claim to be a constituent, the final two 
sections will examine how political and geographic concentration affects interest 
representation on House committees. 
 
 
Does the Effect of Political Concentration on Committee Representation Differ for 
Groups with Different levels of District Presence? 
 
Groups with a presence in a large number of districts have more committee 
representation than groups with a presence in a small number of districts.  But if the level 
of district presence is held constant does variation in a interest’s concentration within the 




 To gauge the effect of political concentration I ran two new models that interact 
political concentration with dummy variables that measure low and high district presence.  
The first model parses out the effects of concentration on groups with high district 
presence.  In order to measure the effects of high and low political concentration on 
groups with a high district presence I added a dummy variable to the base model labeled 
“1” for groups that had a local presence in 90 percent or more of the 435 House districts.  
I also included an interaction term for political concentration multiplied by the dummy 
variable for groups with a high district presence.  Predicted values were then calculated 
for groups with high district presence from low to high values of political concentration 
(all other variables were set to their average value).
15
 
Figure 4.5 presents the results by committee for the effect of low to high values of 
political concentration for groups with high district presence for each committee studied.  
The results differ substantially for each committee studied.  For groups with high levels 
of district presence that participated in the policy subsystem related to banking and 
financial reform (labeled “Financial Services” in figure 4.5), as political concentration 
increases the results suggest that committee representation also increases.  In this policy 
subsystem it was better to have a concentrated constituency presence in some districts 
than to be perfectly dispersed across districts.  These findings were suggestive, but 
predicted percentiles for low values were not statistically different from higher values of 
political concentration.   
                                                          
15
 Full results for models with interaction terms can be found in appendix A-1.   All models in the 
remaining sections were also tested with the dummy variables for high presence set to include 80% rather 
than 90% of districts and the results of the model are not noticeably different.  The same is true when low 
presence is set to include 20 % of all districts.   
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Though it is difficult to see in the figure, 
the effect of political concentration on a group 
with high district presence for groups involved 
in the policy subsystem for healthcare reform 
(labeled “Energy & Commerce” in figure 4.5) 
was slightly weaker as political concentration 
increased.  While the coefficient decreases at 
higher levels of political concentration, it is not 
statistically distinguishable from interests with 
lower levels of concentration and high district 
presence.  The effect was less strong for groups 
seeking representation on this committee than 
the Financial Services committee.   The results 
for the Natural Resources committee were 
similar.  For groups with high levels of district 
presence, participating in the policy subsystem 
related to energy regulation, as political 
concentration grew committee representation 
slightly decreased.    
Is it more advantageous for a group to 
have high district presence and higher political 
concentration within particular districts or to 
have high district presence with a dispersed presence within districts?  For groups with 
Figure 4.5: Does Political 
Concentration Influence 
Committee Representation for 
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high district presence the effect of being more 
politically concentrated does not have a 
substantively relevant influence on the amount 
of committee representation that they receive. 
The second model parses out the effects 
of groups with low district presence.  To 
measure the effects of high and low political 
concentration on groups with a low district 
presence, I added a dummy variable to the base 
model labeled “1” for groups that had a local 
presence in 10 percent or fewer of the 435 
House districts.  In the same fashion as the 
models for high presence I included an 
interaction term for political concentration 
multiplied by the dummy variable for groups 
with a low district presence.  Predicted values 
were calculated for groups with low district 
presence from low to high values of political 
concentration (with all other variables set to 
their average values). 
 Figure 4.6 presents the effects of 
different levels of political concentration on 
committee representation for groups with low district presence.  For groups with low 
Figure 4.6: Does Political 
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district presence higher levels of political concentration decreased committee 
representation for the Energy and Commerce and Natural Resources committees and it 
slightly increased representation on the Financial Services committee.  However, these 
results were not statistically significant at (or near) the 95 percent level of statistical 
significant for any committee related model.  Similar to the results for the models testing 
the effects of political concentration for groups with high levels of district presence, there 
is little evidence that variation in political concentration in a subset of the districts where 
they have district presence has any consistent effect on committee representation.  It may 
be slightly better in some committees for a group to have a concentrated presence in a 
subset of the districts where they can claim to be a constituent, but the effects measured 
here are much less clear than the effect of having simply being a constituent in a large 
number of districts. 
 
 
Does the Effect of Geographic Dispersion/Concentration on Committee 
Representation Vary for Groups with Different levels of District Presence? 
 
Political concentration measures the proportion of the total constituency that is 
concentrated within particular districts.  High values of political concentration indicate 
that a constituency is concentrated in particular districts rather than spread more evenly 
across districts.  But political concentration is unable to capture how dispersed or 
clustered the constituency is geographically. 
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To gauge the effect of geographic 
dispersion and concentration within the districts 
where groups are present I ran two new models 
that interact geographic dispersion with dummy 
variables that measure low and high district 
presence.  Note that I measure geographic 
concentration and dispersion using the 
standardized distance from the weighted spatial 
mean of the constituency to the weighted 
constituency presence within the 435 districts.  
Higher values of standard distance indicate 
geographic dispersion and lower values indicate 
geographic concentration.  The first model 
parses out the effects of groups with high 
district presence.  In order to measure the effects 
of high and low geographic concentration on 
groups with a high district presence, I added a 
dummy variable to the base model labeled “1” 
for groups that had a local presence in 90 
percent or more of the 435 House districts.  I 
also included an interaction term for geographic 
concentration multiplied by the dummy variable 
for groups with a high district presence.  Predicted values were then calculated for groups 
Figure 4.7: Does Geographic 
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with high district presence from low values which indicate geographic concentration to 




Figure 4.7 presents the results by committee for the effect of low to high values of 
geographic concentration/dispersion for groups with high district presence for each 
committee studied.  The results for groups with high district presence suggest that 
interests that are geographically dispersed and in a high number of districts tend to win 
better committee representation than interests that are present in a large number of 
districts but also geographically concentrated.  The predicted values were statistically 
different when geographic concentration for interests with high district presence was set 
to its minimum and maximum values for the Natural Resources committee, but not for 
other committee related models.
17
  Even so, the direction of the predicted values for all 
models suggest that groups with geographically dispersed constituency presence have 
higher levels of committee representation for each of the three committees studied.  The 
first important finding here is therefore that geographic concentration does not appear to 
increase committee representation for interests with high levels of district presence.  
These results again emphasize that district presence rather than political or geographic 
concentration impacts committee representation.   
Reinhardt and Busch’s work (1999, 2000, 2001) indicates that geographically 
concentrated economic sectors will engage in more effective political activity because 
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 For the Financial Services model the minimum value was 3.2 and the maximum value was 21.1.  For the 
Energy and Commerce model the minimum value was 3.2 and the maximum value was 20.4.  And for the 
Natural Resources model the minimum value was 6.4 and the maximum value was 20.4. 
17
 This pattern may also be related to practices that tend to limit the number of 
representatives from any one particular state on congressional committees.   
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spatial proximity makes it easier to overcome the difficulties presented by the collective 
action problem.  Following from Reinhardt and Busch’s findings, as geographically 
concentrated interests become more politically active, we should expect elevated levels of 
political advocacy from their legislative allies.  While this may be true for particular 
districts, in the aggregate, the results from Figure 4.7 indicate no consistent effects from 
geographic concentration.  In a given district, it may be the case that legislators make a 
stronger effort to win membership on committees that assist geographically concentrated 
constituencies.  However, for all districts where a group has a district presence I do not 
find consistent evidence to infer that geographic concentration leads to higher levels of 
committee representation.  While geographic concentration may elevate levels of 
legislative advocacy for group allies once they are on a committee relevant to the policy 
needs of the group, it does not lead to consistently higher committee representation for 
groups with high district presence.   
The problem that groups face when they are geographically concentrated is that 
they are also more likely to be constituents in fewer congressional districts.  Being a 
constituent in a larger number of districts expands a group’s pool of potential legislative 
allies.  The consequence is that while a group with a geographically concentrated 
constituency may have stronger allies, they are also more likely to have fewer total allies, 
which can weaken their impact on policy outcomes. 
 The second model parses out the effects of groups with low district presence.  In 
order to measure the effects of high and low geographic concentration on groups with a 
low district presence I added a dummy variable to the base model labeled “1” for groups 
that had a local presence in 10 percent or fewer of the 435 House districts.  I also 
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included an interaction term for geographic concentration multiplied by the dummy 
variable for groups with a high district presence.  Predicted values were then calculated 
for groups with low district presence from low 
values which indicate geographic concentration to 
high values which indicate geographic dispersion 
(all other variables were set to their average 
value). 
 Figure 4.8 presents the results by 
committee for the effect of low to high values of 
geographic dispersion for groups with low district 
presence for each committee studied.  Similar to 
each of the previous analyses of political 
concentration, the direction of predicted values 
was not consistent for all committees studied.  
Additionally, none of the three committees 
studied had statistically different results at any 
meaningful range of predicted values.  For 
interests with low district presence in the 
Financial Services and Natural Resources models, 
geographic concentration increases the predicted 
percentile of committee representation.  In 
contrast with these findings, the direction of the 
predicted percentile of committee representation 
Figure 4.8: Does Geographic 
Concentration Influence 
Committee Representation for 
Groups with Low Levels of 






for the Energy and Commerce committee indicates that groups that are more 
geographically dispersed receive greater representation.    
Moving from the minimum value of geographic dispersion to the maximum value 
of geographic dispersion for interests with low district presence for each committee 
resulted in no statistically different predicted values of committee representation.  
Therefore, the results of the models for groups with low district presence that are also 
more geographically concentrated indicate that these interests do not consistently win 
greater representation on House committees. 
 
Conclusion: The Geography of Interest Representation, Legislative Behavior, and 
Group Influence 
This chapter offers a new theoretical foundation and empirical evidence on the 
question of what groups are advantaged and disadvantaged in the legislative process in 
Congress. Rather than focusing on financial resources, the theory presented here centers 
on which interests are better able to win legislative allies on important committees in 
Congress. Put simply, groups vary in the number of allies that they generate largely as a 
result of constituency-related factors.  
The results presented here, and in the two chapters that follow, illuminate how 
geographic representation shapes the composition of congressional committees to the 
advantage and disadvantage of different interests in society.  Groups exhibit wide 
variation in the number of districts where they have a local presence.  Some interests 
have a presence in many districts, and some have a presence in few districts.  Moreover, 
interests can also be uniquely spread across or concentrated within the districts where 
they are located.   They can also be geographically concentrated within particular areas of 
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the country.  After examining the effects of variation in district presence and variation in 
political and geographic concentration within the districts where groups are present, the 
effects of constituency presence on committee representation (and sometimes the lack of 
effects) are now clearer.   
Groups that have a local presence in a larger number of House districts generally 
win more committee representation on average than groups with a local presence in fewer 
districts.  Within the districts where constituencies are present, being politically or 
geographically concentrated does not consistently increase or decrease a group’s level of 
committee representation.  This is true whether a group has a local presence in a large 
number or a small number of districts.  The bottom line after extensively examining each 
of the above geographic explanatory variables in this chapter is therefore that being a 
constituent in more electoral districts is more important to committee representation than 
the concentration of the constituency across the districts where a group is present.   
Constituency presence motivates ally generation in Congress.  And organized 
interests that generate more allies are often likely to be better represented in the House.  
When groups have a local presence in more districts, they increase the pool of potential 
legislative allies that can advocate for their policy needs in Congress.  The concentration 
of the total constituency within the districts where it is present did not affect committee 
representation in this study, but it is important to note that though geographic and 
political concentration are less important to committee membership, they are still likely 
to be important after committee membership is set.  Future studies should consider 
whether committee members from districts with geographically and/or politically 
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concentrated constituencies advocate for group interests more aggressively or 
consistently than committee members who represent more dispersed constituencies.   
Groups vary in how they are distributed geographically across electoral districts.  
When they are present in more districts, they systematically win greater committee 
representation than when they are present in fewer districts.  And as the next two chapters 
will demonstrate, systemic bias in the legislative process does not end with variation in 
how geography impacts interest representation.  Within a given district, some types of 
constituencies may have a stronger impact on constituency-motivated ally generation 
than others.  Organized interests that have control over the local economy, for example, 
are likely to receive greater representation than other types of interests.  The next chapter 
empirically examines Charles Lindblom’s much debated assertion that business interests 








This chapter offers a fresh theoretical approach and empirical evidence that a 
built-in advantage exists for business interests over and above other interests in the 
legislative process.  The source of this advantage begins at the local level.  Within any 
given district, many different interests with varied policy agendas coexist.  When 
members of Congress make decisions about which constituency interests to prioritize 
they are likely to view the policy needs of some types of interests as being more 
important than others.  Consequently, some categories of constituents may be more likely 
to generate allies in, and receive greater advocacy from, their representative(s) than 
others.  In the following pages I first detail the prominent theoretical and empirical 
approaches to studying systematic business influence over legislative behavior and policy 
outcomes in Congress.  I then offer a revised theoretical perspective and empirical 
evidence that business advantage over legislative advocacy in Congress is related to the 
leverage that business interests have over jobs and economic investment in the district.   
As in the previous chapter, my focus is on the stage in the legislative process 
where bias in legislative representation is the most likely to impact the policymaking 
process, legislative committees.  Baumgartner et al. (2009) found that one of the few 
predictors of policy success for organized interests on a particular side of a policy issue 
debate was the number of committee level allies that they have.  The focus on this 
chapter will therefore be on testing whether business interests have a systematic 
advantage over nonbusiness interests in committee representation.  I expect to find 
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evidence that business interests are more likely than other types of groups to be 
overrepresented (and less likely to be underrepresented) on committees of importance to 
their policy goals.  
I will present evidence that business advantage is derived from its role as a 
constituent in members’ districts.  Representatives will, on average, advocate for local 
business interests over and above other interests in the district (and all interests outside 
the district) because business interests have control over local jobs and economic 
investment.  As the more detailed theoretical discussion and the evidence presented in the 
following pages will establish, business advantage over legislative advocacy in Congress 
has roots in constituency representation. 
 
Competing Explanations for Business Advantage in Congress 
 
The following theoretical discussion describes the two prominent explanations of 
business influence over policy outcomes in Congress.  After describing the prominent 
theories of business influence, I offer a new explanation of why business interests have a 
built-in advantage over other interests in the policymaking process.  I argue that the 
causal mechanism for business influence over policy outcomes is not primarily the result 
of business control over the national economy or businesses dominance among all the 
moneyed interests that donate to legislators.  In key respects, business advantage in 
Congress begins at the local level.  It is closely tied to the role business interests play as 
constituents in members’ districts.   
The principal theory of business influence is often referred to as structural 
dependence theory.  Structural dependence theory, which is also sometimes described as 
“the privileged place of business, the structural source of power, or the structural 
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dependence of the state on capital” (Smith 1999), argues that business has a structural 
advantage over other interests in the policy process because it has greater leverage over 
the economy.  Business interests are described as having more influence over policy 
outcomes than other interests because business controls “investment, employment, and 
economic growth” (Quinn and Shapiro 1991).   
The foundational explanation of this theory in the political science literature was 
put forward by Charles Lindblom (1977)
18
.  In Politics and Markets, Lindblom contends 
that business holds a privileged place in the policymaking process because of its leverage 
over jobs and economic investment.  Politicians, on average, advocate for business 
interests over and above other interests because advocating against business initiates an 
“automatically punishing recoil” of economic costs (Lindblom 1982).  When the 
economy is in trouble, Lindblom argues, politicians face the threat of losing future 
elections.  Politicians are therefore incentivized to work harder for business interests than 
other categories of organizations in the interest group universe.  This description of the 
structural dependence theory has been repeated in Bernagen and Brauninger (2005), 
Bowles and Gintis (1986), Cohen and Rogers (1983), Dryzek (1996), Elkin (1985), 
Mitchell (1997), and Smith (1999, 2000).   
A substantial number of authors have tested this theory, but the empirical 
literature does not present consistent evidence in favor of the claim that business is 
advantaged over other interests.  One prospective reason why the evidence for business 
advantage is mixed is that the literature almost exclusively operationalizes business 
influence using national rather than local economic indicators.  Lindblom’s work does 
not offer detailed guidance in this regard.  He argues that business has a privileged place 
                                                          
18
 But see also Block 1977 and Offe 1984 for early similar formulations of this theory. 
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in the political process because of its control over the economy, but he does not tie this 
economic leverage to the political representation of particular geographically bound 
areas.   
Without clear theoretical guidance about which aspects of the economy are the 
most relevant to business advantage over policy outcomes, scholars have overwhelmingly 
chosen to examine the effect of national economic indicators on the policy benefits that 
business interests receive.  Findings that support theses of business advantage have been 
generated when testing the effect of increased national employment on both corporate tax 
rates (Campbell and Allen 1994) and tax progressivity (Allen and Campbell 1994), when 
examining the effect of the national economy on tax incentives for business (Quinn 
1988), and when studying the relationship between welfare spending and variation in 
national economic investment (Hicks and Swank 1984).  In contrast, scholars have 
uncovered evidence that does not support structural dependence theory when testing the 
relationship between the national economy and corporate taxes (Jacobs 1988), when 
measuring the effect of national investment on taxes (Quinn and Shapiro 1991), and when 
testing the effects of diverse national economic factors such as GDP, the employment 
rate, the rate of investment growth, and an index combining these factors on an index of 
business’s federal level policy success (Smith 1999,  2000).  
The methodological approach that the literature examining Lindblom’s thesis has 
therefore almost exclusively tested whether business leverage over the national economy 
relates to its influence over policy outcomes.  Because legislative representation in 
Congress is tied to geography, we may find more consistent evidence that business is 
better positioned in the policymaking process than other interests if we examine business 
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through the lens of constituency representation.  As I will argue after reviewing the 
second prominent theory of business influence below, business’s advantage over other 
interests in Congress is more likely to begin at the local level, within the borders that 
legislators actually represent. 
Scholarship on interest group influence offers a second theoretical explanation of 
business advantage in Congress.  This approach, sometimes referred to as exchange 
theory, focuses on the effect of transactions between organizations and legislators.  
Exchange theory argues that money is contributed to legislators in order to buy legislative 
behavior.  Because business interests make up the largest proportion of interests 
represented in the interest group universe (Schlozman and Tierney 1986), and because 
they are often the best financed among politically active interests that lobby in 
Washington (Baumgartner and Leech 2001), exchange theory suggests that they ought to 
gain more leverage over legislative outcomes than other interests.
19
  A large body of 
work has tested the hypothesis that moneyed interests buy legislative advocacy (See 
Chappell 1982; Fleisher, 1993; McCarty and Rothenberg 1996; Morton and Cameron 
1992; Snyder 1992; Stratmann 1995; Welch 1982; but see also Baumgartner and Leech 
1998a; and Smith 1995 for more detailed reviews of the many studies analyzing this 
hypothesis).  However, like structural dependence theory, the evidence that moneyed 
interests win policy outcomes via quid pro quo transactions is mixed, at best 
(Baumgartner and Leech 1998a). 
Recent empirical and theoretical work by Baumgartner et al. offers further 
evidence business does not systematically possess influence over and above other 
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 Scholars testing exchange theory rarely explicitly argue that exchange theory means that there is a built 
in advantage for business interests.  However, an advantage for business interests is often implied by theses 
of empirical work testing this approach (Harris 2013).   
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interests.  Baumgartner et al. (2009) argued that the models put forth by much of the 
work on exchange theorists were overly simplistic.  In most cases, the competition among 
organized interests for particular policy outcomes pits multiple interests on different sides 
of the issues against one another.  Business interests often build coalitions with 
nonbusiness interests to face coalitions of business and nonbusiness interests on an 
opposing side of an issue.  The result is that well-financed interests are often 
counterbalanced by other well-financed interests.   
Another powerful critique of exchange theory is that we should expect organized 
interests who desire to buy votes to contact legislators that are on the fence or in 
opposition to a policy, but the empirical evidence demonstrates that organized interests 
are much more likely to contact their legislative allies (Hall and Deardorff 2006; Hall and 
Wayman 1992; Hojnacki and Kimball 1998).  Instead of buying legislative behavior 
money is often thought to buy access such that organized interests can make the case for 
their policy interests to members of Congress (Herndon 1982; Langbein 1986; and 
Schlozman and Tierney 1986, 246). 
In addition to the prominent theories for business influence discussed in the two 
sections above, other scholars have argued the structural dependence of policymakers on 
business is conditional upon the historical context, the mobilization of other interests, or 
the type of issue studied (Harris 2013; Smith 2010; Vogel 1983, 1996a, 1996b, 2003).  
Yet others make the case that business interests may win more favorable policy outcomes 
by shaping public opinion (Smith 2000).  But the same empirical issue remains.  To date 
there is simply no consistent systematic evidence that business has a structural advantage 
in the policymaking process.  To make a well substantiated argument that business 
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interests have greater leverage over the legislative process than other types of groups, a 
fresh theoretical explanation of the causal mechanism and an alternative foundation for 
demonstrable supporting evidence is needed.  The following section offers a revised 
theoretical approach to the study of business advantage over policy outcomes in the 
legislative process. 
 
Constituency Motivated Ally Generation and Business Advantage 
Business interests have a privileged place in the policymaking process, but it is 
tied to their role as constituents within the geographic areas represented by legislators in 
Congress.  Studying groups through the lens of constituency representation offers fresh 
opportunity in the search for business influence on the legislative process.  Various types 
of constituencies exist within the district.  However, the legislative needs of business 
interests are likely to be prioritized by members of Congress over other local interests 
because businesses have control over local economic investment, jobs, and economic 
growth.  Legislators work on behalf of many interests in their districts, but because they 
care about jobs, economic investment and growth in the district, business interests’ policy 
needs are more likely to be prioritized over nonbusiness interests.  Even if the priority 
given to business interests is only modest, a small prioritization of local business needs 
can result in a substantial amount of business advantage over the levers of power in 
Congress.  As legislators request membership on House committees, the prioritization of 
local business interests over and above other interests can lead to a substantial aggregate 
advantage for business interests over nonbusiness interests in committee representation.   
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With an increased likelihood of prioritizing local business interests over other 
constituencies, legislators will be more likely to request membership on committees that 
have the greatest leverage over the policy agendas of local business interests.  And with a 
larger pool of legislators requesting committee membership to serve local business 
interests, we should see systematic evidence that committee representation reflects a 
pervasive business advantage in Congress.  Small differences in a legislator’s perceived 
importance of some types of local interests over others, namely the elevation of the 
policy needs of local business interests because of their control over local jobs and 
economic investment, can therefore lead to substantial systematic differences in 
committee representation for business interests.   
 
Political Mobilization: An Alternative Explanation for Business Advantage Over 
Other Interests in the District 
Local business interests may also receive more legislative advocacy than other 
interests in the district simply because they are, on average, more politically active.  
Miler (2010) found that local interests were more likely to both be seen by, and receive 
legislative advocacy from, their representatives when they contacted them via phone, 
email, or mail.  If business interests contact their representatives more than nonbusiness 
interests, then they may be more likely to generate an ally in, and receive advocacy from, 
the members of Congress where they have a local presence. 
Moreover, Mancur Olson’s foundational work on collective action (1965) posited 
that business interests will find it easier to organize for collective political action than 
interests with less clearly defined incentives for member participation.  This logic offers 
an explanation for the substantial literature that finds evidence that business is among the 
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most politically mobilized category of interests in the interest group universe (Schlozman 
and Tierney 1986), among interests that lobby Congress (Baumgartner et al. 2001), as 
participants in bureaucratic rule-making (Golden 1998), and among interests who file 
amicus briefs to the Supreme Court (Caldeira and Wright 1990).  Given the abundance of 
evidence that business interests are effective at mobilizing for political action in varied 
contexts, it is possible that within the district, business interests may gain more legislative 
advocacy simply because they are more likely to muster more political action than other 
interests.  To control for the possibility that business wins greater legislative 
representation compared to other local interests because they are more likely to 
participate in the political process, I include a number of variables in the below models 
that control for this alternative explanation. 
 
Methodology 
The dependent variable and constituency data analyzed here are identical to those 
used in the previous chapter (see chapter 4 for complete explanation).  The dependent 
variable is the percentile of committee representation of constituencies.  A percentile of 
(over or under) representation when compared to the full membership of the House was 
calculated for each constituency for three committees- Financial Services, Energy and 
Commerce, and Natural Resources.  Recall that if a constituency is near the 50
th
 
percentile of committee representation, then they receive committee representation that is 
identical to what we should expect from a committee randomly selected from the full 
membership of the House.  Percentiles above the 50
th
 percentile indicate 
overrepresentation on the committee when compared to the entire House membership and 
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percentiles below the 50
th
 percentile indicate underrepresentation when compared to the 
entire House membership.   
 
Independent Variables Explained 
While the dependent variable, the observations, and the committees studied are 
the same as the previous chapter, I include a number of new independent variables to 
parse out and test the varied theories of business advantage described above.  To 
illuminate which theory of business advantage each set of variables is testing, I first list 
the hypothesis associated with each theory and then I describe all independent variables 
testing each theory.   
Structural dependence theory with emphasis on national economy hypothesis: 
H1: Organized interests with more influence over the national economy will receive 
better representation on House committees than interests with less influence over the 
national economy. 
The trend in the empirical work is to use national economic indicators such as 
economic investment, job loss, or firm closings to test for business advantage in the 
policymaking process.  In accordance with this literature, I include three variables testing 
structural dependence theory in each model.  Business Investment measures the total 
amount of investment an economic sector made in 2008.
20
  Business investment was 
collected from the 2008 Annual Capital Expenditures Survey gathered by the U.S. Census 
Bureau.  Employment Change measures the change in national employment from 2008 to 
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2009 for each business constituency analyzed.
21
  It is measured as the total number of 
jobs gained or lost from 2008 to 2009.  Firm Change measures the net number of 
business establishments opened and closed nationally for each business constituency 
studied (it is a negative number if more establishments were closed than open, for 
example).  Data for Employment Change and Firm Change was collected using the 
Statistics on U.S. Business annual economic census survey
22
.  If the theory of structural 
dependence is correct, then first, as jobs are lost and as the number of business 
establishments close for particular economic sectors, these sectors should receive greater 
amounts of representation on House committees.  Second, interests that exhibit higher 
levels of business investment should be better represented on House committees. 
 
Exchange theory hypothesis: 
H2: As the amount of PAC money that a particular type of organization contributes (to 
candidates and/or to candidates in the majority party respectively) increases, the amount 
of committee representation that these interests receive will also increase. 
 Two variables were included in each model to test for the assertion that interests 
that give more money in political campaigns are better represented on House committees.  
The first variable testing this hypothesis is PAC Contributions.  PAC Contributions 
measures the average of the total of all PAC contributions during the 110
th
 session of 
Congress for all organizations linked to a particular constituency in the sample.
23
  If the 
exchange theory hypothesis is true, as average PAC contributions by a particular type of 
                                                          
21
 Nonbusiness interests were set to the average value of Employment Change for all observations per 
committee model. 
22
 The most granular level of data available was used for Business Investment, Employment Change, and 
Firm Change.  Data for Employment Change and Firm Change was available at the four digit NAICS code 
level.   And data for Business Investment was available at the three-digit NAICS code level. 
23
 For more information on how organizations were coded per constituency studied prior to calculating this 
or other variables see chapter 3. 
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organized interest increase, these interests ought to receive greater representation on 
House committees.   
 It may also be the case, however, that interests are more likely to receive policy 
benefits if they contribute money to the majority party.  Recent work by Gimpel, Lee, and 
Parrott (2014) finds that organized interests demonstrate variation in their approach to 
party giving.  I therefore include a variable, PAC Contributions to Majority Party to add 
a further empirical test of the exchange theory hypothesis.  This variable measures the 
average total PAC contributions for all organizations linked to a particular constituency 
in the sample to the majority party only.  As PAC contributions to the majority party 
increase, exchange theory predicts that committee representation should also increase. 
Constituency motivated ally generation hypothesis: 
H3: Organized interests that have more influence over local jobs, economic investment, 
and growth will receive better representation on House committees than interests with 
less influence over the local economy. 
 Within the district, business constituencies are more likely to receive legislative 
advocacy than nonbusiness constituencies because of their control over local jobs, 
economic investment, and economic growth in the district.  Across all districts this 
advantage in constituency representation should result in evidence of systematically 
greater representation of business interests on congressional committees, as compared to 
the amount of representation received by nonbusiness constituencies.  Table 5.1 presents 
the bivariate results for this variable.  The preliminary results show that business 
constituencies garner consistently higher levels of representation across all committees 
studied.
24
  Put differently, business interests are more likely than nonbusiness interests to 
                                                          
24
 For the main analysis presented throughout this chapter I used an expansive definition to define business 
interests.  All interests that could be categorized as having control over local jobs and economic investment 
126 
 
have a stronger presence in the districts of committee members than they have in House 
districts at large.  As shown below, most nonbusiness interests, in fact, have a smaller 
presence in the districts of key committee members than they have in House districts 
generally. 
 
Table 5.1: Average Committee Representation for 
Business and Nonbusiness Interests 
 
Committee Nonbusiness Business 
Financial Services 47 68 
Energy & Commerce 42 54 
Natural Resources 46 53 
All Committees 45 57 
Note: Dependent Variable: House median is at the 50th percentile.    
Values above 50 indicate overrepresentation and values below indicate 
underrepresentation 
 
Control Variables Explained 
 Business interests in the district may receive heightened legislative advocacy 
because they have leverage over the local economy, but political mobilization could also 
explain findings that support business influence.  Business interests demonstrate more 
political mobilization than nonbusiness interests in a variety of contexts.  Legislators are 
likely to work harder for their most politically active constituents.  This elevated 
advocacy could translate into greater levels of committee representation for business 
when compared to nonbusiness interests.  To control for this alternative explanation, I 
                                                                                                                                                                             
in the districts were labeled as business interests.  This definition is admittedly very broad.  To ensure that 
the results presented here were accurate I reran models using varied definitions for business interests and 
the results remained consistent despite alternative ways of operationalizing this variable.  For example, 
some authors prefer to exclude healthcare sectors from business categories (Holyoke 2014).  When I 




include several variables that gauge political mobilization.
25
  Lobbying $ measures the 
average amount all interests linked to a particular constituency spent on lobbying during 
the 111
th
 Congress.  Lobbying Reports is the average number of lobbying reports the 
constituency interest filed for all bills under the issue area during the 111
th
 Congress.  
Finally, Bills Lobbied is the average number of bills in the issue area that the constituency 
interest lobbied during the 111
th
 Congress.  For each indicator of political mobilization, 
the alternative hypothesis that constituencies that are more active politically receive 
greater amounts of committee representation is supported if the variable demonstrates 
positive and statistically significant results. 
The next two control variables gauge the total national size of the constituency.  If 
constituency motivated ally generation matters, then we should see evidence that local 
constituencies drive committee representation.  To ensure that national constituencies do 
not act as a confounding variable that impacts committee representation I also include 
two variables that control for national group size.  Total Receipts measures the amount of 
money each group received in 2008.  It includes the total sales, shipments, receipts, and 
revenue for each group studied.  Total Receipts is an aggregate variable that is gathered 
by NAICS industry code from the 2007 economic census.  For constituencies that were 
not generated from NAICS data I generated Total Receipts using data from nonprofit 990 
tax forms for 2008 from guidestar.com.  Total receipts were gathered from 990 forms for 
all organizations that filed at least one lobbying report per issue area studied.   Then the 
total receipts were aggregated by constituency.  
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The variable Total Membership is the total number of members a group has 
nationally.  For constituencies that are economic sectors, this variable is the total national 
employment for the group.  For groups that are not economic sectors, this variable is the 
total number of individuals that fall into the group type.  I use the term membership 
broadly to indicate the number of citizens that are affiliated with the group.   
 I also include versions of all geographic variables from the previous chapter that 
are likely to influence committee representation.
26
  Local Presence is a count of the 
number of districts where the interest has a local presence.  As previously discussed, 
legislators are the natural allies of their constituents.  Groups who are a part of a 
representative’s constituency are more likely to receive advocacy from the legislator than 
groups with no local presence.  As a group becomes present in more districts they have a 
greater pool of potential legislative allies.  I therefore expect to find evidence that 
parallels findings in the previous chapter that groups that have a local presence in more 
districts will gain greater committee representation than groups with a local presence in 
fewer districts.  Geographic Dispersion measures the extent to which a constituency is 
clustered in a particular part of the country or dispersed across districts that are more 
distant from one another.   
Lastly, Committee Ranking for Group's Policy Agenda measures the committee’s 
importance to the total policy agenda of a particular interest when compared to the 20 
                                                          
26
 I include all geographic explanatory variables that were consistently statistically significant predictors 
across the majority of models.  A count of the districts where groups maintain a local presence is 
substituted for dichotomous variables that measure high or low local presence because the goal of the 
previous chapter’s goal was to parse out how high and low district presence AND different types of 
concentration influence committee representation.  This is not the goal in this chapter.   For more details on 
how geographic variables were calculated see the previous chapter. 
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standing committees of the House.
27
  As described in the previous chapter, constituencies 
inform their allies that a particular committee is the most important to their policy 
agenda.  When legislative allies receive a clear message about which committee would 
best serve the needs of their constituents they become more incentivized to join the 
committee.  Positive and statistically significant results for Local Presence,Committee 
Ranking for Group's Policy Agenda, and Business offer evidence that business is 
advantaged via the theory of constituency motivated ally generation and mobilization. 
 
Model Results 
Table 5.2:  In a Comparison of Constituencies Tied to Particular Interests, 
What Factors Predict Variation in Committee Representation? 
 




















(6.178) (11.637) (9.109) (9.905) 
Change in Employment -9.226 -8.539 -9.750 -9.619 
 
(6.076) (10.196) (6.846) (22.870) 
Business Investment 1.659 11.995
**
 -1.562 -1.624 
 
(3.174) (5.953) (4.971) (4.926) 
Change in Firms -0.764 6.596
**
 -0.890 -4.173 
 
(1.748) (3.042) (2.747) (3.709) 
PAC Contributions -0.653 -1.554
*
 -1.205 1.694 
 
(0.543) (0.873) (0.730) (1.222) 






(0.728) (1.207) (1.064) (1.465) 
Avg. Lobbying Spending 0.031 0.040 0.010 0.047 
 
(0.029) (0.042) (0.053) (0.055) 
Avg. Lobbying Reports 0.169 0.717 0.271 0.154 
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(0.195) (0.438) (0.282) (0.322) 
Avg. Number of Bills Lobbied -0.024 -0.046 -0.021 -0.036 
 









(3.025) (6.298) (5.125) (5.069) 








(0.531) (1.023) (0.880) (0.811) 
Committee Ranking for 











(0.254) (0.470) (0.663) (0.531) 
Total Receipts 0.004 -0.081 -0.023 0.172 
 
(0.043) (0.173) (0.042) (0.221) 













(11.298) (21.391) (20.301) (18.888) 
Observations 532 143 186 203 
R
2
 0.075 0.337 0.201 0.129 
Adjusted R
2








Note 2: One sided significance tests used for Business, Local Presence, and Committee Ranking for 
Group’s Policy Agenda. 
 
 
Results Testing Systematic Business Advantage and Structural Dependence Theory 
 Structural dependence theory argues that business has a built-in advantage over 
nonbusiness interests because business largely controls economic growth, investment, 
and employment.  The methodological trend of the empirical work testing structural 
dependence theory has been to examine whether economic sectors with greater leverage 
over the national economy receive more policy benefits.  Previous work has found mixed 
evidence that economic sectors with greater leverage over the national economy receive 
more policy benefits.  After retesting three commonly studied national economic factors 
on committee representation, I find little evidence supporting the structural dependence 
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hypothesis.  Results were consistent for models testing all committees and all groups, for 
the Financial Services committee model, for the Energy and Commerce committee 
model, and for the Natural Resources committee model. 
 Figure 5.1 presents the results for the first national economic indicator studied, 
employment change.  I find no substantively meaningful or statistically significant 
Figure 5.1:  Did Economic Sectors Which Lost Greater Amounts of Jobs From 





evidence that the economic sectors which lost greater amounts of jobs from 2008 to 2009 
received better representation on House committees.
28
  The predicted percentile for 
economic sectors in the Financial Services model was 67 when employment change was 
set to the mean value of the dataset, and 64 when set to one standard deviation above the 
mean.
29
  These point estimates were neither substantively meaningful nor statistically 
different from one another at the 95 percent confidence level.   
The predicted percentile for economic sectors in the Energy and Commerce 
model was 53 when employment change was set to the mean value of the dataset and 50 
when set to one standard deviation above the mean.  Again, these point estimates were 
not statistically different from one another at the 95 percent confidence level.  Finally, the 
predicted percentile for economic sectors in the Natural Resources model was 53 when 
employment change was set to the mean value of the dataset, and 52 when set to one 
standard deviation above the mean.  These point estimates, following the pattern 
established by the previous models, were neither substantively meaningful nor 
statistically different from one another at the 95 percent confidence level.   
Figure 5.2 lists the predicted percentiles and confidence intervals for each model 
testing the effects of the rate of national firm closings for each economic sector on 
committee representation.
30
  The results for this variable again did not support the 
structural dependence hypothesis.  Moving from the mean to one standard deviation 
above the mean of the rate of firm closings resulted in an increase of about five 
                                                          
28
 Figure 5.1 shows the number of jobs lost in the hundreds of thousands where “-1” indicates that one 
hundred thousand jobs were lost from 2008 to 2009. 
29
 For all calculations of the predicted percentile for particular variables in this chapter, all other variables 
were set to their mean values. 
30
 Figure 5.2 shows firm closings in the thousands where “-4” indicates that four thousand firms were 
closed from 2008 to 2009. 
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percentage points for the Financial Services committee model, and a decrease of one and 
four percentage 
 
points, respectively, for the and Energy and Commerce and Natural Resources committee 
models.  These differences in point estimates were neither substantively meaningful nor 
statistically different from one another.  
Figure 5.2:  Do Economic Sectors With the Higher National Rates of Firm Closings 




Figure 5.3 lists the predicted percentiles and confidence intervals testing the 
effects of the final variable used to evaluate the structural dependence hypothesis, 
national economic investment.
31
  The results are consistent with previous findings: there 
are no statistically significant differences between the predicted percentile of committee 
representation when industry investment is set to its mean value and when it is set to the 
mean plus one standard deviation.  Moving from the mean value of industry economic 
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 Figure 5.3 shows the amount of money invested in the hundreds of billions where “1” indicates that one 
hundred billion was invested in 2008. 
Figure 5.3:  Are Economic Sectors That Invest more in the National Economy Better 
Represented on House Committees? 
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investment to its value at one standard deviation above the mean increased the predicted 
percentile in the Financial Services committee by four percentage points.  In contrast, it 
slightly decreased the predicted percentile by less than one percentage point for the 
Energy and Commerce and the Natural Resources committees.  Consistent with all other 
tests of the structural dependence hypothesis, none of the above differences in effects 
were substantively meaningful or statistically different from one another. 
 
Results Testing Systematic Business Advantage and Exchange Theory 
 Exchange theory argues that there is a quid pro quo exchange of campaign 
contributions from organized interests for legislative advocacy in Congress.  Because 
business interests are among the most well financed type of organized interests, exchange 
theory implies that they should win systematically greater legislative advocacy than other 
types of interests.  After testing whether PAC contributions and/or PAC contributions to 
the majority party predict an increase in committee representation for organized interests, 
I find little evidence in support of exchange theory.   
Figure 5.4 presents the results testing whether PAC contributions affect the level 
of committee representation that a type of organization interest receives.
32
  When moving 
from the minimum to the maximum value of PAC contributions, the results ranged from 
a decrease of 7 percentage points for the Financial Services committee and 5 percentage 
points for the Energy and Commerce committee to a 6 percentage point increase for the 
Natural Resources committee.  None of the differences in predicted percentiles were, 
however, statistically different from one another.  Further, the results for all groups and  
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all committees, the Financial Services committee, and the Energy and Commerce 
committee were actually in the opposite direction of the exchange theory hypothesis.   
  
 
Figure 5.4:  Do Organized Interests that Contribute Comparatively larger Amounts of 
PAC Money Receive Better Representation on House Committees? 
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When organized interests give to the majority party there is some weak, but 
suggestive evidence that they receive heightened levels of committee representation.  The 
direction of the estimated percentiles supported the exchange theory hypothesis for all 
groups and all committees, for the Financial Services committee and for the Energy and  
 
Figure 5.5:  Do Organized Interests that Contribute Comparatively larger Amounts of 




Commerce committee.  Moving from the minimum value to the maximum value of PAC 
contributions to the majority party increased the percentile of representation for 
organized interests by 4 percentage points for the Financial Services committee, 9 
percentage points for the Energy and Commerce committee, and decreased the percentile 
of representation by 4 percentage points for the Natural Resources committee.  The effect 
of majority party contributions was also statistically significant in the Energy and 
Commerce model.  The results for two of the three committees studied therefore offer 
weak, but suggestive data that when organized interests give to the majority party they 
receive better representation.
33
  Alternatively, the causal arrow may run in the opposite 
direction.  These findings might also indicate that interests contribute more when they 
have better committee representation.  More research would be necessary to parse out the 
direction of any relationship along these lines. 
 
Results Testing Systematic Business Advantage via Constituency Motivated Ally 
Generation 
 
All else equal, I find a substantial amount of evidence that business constituencies 
receive greater amounts of representation on House committees than nonbusiness 
constituencies.  Local business interests have control over jobs and economic investment 
in ways that nonbusiness interests do not.  The evidence for three of four models 
indicates that interests with leverage over the local economy receive systematically better 
representation on House committees.  The results were consistent for nearly every model 
                                                          
33
 The sample of Natural Resources interests, however, contains many economic sectors that align 
themselves with Republican Party (see Gimpel, Lee, and Parrott 2014).  The negative effect for this 
committee may therefore indicate some weak evidence for a hypothesis that these interests were awarded 
fewer committee seats as a result of being allied with the minority party. 
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studied, and they offer considerable support for constituency motivated ally generation as 
a source of advantage for business interests in Congress.   
The first model presented in the multivariate results in Table 5.2 includes all 
groups in the dataset irrespective of the committee studied.  Across all groups and all 
committees the predicted percentile of committee representation for business 
constituencies is 18 percentage points higher than nonbusiness constituencies.  The 
predicted percentile of committee representation for business constituencies is 58 
compared to 40 for nonbusiness constituencies.  For all constituencies, irrespective of the 
committee under examination business interests were mildly overrepresented on the 
committee compared to their presence in House districts generally, on average, while  
Figure 5.6a:  
 
nonbusiness interests were slightly underrepresented on committees relative to their 
presence in House districts at large.
34
  However, the advantage that business interests 
have over nonbusiness interests also varies considerably by committee.   
                                                          
34
 Note that the confidence intervals are larger for nonbusiness constituencies for all predicted percentiles because they 
have a much smaller N than business constituencies in the dataset for each model studied.  As discussed in chapter 
three, there were simply much fewer nonbusiness interests and corresponding constituencies that filed lobbying reports 
within each policy subsystem studied.  
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The second model examines variation in Financial Services committee 
representation for the 143 constituencies that lobbied under the issue area: “U.S. Banking 
System and Financial Institution Regulation.”  The predicted percentile of representation 
generated from this model was 38 percentage points higher for business constituencies 
than for nonbusiness constituencies.  For business constituencies the predicted percentile 
of committee representation was 79 compared to 41 for nonbusiness constituencies.  
Business interests were therefore overrepresented on the committee while nonbusiness 
interests were underrepresented compared to what we should expect from a committee 
randomly selected from the full membership of the House.  Examples of business 
interests with strong representation on this committee include commercial banks, 
investment banks, savings institutions, and real estate creditors.  Nonbusiness interests 
that received substantially lower levels of committee representation included consumers 





The difference in representation for business constituencies and nonbusiness 
constituencies was larger on the Financial Services committee than on the Energy and 
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Commerce committee or the Natural Resources committee.  What explains the strength 
of business representation on this committee?  The major reason for this disparity is that 
the Financial Services committee has a narrow jurisdictional focus.  It does not have 
jurisdiction over many diverse issue areas in the same way as the Energy and Commerce 
committee does.  When the jurisdiction of the committee is narrow, the types of groups 
seeking seats on the committee are less diverse and competition among group advocates 
for limited seats on the committee is less intense.   This explanation is consistent with 
previous work such as Hall and Grofman (1990) and the logic presented in Shepsle’s 
study of committee representation, The Giant Jigsaw Puzzle (1978).  Because 
competition for seats is less fierce on committees with narrow jurisdictions, legislators 
allied with groups concerned about policies that come before those committees are likely 
to have an easier pathway toward obtaining committee membership, thereby leading to 
greater amounts of committee representation for these interests. 
Figure 5.6c: 
 
The third model examines variation in Energy and Commerce committee 
representation for the 186 constituencies that lobbied under the issue area: 
“comprehensive health care reform.”  The predicted percentile of representation was 25 
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percentage points higher for business constituencies in the Energy and Commerce 
committee model than for nonbusiness constituencies.  The predicted percentile of 
committee representation for business constituencies was 66 compared to 41 for 
nonbusiness constituencies.  Business interests were therefore slightly overrepresented on 
the committee while nonbusiness interests were, on average, quite strongly 
underrepresented compared to what we should expect from a committee randomly 
selected from the full membership of the House.  Examples of business interests that 
were overrepresented on this committee included many economic sectors that were 
central in the debate on healthcare reform such as direct health and medical insurance 
carriers, medical equipment and supplies wholesalers, and pharmacies.  A number of 
business interests related to other major issue areas under the committee’s jurisdiction 
also received strong representation such as aircraft manufacturers, auto parts 
manufacturers, department stores, gas stations and wireless service carriers.   Examples 
of nonbusiness interests receiving less representation included the elderly, people in 
poverty, and labor unions.  The uninsured received elevated representation on the 
committee compared its representation in the full membership of the House.  However, 
they received substantially less representation than business interests like health 
insurance providers.   The uninsured were in the 81
st
 percentile of committee 
representation while medical insurance providers received representation at the 89
th
 
percentile.   
These findings support a localized version of Lindblom’s hypothesis that because 
business interests have leverage over local jobs and economic investment they maintain a 
“privileged position” in the policy-making process.  Like the Financial Services 
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committee, there are other factors unique to the Energy and Commerce committee that 
impact the strength of business advantage over nonbusiness interests in committee 
representation. 
In contrast to both the Financial Services committee and the Natural Resources 
committee, Energy and Commerce had jurisdiction over a diverse number of policy issue 
areas.  Bills that flow through the Financial Services committee are overwhelmingly 
related to policy affecting economic sectors such as banking and finance interests.  
Legislation that is assigned to the Natural Resources committee is heavily weighted 
towards policy areas that affect both environmental advocates and economic sectors 
involved in resource extraction and energy production.  By contrast, the Energy and 
Commerce committee could consider a bill that affects unions and the auto industry in 
one hearing, a bill that sets off policy alarms for the energy industry and environmental 
advocates the next, yet more bills that influence the insurance industry, drug companies, 
hospitals and those without insurance, and on and on.  Because the policy jurisdiction of 
the committee is so diverse, the policies handled by the committee affect a much greater 
diversity of groups.  As more groups signal to their legislative allies to join the 
committee, there is greater competition for a limited number of seats on the committee.  
This competition makes it difficult for any one type of group to receive high levels of 
representation on this committee.  The result is that, in contrast to the results for group 
representation on the Financial Services committee, representation on the Energy and 
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 It’s important to note that I have not examined subcommittee representation here.  It could be that while 






The fourth and final model examines variation in Natural Resources committee 
representation for the 203 constituencies that lobbied under the issue area: “Natural Gas 
and Oil (Including Offshore Oil and Gas).”  The theory of constituency motivated ally 
generation argues that business constituencies receive systematically greater 
representation than nonbusiness constituencies within the district.  On a district by district 
basis it is likely that representatives are advocating more for business than nonbusiness 
constituencies (see Hall and Wayman 1990).  The results for the Natural Resources 
committee model, however, demonstrate that other factors can limit the impact that 
elevated advocacy for business interests in particular districts can have on committee 
representation. 
The percentile of representation was statistically the same for business 
constituencies as for nonbusiness constituencies on the Natural Resources committee.  
The predicted percentile of committee representation for business constituencies is 64.3 
                                                                                                                                                                             
the Financial Services committee, when subcommittee representation is analyzed, we see even stronger 
levels of representation for particular types of groups. 
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compared to 64.2 for nonbusiness constituencies, and the difference between these values 
is not statistically significant.  It is reasonable that business representation is not 
statistically larger than nonbusiness representation on this committee because 
nonbusiness interests under this policy issue area, primarily environmental organizations, 
are more politically mobilized and have a policy agenda that is focused and highly 
relevant to this committee.  In contrast, many business interests that participate in this 
issue area include economic sectors with policy agendas that were referred to multiple 
committees and that had a limited district presence.  These included sectors that are 
primarily involved in resource extraction.   
Environmental groups, the nonbusiness interest with perhaps the most to win or 
lose from policy outcomes under the jurisdiction of the Natural Resources committee are 
highly politically mobilized and they have a focused policy agenda.  Environmental 
groups, like labor unions, are much more politically mobilized than nonbusiness interests 
that represent the poor or consumer groups.  Furthermore, environmental groups also 
have agendas that are focused on the policies that flow through the Natural Resources 
committee rather than being spread across several committees.  The legislative allies of 
environmental groups are likely to receive a very clear signal from these groups about 
which committee they should join.  The result of being politically mobilized and having a 
focused policy agenda that aligns well with the jurisdiction of one particular committee is 
that environmental organizations received extremely high levels of representation on the 
Natural Resources committee.  Environmental organizations were in the 99
th
 percentile of 
representation on the Natural Resources committee compared to what we should expect 
from committees randomly selected from the House at large.  In other words, 
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environmental groups have a much stronger presence in the districts of Natural Resources 
committee members than they have in House districts at large. 
In contrast, business interests with policy needs related to energy policy are faced 
with the reality that no single committee has dominant jurisdiction over this policy area.  
Because energy policy is often referred to the Ways and Means, Energy and Commerce, 
and Natural Resources committees, legislators that are allied with groups interested in 
this policy area will be dispersed across committees.  As a result, these interests receive 
less representation on any one committee when compared to interests whose policy 
agendas are not referred to multiple committees. 
The final reason why there is a difference between business interests on this 
committee and business interests on the other committees analyzed in this chapter is that 
many businesses that participate in this issue area are constituents in a limited number of 
congressional districts.  The average number of districts where groups seeking 
membership on the Natural Resources committee had a local presence was more than 45 
districts fewer than the average for groups seeking membership on the Financial Services 
or Energy and Commerce committees.  Further, 20 percent of the 203 interests in the 
population of groups studied for the Natural Resources committee had a local presence in 
less than half of the 435 Congressional districts, which is nearly twice the number of 
interests with similar district presence in the other committees studied.  For example, 
each of the following economic sectors involved in resource extraction had percentiles of 
representation on the Natural Resources committee that were at or below the 50
th
 
percentile when compared to committees randomly selected from the House at large: Iron 
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Ore Mining, Uranium-Radium-Vanadium Ore Mining, Bituminous Coal Underground 
Mining, and Gold Ore Mining.  
 
Results Testing Political Mobilization as an Alternative Explanation for Systematic 
Business Advantage 
 
 Within a given district, business interests could win greater legislative advocacy 
over and above other interests for two reasons.  First, business interests have leverage 
over local jobs and economic investment and other interests do not.  Second, business 
interests are, on average, more politically mobilized than other interests in the districts.  
To rule out political mobilization as an alternative explanation for business influence I 
tested the relationship between several indicators of political activity against the 
magnitude of a given interest’s committee representation.  Following the null findings for 
the effect of PAC contributions on committee representation presented above  (also a 
proxy for political mobilization), I find no evidence in any committee level model that 
organized interests that exhibit higher amounts of political activity enjoy elevated levels 
of committee representation.  Moving from the mean value of political mobilization to 
the mean plus one standard deviation for the average number of lobbying reports filed, 
the average amount of money spent on lobbying, or the number of bills lobbied had no 
substantively meaningful or statistically significant correlation to committee 
representation in Congress. 
 
Results for All Other Control Variables 
Coefficients for control variables were consistent with all results discussed in the 
previous chapter.  Variables measuring group size (membership and receipts) were, for 
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the most part, statistically insignificant.  For all models, the total money that groups 
receive nationally showed no statistically significant relationships with committee 
representation.  Furthermore, the size of national group membership was also  
insignificant in all models except for that testing committee representation for interests on 
the Energy and Commerce committee.   
The coefficients for the geographic explanatory variables in the models in this 
chapter were consistent with the findings in the previous chapter. Lastly, the coefficients 
measuring how important the committee was to an interest’s policy agenda were positive, 
substantively meaningful and statistically significant each committee related model.  I 
will focus on the effects of that variation in interest group policy agendas have on 
committee representation in detail in the following chapter.  Again, these preliminary 
results suggest that the signal that organized interests send to their legislative allies about 














































































Conclusion: Constituency Motivated Ally Generation and Business Advantage in 
Congress 
 
This chapter offers a fresh theoretical approach and new empirical evidence that a 
built-in advantage exists for business interests in the legislative process.  After testing 
two prominent explanations for business advantage, structural dependence theory with a 
focus on the national economy and exchange theory, I find little evidence in support of 
either approach.  The evidence presented in this chapter points to a decidedly different 
story of business advantage in the legislative process.  Business interests are more likely 
than other types of interests to be advantaged in the amount of committee representation 
that they receive in the House of Representatives because they have leverage over local 
jobs and economic investment. 
 
Table 5.3:  Summary of Findings Supporting Business Advantage by Theory: 
 
Were the variables that tested each theory 
statistically significant and substantively 
meaningful? 
Theory Tested 








Structural Dependence w/ National Economic Focus No No No No 
Exchange Theory No No No No 
Constituency Motivated Ally Generation Yes Yes Yes No 
 
The results presented in this chapter therefore support Charles Lindblom’s much 
cited hypothesis that business has a structural advantage in the political process because 
of its control over jobs and economic investment.  But they reveal an important part of 
the theoretical story that Lindblom’s work did not explain.  Business advantage in 
Congress is grounded in the constituencies that legislators actually represent.  Our 
empirical and theoretical focus should therefore not solely be on the leverage that 
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business interests have over the national economy.  Instead, it should include an 
understanding of the importance of the jobs and economic investment that exist inside the 








Committee jurisdictions have been reformed over time according to Congress’s 
convenience (Davidson 1990; Kravitz 1990; Oleszek 1977; Wolfensberger 2013).  
Congressional scholars  largely focused on how well jurisdictions match up with the 
policy decisions Congress has to make.  Within this literature, scholars examine why 
legislators join committees and how this affects committee membership (Adler 2000, 
2002; Adler and Lapinski 1997; Cox and McCubbins 2007; Krehbiel 1990, 1992; Shepsle 
1978; Shepsle and Weingast 1987).  But we have very little knowledge about the 
relationship between committee jurisdictions and interest group representation.  This 
chapter will make the case that committee jurisdictions are also highly important for the 
representation of particular interests in society.   
The potential for a relationship between committee policy jurisdictions and group 
access to, and influence on, committee members is easier to see when we start to think 
about differences in the policy agendas of particular groups.  Committees have 
jurisdiction over particular policy areas (Adler and Wilkerson 2008; King 1994).  
Likewise, groups themselves demonstrate wide variation in the types of policies that they 
seek to influence in Congress.  Some interests are largely focused on a single issue area 
while others have diverse policy agendas.  Legislation tied to each issue area on a group’s 
policy agenda will fall under the jurisdiction of a unique subset of committees.  Thus, 
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some interest groups will have policy agendas that will be under the jurisdiction of few 
committees while others will have policy agendas that are referred to many committees.     
The central question of this chapter, then, is how does variation in interest group 
policy agendas influence the amount of representation that they receive on House 
committees?  Interest groups communicate with their legislative allies about which 
committee(s) to join to better serve their mutual policy goals.  When a group’s policy 
agenda is largely under the jurisdiction of a single committee, their legislative allies will 
have a clear understanding about which committee they should request.  With many allies 
concentrating their requests for membership toward a single committee, the group will 
win stronger committee representation.  Groups with policy agendas that map well onto 
the jurisdictions of few committees will therefore have more allies on the committees 
important to their policy needs than other interests.  The legislative allies of groups with 
diverse policy agendas will, conversely, receive less clear information about which 
committees to join.  They will request multiple committees and the interest groups they 
seek to represent will, consequently, receive less representation on any one committee.  
In this manner, interests with narrow policy agendas will be better at mobilizing allied 
legislators toward effectively advocating for their policy needs than interests with diverse 
policy agendas. 
 
Review of Relevant Literature on Policy Agendas 
When scholars think about policy agendas they have only recently considered the 
agendas of particular groups.  The trend in the literature on agenda setting has instead 
been to focus on the set of issue areas that are prioritized by salient federal institutions.  
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Scholars have studied how groups affect the broad policy agenda in a number of ways.  
Baumgartner and Jones (2010) and Kingdon (1984), for example, offer explanations 
about how policies make it onto, and disappear from, the policy agenda of government 
officials in Washington.  These scholars study the various factors that predict when 
particular policies gain attention, advocacy, and success (or failure) through the 
legislative process in Congress.    
A second line of research has examined whether the legislative agenda in 
Congress mirrors public opinion or the goals of lobbying organizations.  Scholars have 
found that organizations that lobby the federal government have a substantially different 
agenda from the public at large (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Kimball et al. 2012).  Others 
find that while lobbyists have a different policy agenda than the public, there is evidence 
that government officials still advocate for the policy needs of average citizens 
(Baumgartner and Jones 2004).  
Still others have examined how the dynamics of group participation within policy 
communities can affect their success at making it onto the legislative policy agenda.  
Competition among groups can increase the salience of policy issue areas to government 
officials (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Baumgartner and Jones 2010; Schattsneider 1975).  A 
lack of competition among groups within an issue area sometimes relates to a lack of 
political attention (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Baumgartner and Jones 2010) and at other 
times it may signify control over the policy area by a limited number of groups 
(Baumgartner and Jones 2010; Lowi 1964, 1972).  There has also been a large body of 
work that suggests that differences in the political mobilization of particular groups will 
affect which issues make it onto the legislative agenda.  The population of interests active 
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in Washington is weighted towards business and occupational groups (Baumgartner and 
Leech 1998a, 2003; Heinz et al. 1993; Schattsneider 1975; Schlozman 1984;  Schlozman 
et al. 2008).  Recent work by Gilens and Page (2014) also suggests that biases in 
representation may translate into biases in the issues that are prioritized on the legislative 
policy agenda. 
With the dominant focus on how policies make it onto the broad legislative 
agenda, other research questions have been given less attention.  Rather than examining 
the role of interest groups to the broad policy agenda, we might instead attempt to study 
factors related to the policy agendas of particular interest groups.  Scholars have just 
started to think about the importance of variation in the policy agendas of organized 
interests.  As recently as 2015 Darrin Halpin’s chapter in Interest Group Politics was 
entitled, “Interest Group Policy Agendas.  What Are They and How Might We Study 
Them?”  The very title of Halpin’s piece underscores the lack of research in this area.  
We are just beginning to ask what they are and to think about where to begin with 
empirical research.  The central contribution of this chapter will therefore be to begin to 
build a literature that contributes to our knowledge of interest group policy agendas.   
This chapter will systematically study how variation in interest group policy 
agendas affects interests’ committee representation.  In the following sections I will argue 
that the subset of policy issue areas that define a group’s policy goals have a substantial 
impact on the level of representation that the group receives on any particular committee.  
A number of studies have emphasized the importance of policy issue areas to the 
magnitude of group influence in Congress.  Groups are often thought to have a better 
chance at winning policy outcomes when they pursue narrow or distributive policy, for 
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example, as opposed to redistributive or regulatory policy (Lowi 1964, 1972; Thorpe 
2014; Wilson 1973).  Policy issue areas are also relevant to committee representation 
because they determine which committee (or committees) will have jurisdiction over 
groups’ policy goals.   
Groups that have diverse policy agendas are likely to find that their policy 
agendas are spread across multiple committees.  As such, the group’s legislative allies 
may be spread thinly across several committees and the group will have weaker 
representation on any particular committees of interest.  Factors related to a group’s 
policy agenda such as (1) the number of major policy issue areas that they pursue, (2) the 
proportion of their total agenda that is under a single committee, and (3) the extent to 
which their agenda is split across multiple committees can affect the strength of 
representation that they receive on the committees with jurisdiction over their policy 
concerns in the House.   
 
Theoretical Expectations 
Some interest groups have agendas concentrated before one particular 
congressional committee. Others have agendas that fall under the jurisdictions of many 
committees.  As such, interest group policy agendas differ in ways that systematically 
affect the amount of committee representation that groups are likely to obtain.  
Legislative allies of interest groups with agendas concentrated before one congressional 
committee are likely to have a clear understanding of which committee(s) they should 
request.  The interests in their district will send a clear message about the committee of 
primary importance to their policy needs and allied representatives will have little doubt 
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about which committee to join in order to advocate for their mutual policy goals.  But the 
legislative allies of interest groups with agendas that do not map well onto existing 
committee jurisdictions will not receive clear information about the right committee 
assignments to request. 
The clarity of information that legislators receive from their allied interests about 
which committee they should join is therefore likely to affect the extent to which 
particular groups are over or underrepresented on key committees.  The likelihood that 
the interest will win greater amounts of representation on the committee increases when it 
is clear which committee its legislative allies should request, all else being equal.  Mixed 
information about which committee an interest’s allies should request will have the 
opposite effect.  The interest’s legislative allies will be unsure about which committee to 
join, individual legislators will request varied committees, and, as a result, the interest 
will receive less representation on any one committee. 
 
Variation in Interest Group Policy Agendas that Affect Which Committee(s) Allied 
Legislators Request 
 
Variation in interest group policy agendas can systematically influence the clarity 
of the information that allied legislators receive to join particular committee(s) in a 
number of ways.  First, for a given committee in the House, when the committee has 
greater amounts of jurisdiction over an interest’s total policy agenda, we should expect 
the interest to give a clear message to their allied legislators to request the committee.  
After receiving this message, their allies should increase their requests for this committee.  
With more allies requesting membership on this committee, the interest is likely to win 
better representation on the committee. 
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 Relatedly, the diversity of an interest’s policy agenda can also influence the 
clarity of information their allied legislators receive about which committee to request . 
Some interests have policy agendas that are diverse and others have agendas that are 
focused.  That is, some interests have policy needs that span multiple major policy areas 
while others have agendas that are targeted to one or two major issue areas.  When 
interests have diverse policy agendas, the corresponding legislation in Congress is more 
likely to be consistently referred to multiple committees.  As a result, these interests are 
more likely to send unclear messages to their legislative allies about which committee to 
join, and they therefore receive less representation on particular committees. 
 Lastly, even though some interests have narrow policy agendas, the few policy 
issue areas that they pursue are still consistently referred to multiple committees.  When a 
group’s policy agenda is referred consistently to multiple committees, their allies receive 
less clear information about which committee to request, and consequently the interest 
receives a lower amount of representation on any given committee.   
 In summary, I expect the following empirical analysis to demonstrate that the 
clarity of the information that legislative allies receive about which committees to 
request, and consequently the amount of committee representation that interests win, is 
affected by systematic variation in (1) the importance of the committee to the policy 
agenda of the group, (2) the extent to which the group’s policy agenda is diverse or 
narrow, and (3) how often the group’s agenda, no matter how narrow, is referred to 






The dependent variable and observations analyzed in this chapter are identical to 
those used in the previous two analytical chapters (see chapter 4 for complete 
explanation).  The dependent variable is the percentile of committee representation of 
constituencies tied to particular interests.  As the percentile of committee representation 
increases above the 50
th
 percentile, the dependent variable shows overrepresentation for 
the interest studied, meaning that the interest receives more representation on the 
committee than one would expect if committees were assembled randomly from the 
House at large.  Conversely, when the dependent variable is below the 50
th
 percentile it 
indicates that the interest under examination is underrepresented if committees were 
randomly selected from the membership of the House. 
 
Independent Variables 
Committee Ranking for Group's Policy Agenda measures the committee’s importance to 
the total policy agenda of a particular interest when compared to the 20 standing 
committees of the House.
36
  For each interest in the dataset the committee under 
examination (be it the Financial Services, Energy and Commerce, or the Natural 
Resources committee respectively) is ranked by its proportion of jurisdiction over the 
total policy agenda of the group.  Committee Ranking for Group's Policy Agenda is 
labeled “1”, for example, when the committee under examination is the least important to 
the total policy agenda of the group (i.e. - it had jurisdiction over the smallest proportion 
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of the group’s policy agenda compared to all other standing committees) and it is labeled 
“20” when it is the most important to the group’s policy agenda.   
To calculate the proportion of a group’s total policy agenda that was under the 
jurisdiction of each committee studied I began by building a database of all organizations 
that were tied to a particular type of constituency.  For each organization, the lobbying 
reports that the organization filed in the 110
th
 Congress were gathered with corresponding 
information for the related bill number in the House and the committee of referral.  If 
there were multiple committees of referral they each received a single row in the 
database. 
Table 6.1:  Rank of Committee on the Policy Agendas of Selected Interests…  
Committee Interest 
Cmte. Rank on Policy 
Agenda 
Financial Services Commercial Banks 20 
 
Drugs and Druggists' Sundries 
Merchant Wholesalers 13 
 
Gasoline Stations 4 
Energy & Commerce Commercial Banks 16 
 
Drugs and Druggists' Sundries 
Merchant Wholesalers 20 
 
Gasoline Stations 18 
Natural Resources Commercial Banks 9 
 
Drugs and Druggists' Sundries 
Merchant Wholesalers 10 
 
Gasoline Stations 20 
Note: "1" indicates that the committee was ranked the lowest and "20" indicates that they were ranked the highest 
on the interest's policy agenda among the 20 standing committees. 
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The total proportion of lobby reports, bill numbers, and committee of referral 
observations were then tabulated by committee for each constituency.  Finally, for each 
constituency, the committee under examination (be it the Financial Services, Energy and 
Commerce, or the Natural Resources committee respectively) was ranked in relation to 
all other standing committees of the House by its proportion of jurisdiction over the 
constituency’s total policy agenda.  For example, the commercial banking industry was 
active in each issue area studied.  The highest proportion committee referrals for each 
lobbying report that organizations tied to this industry filed went to the Financial Services 
committee.  For the Financial Services model, the data point for commercial banking 
interests was therefore coded as “20”.  The Energy and Commerce committee had the 
fifth largest proportion of referrals per lobbying report.  In the dataset for the Energy and 
Commerce model the data point for commercial banking interests was coded as “16”.   
The variable therefore serves as a measure of the relative importance of the committee to 
a particular constituency. 
As a committee’s jurisdiction over an interest’s total policy agenda increases, the 
clarity of the information that an interest’s legislative allies receive to join the committee 
likely increases.  These legislators are thus more likely to request membership on the 
committee. In consequence, the interest is likely to receive better representation on the 
committee.  The hypothesis that follows is: 
H1:  As the importance of a committee to a constituency’s total policy agenda 
increases, the amount of representation that the constituency receives on the 
committee also increases. 
The second independent variable in the model, Diverse Policy Agenda, is a count 
of the total number of major policy issue areas that are important to an interest’s policy 
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agenda.  Issues are considered to be important to an interest’s total policy agenda when 
they constitute at least 15 percent of the total policy agenda of all organizations tied to a 
particular type of constituency.   
 
 For each constituency, I again started by building a database with information for 
all organizations tied to a particular constituency.  The proportion of an interest’s total 
policy agenda per major policy issue area was calculated by tabulating information for 
each lobbying report that the organization filed on a particular bill in the 110
th
 Congress, 
the related bill number in the House, and the major policy issue area of the bill by 
constituency and major policy issue area.
37
 The final variable was a count of the number 
of issue areas that comprised at least 15 percent of a group’s total agenda. 
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 The Congressional Bills Project labels each bill by a major policy issue area.  I included the top 21 major 
policy issue areas in the dataset.  More information on major issue categories via the Policy Agendas 
project codebook at the following website: http://www.policyagendas.org/page/topic-codebook. 
Table 6.2: How Many Major Policy Areas are Important to the 
Policy Agendas of Selected Interests…  
Interest 
Count of Major Policy Areas on 
Interest’s Agenda 
Consumer Lending 5 
Fossil Fuel Electric Power Generation 4 
Investment Banking and Securities 
Dealing 2 
Cigarette Manufacturing 1 
Pharmaceutical Preparation Manufacturing 1 
Note: Only major policy issue areas that constituted 15 percent or more of an 
interest’s total policy agenda were included in the count.  The maximum count of 




 As an interest’s policy agenda becomes more diverse across multiple policy issue 
areas, related legislation in the House flows through a larger number of committees and 
the information that the interest’s legislative allies receive about which committee to join 
becomes less clear.  Conversely, legislative allies of interests that focus on a limited 
number of major issue areas will receive a comparatively clearer message about which 
committee to request because the interest’s policy agenda will be under the jurisdiction of 
fewer committees.  My expectation is therefore that: 
H2:  Interests with policy agendas that span multiple policy issue areas will 
receive less committee representation on any given committee important to their 
policy goals. 
Some policy issue areas, however, are consistently referred to multiple 
committees such that even if a group has a policy agenda that is focused on few major 
issues it may face another barrier to increased committee representation.  It may be that 
the few issues that the group is focused on are consistently referred to multiple 
committees.  To examine the potential effects of split referrals I included the independent 
variable Policy Agenda Split Across Committees.  Policy Agenda Split Across 
Committees is a count of each standing committee that has jurisdiction over at least 15 
percent of the total policy agenda of all organizations tied to a particular type of 
constituency.  To calculate this variable for each interest in a dataset for a committee 
related model, I used the same tabulation of the total proportion of an interest’s policy 
agenda per committee that I created for the variable, Committee Ranking for Group's 
Policy Agenda.   For each interest constituency in the dataset, I counted the total number 
of standing committees with at least 15 percent of the interest’s total policy agenda. 
164 
 
Table 6.3 lists examples of data points for this variable.  Notice that large 
proportions of the policy agendas of limited service restaurants (e.g.- restaurants like 
Mcdonald’s, Taco Bell, Kentucky Fried Chicken, etc.) are split across four different 
committees.  The same is true of the agendas of department stores like Macy’s or 
Dillard’s.  However, a large proportion of the policy agendas of economic sectors like 
direct health and medical insurers or credit card issuers fall under the jurisdiction of a 
single committee.   
Table 6.3: How Many Committees Have Jurisdiction over a large 
portion of an Interests Policy Agenda?  Data for Selected Interests… 
Interest 
# of Cmtes w/ Jurisdiction Over 
Group’s Agenda 
Limited-Service Restaurants 4 
Department Stores 4 
Automobile and Other Motor Vehicle 
Merchant Wholesalers 3 
Direct Health and Medical Insurance 
Carriers 1 
Credit Card Issuing 1 
Note: Count limited to committees with jurisdiction over at least 15 percent of an 
interest’s policy agenda only.  The maximum count for all interests was 5 and the 
minimum was 1. 
 
 Factors related to committee context make predictions of the direction of the 
effect for this variable more difficult.  The major issue area “Energy”, for example, is 
referred most often to the same three committees.  The proportion of referrals to each 
committee is similar.  In this case, the legislative allies of interests seeking advocacy on 
energy policy can make requests to a limited subset of committees.  For issues areas like 
energy policy, it is difficult to measure whether interests will receive slightly more or less 
committee representation as a result of focusing on an issue area that is consistently split 
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across a handful of committees.  It is therefore easier to test this variable using a 
committee that is clearly the committee of primary jurisdiction over the issue area studied 
and that does not have salient jurisdiction over issue areas that are referred to multiple 
committees (e.g.-the Financial Services committee).  The results from this committee are 
less likely to be muddied by policies that are consistently referred to a small number of 
committees. 
I therefore expect to find positive substantively meaningful results for interests 
seeking representation on the Financial Services committee, a committee with dominant 
jurisdiction over the policy issue area studied.  But I expect to find mixed results for 
committees that often share jurisdiction with a small subset of other committees on major 
policy issues (i.e.- the Energy and Commerce and Natural Resources committees).  For 
the Financial Services committee model I expect to find that: 
H3: When a large proportion of an interest’s policy agenda is referred to multiple 
committees, the interest will receive systematically less committee representation 
on any given committee important to its agenda. 
 
Control Variables 
 The control variables included in this model are consistent with those inserted into 
models testing committee representation throughout the dissertation.  For more 
information regarding the measurement of each variable see the more detailed variable 
explanations in chapters 4 and 5.  The models in this chapter control for variables related 
to constituency representation with consistent effects on committee membership in 
previous chapters.  Positive and statistically significant results for these variables support 
a theory of constituency motivated ally generation.  These variables include: 
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1. Business- Whether an interest tied to a particular constituency was classified as 
business or nonbusiness  
2. Local Presence- The count of the total number of districts where a group had a 
constituency presence 
3. Geographic Concentration- One standard deviation of distance from the center 
point of the spatial distribution of the constituency across districts 
I also include two variables that, as in other chapters, control for the total national size of 
the group.  These include a measurement for the total monetary receipts of the group 
(labeled Total Receipts) and the total national membership of the group (labeled Total 
Membership). 
Model Results 
Table 6.4:  In a Comparison of Constituencies Tied to Particular Interests, 
Does Variation in Interest Group Policy Agendas Affect Committee Representation? 
 










(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Committee Ranking for Group's 
Policy Agenda 
0.031 0.944** 0.937* 0.820* 
 
(0.246) (0.445) (0.652) (0.554) 
Diverse Policy Agenda -3.965*** -6.031** -4.544** -1.485 
 
(1.611) (3.199) (2.700) (2.400) 
Policy Agenda Split Across 
Committees 
-1.119 -6.479** 0.959 -0.371 
 
(1.582) (3.043) (2.283) (2.876) 
Business 22.024*** 33.084*** 29.960*** 5.070 
 
(6.157) (12.025) (9.284) (9.775) 
Local Presence 0.031*** 0.058** 0.046*** -0.020 
 
(0.012) (0.025) (0.019) (0.020) 
Geographic Dispersion 0.603 2.409** -3.130*** 2.509*** 
 
(0.536) (1.083) (0.858) (0.812) 




(0.042) (0.172) (0.040) (0.204) 
Total Membership 0.035 0.051 0.100*** -0.065 
 
(0.027) (0.058) (0.036) (0.048) 
Constant 24.351** -12.590 45.589** 9.426 
 
(10.582) (20.178) (19.897) (17.890) 
Observations 532 143 186 203 
R
2
 0.053 0.221 0.141 0.081 
Adjusted R
2








 Note 2: One tailed significance tests used for Committee Ranking for Group’s Agenda, Policy Agenda,      
Diverse Policy Agenda, Split Across Committees, Business, and Local Presence. 
 
Do Interests Receive Better Representation on Committees that Have Greater 
Jurisdiction Over Their Policy Agendas?   
When a committee has jurisdiction over a larger proportion of the bills on an 
interest’s agenda, the interest’s allies should receive clearer information about which 
committee to request, and with more allies requesting a particular committee the interest 
should receive better representation.  Figure 6.1 presents predicted percentiles from the 
model when the committee has jurisdiction over the lowest proportion of an interest’s 
policy agenda (e.g.-the lowest ranked committee labeled “1”) to the committee with 
jurisdiction over the highest proportion (e.g.-the highest ranked committee labeled “20”).  
The results for each committee studied indicate that interest representation increases for a 
group as the importance of the committee to the group’s total policy agenda increases.   
The direction of the coefficients was consistently positive and statistically 
significant for each committee model.  The magnitude of the predicted effect was also 
strong for all models.  In a comparison of committee representation on the Financial 
Services Committee for a sample of interests that were active  on the issue of banking 
reform in the 111
th
 Congress, the predicted values indicate that moving from the 
committee being the least important to an interest’s policy agenda to the committee being 
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the most important to their agenda increases 
committee representation by 18 percentage 
points.
38
  This is the difference between an 
interest being in 75
th
 percentile, which 
indicates fairly strong overrepresentation, or 
the 57th percentile which indicates slight 
overrepresentation.   
 The results for the Energy and 
Commerce committee followed the same 
trend.  Moving from the predicted percentile 
for the committee being the least important to 
an interest’s policy agenda to the committee 
being the most important to their agenda 
increases committee representation on this 
committee by 18 percentage points.  This is 
the difference between an interest being in 54
th 
percentile, which indicates slight 
overrepresentation, or the 36
th
 percentile, 
which indicates fairly strong 
underrepresentation compared to 
representation on committees randomly 
selected from the House at large.  The Energy and Commerce committee is a committee 
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 Predicted values throughout this chapter were calculated with all other variables set to their average 
value.   
Figure 6.1: Do Interests Receive 
Better Representation on 
Committees that Have Greater 
Jurisdiction Over Their Policy 






of jurisdiction for a substantial portion of bills within a comparatively large number of 
major policy issue areas.  This means that a larger number of interests are likely to be 
competing for seats on this committee than other standing committees in the House.  
Given the high level of competition that groups face for representation on this committee, 
these findings suggest that interests need to have an extraordinarily large proportion of 
their policy agenda before the committee in order to receive a level of representation that 
is slightly higher than their representation in the House at large.  
Findings for the Natural Resources committee model were also statistically 
significant and in the expected direction, but the magnitude of the effect was slightly 
lower.  Moving from the committee having the least jurisdiction over bills on an 
interest’s policy agenda to the committee having the most jurisdiction over the interest’s 
agenda increased an interest’s level of committee representation by 16 percentage points.  
This is the difference between an interest being in 59th percentile, which indicates slight 
overrepresentation, or the 43
rd
 percentile, which indicates a level of representation that is 
lower than we would expect if the committee was randomly selected from the House at 
large.   
The magnitude of the effect of the importance of the committee to the group’s 
policy agenda on committee representation for the Natural Resources committee is 
somewhat lower than the other committees studied.  This is likely the result of the mixed 
information about which committees to join that the allies of many interests that lobbied 
on energy issues received.  The sample of interests included groups that lobbied the 
minor issue area “Natural Gas and Oil (Including Offshore Oil and Gas)”.  In the 111
th
 
Congress the Natural Resources committee was the committee of primary jurisdiction 
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over bills related to this issue area.  However, it was not the committee with jurisdiction 
over the largest proportion of bills for all energy 
related bills.  The Energy and Commerce and 
Ways and Means committees had jurisdiction over 
a larger proportion of all energy related bills than 
the Natural Resources committee.  As a result, 
allies received mixed messages about which 
committees to join and the results for the Natural 
Resources committee were weaker than other 
committees.   
 
When a Group’s Policy Agenda is Diverse Do 
They Receive Less Committee Representation?   
 
Some interests have diverse policy agendas 
and others have agendas that are focused on one or 
two major policy areas.  As an interest’s policy 
agenda becomes more diverse, a larger number of 
committees become relevant to its policy needs.  
When interests have policy agendas that span 
multiple major policy areas, their allies receive 
unclear information about which committee to 
request, which leads to requests that are split 
among several committees.  My expectation is therefore that interest groups with diverse 
policy agendas will receive less committee representation. 
Figure 6.2: When a Group’s Policy 
Agenda is Diverse do they Receive 






Figure 6.2 presents the predicted percentiles for the count of major issue areas with at 
least 15 percent on a group’s policy agenda from the lowest count to the highest count in 
the data.  Similar to the previous section, the results were consistently in the expected 
direction for each committee model.  But while the coefficients were statistically 
significant for the Financial Services and Energy and Commerce committees, they were 
not significant for the Natural Resources committee.  For the Financial Services 
committee the predicted percentile for interests with focused policy agendas (i.e.- the 
weight of their policy agenda fell under only one major policy issue area) was 72.  
Interests with diverse policy agendas (i.e.-the weight of their policy agenda fell under 
five major policy areas), however, received substantially lower levels of representation.  
These interests had a predicted percentile of 48, which was 24 percentage points lower 
than interests with focused issue agendas. 
 For the Energy and Commerce model I find that interests with focused policy 
agendas have a predicted percentile of 57 while interests with diverse policy agendas 
have a predicted percentile 19 percentage points lower at 38.  In a competitive 
environment for committee membership, interests with focused policy agendas are more 
likely to win greater representation than interests whose diverse issue agendas send 
mixed messages to their legislative allies about which committees to request. 
 Finally, the results for the Natural Resources committee in this section follow a 
similar pattern.  However, though the coefficient is in the expected direction, there is not 
enough data to demonstrate statistically significant findings.  When interests have 
focused policy agendas they have a predicted percentile of representation of 55, but when 
interests have diverse issue agendas the predicted percentile decreases by 6 percentage 
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points to 49.  There appears to be support for this effect, but more data appears to be 
needed to reach statistical significance. 
 
 
When a Group’s Policy Agenda is Split Across 
Multiple Committees Do they Receive Less 
Committee Representation?   
An interest’s policy agenda may be 
focused on a particular issue, but if that issue is 
under the jurisdiction of multiple committees, 
then the interest’s legislative allies will still 
receive unclear information about which 
committee they should request.  When an 
interest’s policy agenda is split across committees 
as a result of committee jurisdiction they should 
therefore receive systematically lower levels of 
representation.  However, the evidence for this 
thesis can be muddied depending on the varied 
jurisdictions of the committees studied.  Figure 
6.3 presents the predicted percentiles for 
organized interests by the number of committees 
that have jurisdiction over 15 percent or more of 
their policy agendas. 
When a committee’s total jurisdiction in Congress is dominant over a major 
policy area that is high on an interest’s agenda, the interest’s legislative allies receive a 
Figure 6.3:  When a Group’s Policy 
Agenda is Split Across Multiple 
Committees do they Receive less 






clear message about which committee to request.  Creating a model with a sample of 
interests in this context offers a precise test of a hypothesis of split agendas.  However, as 
the following analysis reveals, it is difficult to generate a clear test of a hypothesis 
relating to committees with jurisdiction over issues that are consistently under the 
jurisdiction of multiple committees.   For some committees, interests with split agendas 
are so common in the sample as a result of consistent referral of issues high on their 
policy agenda to multiple committees that I actually see evidence that representation 
slightly increases.  For other committees, jurisdiction is at times dominant for one major 
policy area, but it is shared with other committees for different issue areas.  These 
differences in committee context make it more difficult to parse out precisely whether 
interests with policy agendas that are split across multiple committees receive 
systematically less committee representation.  
Models for committees that had clear jurisdiction over the major issue area 
studied demonstrated results that were substantively meaningful, statistically significant 
and in the expected direction.  However, models studying committees that shared 
jurisdiction over the major policy issue area with other committees showed no 
statistically significant effects.   
The results for the Financial Services committee model, a committee with less 
group competition for membership and with clear jurisdiction over the major policy issue 
studied (i.e.- Banking, Finance, and Domestic Commerce), were in the expected 
direction, substantively meaningful and statistically significant.  The predicted percentiles 
for this committee indicate that moving from an interest whose policy agenda was split 
across the few committees to an interest whose agenda was split across the most 
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committees resulted in a decrease of 25 percentage points of committee representation 
when compared to committees randomly selected from the House at large.  The model 
predicts that interests with agendas that were largely under the jurisdiction of a single 
committee (i.e. – 15 percent or more of their policy agenda was under the jurisdiction of 
only one committee) received representation in the 72
nd
 percentile.  Interests with the 
highest levels of their agendas split across several committees, however, received 
representation in the 47
th
 percentile. 
The results for the Energy and Commerce committee were also shaped by the 
committee’s unique jurisdictional context.  The Energy and Commerce committee has 
jurisdiction over several major policy categories.  A number of these policy areas (such 
as energy, health, and technology related policy) are referred consistently to multiple 
committees.  Many of the interests that lobby to affect these issue areas will therefore 
need to request the same subset of multiple committees.  The sample of interests studied, 
then, includes a large number of interests whose allies would consistently receive clear 
messages to join multiple committees.  The result is that interests with policy agendas 
that are split across the same subsets of multiple committees often gain membership on 
the Energy and Commerce committee.  Consequently, I find a slightly positive, but 
statistically insignificant effect for this committee.   
The predicted percentiles from the Energy and Commerce model suggest that 
moving from an interest whose policy agenda was split across the fewest committees to 
an interest whose agenda was split across the most committees resulted in an increase of 
4 percentage points of committee representation when compared to committees randomly 
selected from the House at large.  The model predicts that interests with agendas that 
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were largely under the jurisdiction of a single committee (i.e. – 15 percent or more of 
their policy agenda was under the jurisdiction of only one committee) received 
representation in the 52
nd
 percentile.  Interests with the highest levels of their agendas 
split across several committees, however, received representation in the 56
th
 percentile. 
A similar logic is true for the Natural Resources committee, but with some subtle 
contextual differences.  This committee has clear jurisdiction over and above other 
committees for one major policy area but it also shares jurisdiction with other committees 
over another major policy area.  The committee has jurisdiction over energy policy, 
which is consistently under the jurisdiction of, and referred to, multiple committees.  
However, it is also the committee of primary jurisdiction over another major policy issue 
area, public lands and water management.  The allies of interests seeking representation 
to advocate for energy policy therefore receive mixed messages about which committee 
to join, while the allies of interests that want representation on policy related to public 
lands and water receive clear message about which committee to join.  The Natural 
Resources committee results, like the predicted effect in the model for the Energy and 
Commerce committee, were inconclusive as a result of differences in committee context.  
They were in the expected direction, but were statistically insignificant. 
The Natural Resources committee model predicts that moving from an interest 
whose policy agenda was split across the fewest committees to an interest whose agenda 
was split across the most committees resulted in a decrease of two percentage points of 
committee representation when compared to committees randomly selected from the 
House at large.  The model predicts that interests with agendas that were largely under 
the jurisdiction of a single committee (i.e. – 15 percent or more of their policy agenda 
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was under the jurisdiction of only one committee) received representation in the 54
th
 
percentile.  Interests with the highest levels of their agendas split across several 




Results for Control Variables 
The substantive meaning and statistical significance for all control variables were 
consistent with the results presented in the previous chapters of this project.  As the 
number of districts where an interest has a local presence increases, the interest gains 
more constituency motivated legislative allies.  With a larger pool of allies requesting 
committees of importance to their policy needs, these interests win better representation 
on House committees.  The results for the control variable measuring local presence were 
positive and statistically significant for the Financial Services and Energy and Commerce 
Committees.  The effect was not statistically significant, however, for the Natural 
Resources committee.   
The results for the variable testing the effect of geographic concentration on 
committee representation are also consistent with previous chapters.  Geographic 
concentration predicts increases in committee representation for the Energy and 
Commerce committee, but results for all other models showed the opposite effect.  Note 
that while the Natural Resources committee model did not show direct evidence in 
support of the hypothesis for district presence, it has a positive and statistically significant 
result for the variable measuring geographic dispersion of an interest’s membership 
across districts.  This finding offers evidence that the power of district presence is still at 
work for this committee. 
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The effect of being a business constituency was also substantively meaningful and 
consistent with those presented in previous chapters.  Business interests received much 
stronger representation than non-business interests on the Financial Services and Energy 
and Commerce committees.  The results for the Natural Resources committee, with a 
sample that includes many business interests that are located in a limited number of 
districts, were in the expected direction, but were not statistically significant.  Business 
interests are therefore more likely to win better representation on House committees than 
nonbusiness interests. 
Lastly, the size of the group, whether it was measured in terms of the group’s total 
receipts or total membership, demonstrated no substantively meaningful effects on 
committee representation for the Financial Services or Natural Resources committees.  
But the Energy and Commerce committee, which has jurisdiction over a large number of 
major policy areas related to the national economy, saw positive, substantively 
meaningful, and statistically significant effects for the variable measuring an interest’s 
total national membership.  Moving from the predicted value when group membership 
was set to its minimum value to the predicted value when membership was set to its 
maximum value increased committee representation by 7 percentage points.  Though I 
found no support that group size affects committee representation, interests with more 
members or employees that sought legislative advocacy on the Energy and Commerce 







Committee jurisdictions have historically been evaluated and reformed according 
to Congress’s convenience (Davidson 1990; Kravitz 1990; Oleszek 1977; and 
Wolfensberger 2013).  Congressional scholars usually think about how well jurisdictions 
match up with the policy decisions Congress has to handle.  The scholarly debate has 
largely been about whether committees are composed of members with policy expertise 
(Krehbiel 1990; 1992), whether they serve the party agenda (Cox and McCubbins 2007), 
or whether members self-select onto committees to serve constituency interests (Adler, 
2000; 2002; Adler and Lapinski 1997; Shepsle 1978; and Shepsle and Weingast 1987).  
But committee jurisdictions are also very important for the representation of particular 
interests in society.   
This chapter has offered evidence that committee jurisdictions are highly relevant 
to our understanding of interest group access and influence.  Some interests are better 
able to mobilize their legislative allies toward effective legislative advocacy than others.  
This becomes all the more apparent when we consider how interest group policy agendas 
intersect with committee jurisdictions.  When a group’s policy agenda is largely under the 
jurisdiction of a single committee, its legislative allies have a clear understanding about 
which committee they should request.  With many allies concentrating their requests for 
membership toward a single committee, the group wins stronger committee 
representation.  Groups with policy agendas that map well onto the jurisdictions of few 
committees therefore tend to have more allies on the committees important to their policy 
needs than other interests.   
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Organized interests that gain more committee-level allies in this way will receive 
systematically better access to congressional decision making and are thereby likely to 
gain increased influence in the policymaking process.  As discussed at multiple points in 
this dissertation, committee level allies have greater control over the shape of legislation.  
They also have the gatekeeping power to kill bills before they ever reach the House floor 
for a roll call vote.  Groups that win more committee level allies will, as a result, become 
better positioned to affect the legislation that they care about in Congress. 
The findings presented in this chapter also point toward some interesting 
implications about the possibility that committees will be captured by a subset of 
interests.  Membership is limited on House committees.  Yet there is wide variation in the 
amount of competition that groups face as their legislative allies request particular 
committees.  When committees have jurisdiction over a single major issue area the 
constellation of interests and their legislative allies that compete for limited committee 
seats is relatively low.  When committees have jurisdiction over several major policy 
areas, however, group competition increases substantially.  The Energy and Commerce 
committee is therefore less well designed to be “captured” by the interests that care about 
its jurisdiction than the Financial Services committee.  Reformers worried about this 
issue might prefer to design congressional committees with broad, sprawling 





Chapter 7: Conclusions 
  
Legislators are the primary conduit through which groups affect policy outcomes 
in Congress.  Organized interests rely on members of Congress to prosecute their policy 
agenda at each point in the legislative process.  Groups cannot introduce legislation, 
make floor speeches, participate on committees, or make roll call votes in Congress.  
With this in mind, legislative allies are a prized, but understudied resource among groups.  
Building knowledge about the number of allies that groups generate and the differences 
in how groups mobilize these allies toward effective legislative action is therefore highly 
important to our understanding about group influence in Congress.   
This project has offered a simple explanation for when some groups will have 
more legislative allies than others.  It has argued that groups generate unequal numbers of 
allies because they demonstrate wide variation as constituents.  Constituency presence is 
one of the strongest predictors of legislative activity in Congress (Evans 2004; Hall and 
Wayman 1992; Kingdon 1989; Miler 2010; Welch 1982).  Groups vary substantially as 
constituents in a number of ways that have rarely been directly studied.  Constituency 
related factors are therefore likely to be tied to the number of allies that groups generate 
in Congress.  As constituents, groups vary in (1) the number of districts where they 
maintain a local presence, (2) how politically active compared to other types of 
constituents, and (3) the amount of leverage they have over local jobs and economic 
investment.  Each of these factors may predict systematic differences among groups in 
ally generation.  With more allies advocating for their policy agendas in Congress, these 
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interests stand a better chance of gaining more leverage over legislative outcomes at the 
most important points of the legislative process.  
In the previous chapters, this dissertation has developed a theoretical explanation 
for, and systematic evidence in support of, the claim that groups vary systematically in 
both the number of legislative allies that they have in Congress and in their ability to 
mobilize these allies towards effective legislative action.  Ultimately, there are three 
conclusions that ought to be drawn from this project.  First, biased interest representation 
in Congress at key points of the legislative process results from the clash and 
mobilization of legislative allies advocating for particular group interests.  The first 
section of this concluding chapter will describe why systematic ally generation and 
mobilization should play a prominent role in theories of interest group influence.  
Moreover, it will detail the major conclusions from the analytical chapters of the 
dissertation.  Second, this study also has important normative implications.  The next 
section of this concluding chapter will elaborate on these implications and how reform 
efforts might limit biased interest representation in the legislative process.  Last, this 
chapter will discuss how the theoretical explanation and empirical findings presented 
here might stimulate a variety of future research projects. 
 
Accounting for Unequal Ally Variation and Mobilization in Theories of Group 
Influence 
In Basic Interests Baumgartner and Leech (1998a) review the empirical work on 
group influence in the legislative process in order to evaluate the strength of theory in 
interest group scholarship.  They find that despite decades of work, the empirical 
literature does not support a strong theoretical explanation for group influence in the 
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legislative process.  Two prominent themes in the research made it particularly difficult 
to construct a theory that could convincingly explain how groups influence the legislative 
process.  First, over 35 studies had been published that examined the effects that PAC 
contributions had on legislative behavior (see selected studies by Bronars and Lott 1997; 
Frendreis and Waterman 1985; Grenzke 1989; Langbein and Lotwis 1990; Stratmann 
1991; Wawro 2001; Wilhite and Thielman 1987; Wright 1985).  The evidence in support 
of this hypothesis was mixed.  Second, a growing body of work began to point out that 
groups work predominantly through the members of Congress who are the most likely to 
advocate for their interests (Bauer, Pool, and Dexter 1965; Baumgartner and Leech 
1998b; Hall and Wayman 1990; Hall and Deardorff 2006; Hojnacki and Kimball 1998, 
1999).  If groups primarily work through legislative allies, then it makes little sense to 
argue that they buy advocacy.  The legislators receiving campaign largesse are already 
motivated to advocate for the contributing group’s policy agenda.  In order to build a 
lasting, empirically verifiable explanation of group influence in Congress scholars needed 
to reevaluate these puzzling themes in the literature. 
Hall and Deardorff’s (2006) theory of lobbying as a legislative subsidy offered an 
explanation that began to account for these puzzling empirical findings.  They argued that 
the collective evidence about how groups interact with legislators tells us that if we want 
to explain how groups influence legislative behavior, then we must center our attention 
on the ways that groups work with allied legislators.  Their explanation deemphasized the 
importance of the theory that campaign contributions buy legislative advocacy and 
instead focused on the relationship between groups and their allies.  Hall and Deardorff 
argued that groups influence policymaking by subsidizing the advocacy of their mutual 
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policy allies in Congress.  Groups act as extended legislative staff for allied lawmakers.  
Groups assist legislators toward mutual policy goals by helping them gather information, 
build coalitions, write speeches and craft laws among other activities.  Their theory put 
legislative allies at the center of how groups operate to influence legislative outcomes, 
but it left a major question unanswered.  Interest group scholars were still missing a 
theoretical explanation and an empirical foundation for the claim that some interests have 
more leverage over the legislative process than others.   
These results are also important to our understanding of how Congress is organized.  
Scholars have been interested in whether committees are composed of preference 
outliers.  But they have never analyzed the composition of congressional committees 
from the vantage point of the many different societal interests seeking influence over 
committees.  This dissertation has offered new evidence for, and a new explanation of, 
when we should expect some organized interests to win more representation in Congress.  
There is considerable evidence that groups work through allied legislators in Congress 
(Bauer, Pool, and Dexter 1965; Baumgartner and Leech 1998b; Hall and Wayman 1990; 
Hall and Deardorff 2006; Hojnacki and Kimball 1998, 1999).  But scholars have not 
rigorously studied whether some organized interests win more legislative allies than 
others prior to the act of lobbying.  The major empirically supported theoretical 
contribution from this project is that we now have reason to believe that some interests 
have systematic advantages in the number of allies that they generate in Congress.  The 
number of allies that particular interests generate in Congress increases when they have a 
local presence in more districts and when they have more leverage over local jobs and 
economic investment.  Further, once the number of allies that a group has is set, interests 
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with narrow policy agendas will be better represented at key stages of the legislative 
process.  These findings offer an essential building block for our empirically verifiable 
knowledge about how groups affect the legislative process.   Some groups have more 
allies than others and some interests are better at mobilizing these allies toward effective 
legislative advocacy.  These are empirical findings that future work can build on in ways 
that should contribute to a sustainable explanation for how groups influence the 
legislative process. 
Several conclusions stand out from the empirical analysis in this dissertation.  
Chapter Four tested how different types of constituency distributions affect the amount of 
representation that interests receive on House committees.  Organized interests 
demonstrate wide variation in how they are distributed as constituents across the 435 
House districts.  They can be present in many districts or few.  They also differ in how 
concentrated they are as constituents within the districts where they have a local 
presence.  The core finding of this chapter was that constituency presence affects 
committee representation.  When organized interests have a constituency presence within 
a district they are more likely to win advocacy from the district’s representative.  As the 
number of districts where an interest group has a local presence grows, the group wins 
more constituency representation from more members of Congress.  Hence, constituency 
representation on congressional committees is related to the number of allies that a group 
will have in Congress. 
In addition to testing whether district presence alone influenced interest 
representation on House committees, Chapter Four also analyzed the relationship 
between constituency concentration and committee representation.  Holding the number 
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of districts where a group is a constituent constant, constituencies can be concentrated or 
dispersed within districts in a variety of ways.  For example, a constituency can be 
concentrated in few districts and sparsely present in many.  Or it can be evenly dispersed 
across all the districts where it has a local presence.  Moreover, when a constituency is 
concentrated within a subset of districts, these districts can also be spatially proximate 
(i.e.-geographically concentrated) or they can be concentrated within a subset of districts 
that are not spatially proximate.  While it is important to parse out these relationships, 
constituency concentration did not consistently predict differences in committee 
representation.  The broad takeaway from Chapter Four is therefore that being in more 
districts matters to the number of legislative allies groups generate irrespective of how 
the constituency is concentrated within these districts.  Groups with more constituency 
presence will have more allies and this will systematically increase the amount of 
representation they receive on key committees. 
Being a constituent in more districts matters to ally generation and committee 
representation, but other constituency related factors are also important.  Chapter Five 
found that some types of constituencies, namely business interests, are more likely to be 
overrepresented on congressional committees than are nonbusiness interests.  Members 
of Congress have multiple constituencies in their districts.  As they decide how they will 
spend their limited time and resources local businesses are likely to receive priority in 
members’ committee assignment requests.  Chapter Five tested whether localbusinesses 
generally enjoyed representational advantages committee or whether those advantages 
were specifically focused on more politically active constituencies .  The major finding 
was that business interests tend to win systematically greater amounts of representation 
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on the committees of importance to their policy needs and the degree of political 
mobilization made little measurable difference.   
Local business interests have leverage over jobs and economic investment in the 
district.  Business interests receive more constituency representation because members of 
Congress care about the state of the local economy.  Business interests consequently 
generate more legislative allies.  With more allies requesting committees to serve 
constituency interests, business interests become better represented on House 
committees.  Yet Chapter Five found little evidence that politically active local interests 
were better represented on House committees.  The frequency of lobbying contacts that 
particular constituencies made with members of Congress, the amount of money that they 
spend on lobbying, and the total amount of money they contributed to members of 
Congress through political action committees were not systematically related to the 
amount of committee representation that groups received.   
Unequal allies can affect interest representation at important stages of the 
legislative process.  Once the number of legislative allies that a group generates is set, 
some groups are better than others at mobilizing the advocacy of allied legislators.  
Chapter Six demonstrated that the nature of groups’ policy agendas influences how 
effective they are at communicating their policy needs to legislative allies in ways that 
lead them toward effective advocacy.  Many interest groups have diverse issue agendas 
that span several major policy issue areas.  Many others have narrow policy issue 
agendas focused on a few major policy issue areas.  When interest groups have policy 
agendas that are concentrated on a few issue areas their allies receive a much clearer 
message about how to effectively navigate their mutual policy goals through the 
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legislative process.  The effects of variation in the nature of group policy agendas become 
more relevant as their allies choose their committee assignments.  Committee 
jurisdictions are tied to particular issue areas.  As such, groups with diverse policy 
agendas will find that the legislation that they care about is fragmented across many 
committees.  By contrast, groups with narrow policy agendas will see the legislation that 
they care about flow through few committees.  Groups with narrow policy agendas are 
thus better able to effectively communicate with their allies about which committee(s) to 
request to advance their mutual policy goals.  With more allies requesting fewer 
committees, these interests win systematically larger amounts of representation on the 
committees with jurisdiction over their policy needs. 
 Finally, even if all groups had the same number of allies, these allies were 
mobilized toward effectively advocating for group interests to the same degree, and with 
all else equal, committee jurisdictions would still shape the amount of competition that 
each group’s allied legislators face for limited committee seats.  Scholars have given little 
attention to how the organization of the committee system affects group influence in the 
legislative process.  This dissertation has found much evidence that the manner in which 
committees are organized affects the magnitude of representation that particular interests 
receive.   
The Financial Services committee has jurisdiction over a narrow subset of issues 
largely related to financial policy.  In contrast, the Energy and Commerce committee has 
jurisdiction over multiple diverse major policy areas, including healthcare, technology, 
and energy.  Each issue area corresponds to a constellation of participating interests 
whose allies compete for committee membership.  When the committee has jurisdiction 
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over many diverse issue areas, group allies compete for committee membership with the 
allies of interests with wholly different policy concerns.   
 The result is that the allies of interests whose policy agendas flow through the 
Financial Services committee have a much easier path toward committee membership 
than interests whose policy needs flow through the Energy and Commerce committee.  
Group competition therefore grows for limited committee seats as the issues under the 
jurisdiction of the committee diversify.  Thus, even during the worst financial crisis since 
the Great Depression, the financial industry was highly overrepresented on the Financial 
Services committee and therefore retained considerable influence over the legislative 
response.  In the models presented in each of the analytical chapters of this dissertation 
the results were consistently stronger for this committee for variables signifying that ally 
generation and mobilization matter to committee representation.  It is therefore also 
important that theories of group influence pay particular attention to how variation in 
committee jurisdictions affects the amount of representation that particular groups 
receive. 
 
Assessing the Normative Implications of Unequal Allies and Ally Mobilization 
The common wisdom about how groups influence the legislative process stands in 
stark contrast to empirical evidence.  The majority of the public, prominent politicians 
and many policy practitioners believe that well-financed organized interests buy policy 
outcomes.  Recent survey data demonstrates, for example, that the public believes that 
their representatives advocate for special interests rather than working for constituents 
189 
 
(Montopoli 2011).  The causal explanation in popular accounts of group influence is that 
campaign contributions buy legislative behavior in Congress, which biases policy 
outcomes towards the needs of special interests.  What the results in this dissertation 
project underline is that even if organized interests could no longer contribute money to 
members of Congress, the legislative process would still be biased towards some interests 
and against others.   
Policy practitioners who wish to ensure that policy outcomes in Congress are not 
biased towards some interests in this way ought to pay close attention to what the 
empirical evidence indicates.  There is little hard evidence in support of the thesis that 
money buys policy outcomes.  As a result, if policy advocates build reform proposals 
solely with the corrupting influence of money in mind, then they are likely to overlook a 
substantial amount of what actually causes biased representation in the legislative 
process.  Groups require legislative allies in Congress in order to affect policy change.  
Some interests are better at generating legislative allies in Congress than others and some 
interests are also better at mobilizing these allies than others.  Unequal allies and unequal 
ally mobilization mean unequal representation.   
The results presented here emphasize that constituency representation is central to 
group influence in Congress.  This is a counter-intuitive thought.  It is common to argue 
that members of Congress are fulfilling their responsibilities as elected representatives 
when they work hard on behalf of interests in the district.  Yet the collective findings of 
this dissertation indicate that in the aggregate, some interests are better represented than 
others in Congress precisely because of constituency-related factors.   
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In the first Congress elected after the start of the Great Recession of 2008-9, the 
organized interests who received systematically greater amounts of committee 
representation were not the interests who contributed the most money to political 
campaigns or who spent the most money to lobby Congress.  Rather, groups need 
legislative allies to prosecute their legislative agendas in Congress.  Without them, they 
will find it difficult to affect legislation.  Ally generation and mobilization are therefore 
central to how groups affect the legislative process.  Groups that were constituents in a 
larger number of districts generated more legislative allies.  With more allies requesting 
the committees of importance to their policy needs, these groups won systemically 
enhanced representation on key committees.  Groups that had more leverage over jobs 
and economic investment in the district also won more allies than other interests.  
Business interests won more legislative than nonbusiness interests.  With more legislative 
allies requesting membership on committees with jurisdiction over their policy needs, 
business interests received better committee representation than nonbusiness interests.  
Finally, interests with narrow policy agendas were better at mobilizing their legislative 
allies toward effective legislative advocacy.  Because the policy agendas flowed through 
fewer committees, these interests found it easier to communicate with their allies about 
which committees had jurisdiction over their policy needs.  With clear information about 
which committees to request and fewer committees to choose from, their allies won more 
committee representation than the allies of other interests. 
 Government reform advocates need to consider how committee jurisdictions can 
magnify or limit the influence of organized interests on congressional policymaking.  
Throughout this dissertation the results emphasize that committee jurisdictions influence 
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group competition for committee representation.  Committees with jurisdiction over a 
more diverse set of issue areas like the Energy and Commerce committee correspond 
with more competition among legislators allied with different groups for limited 
committee seats.  With more committee requests from allies of different groups across 
varying issue areas competing for membership on the committee, the composition of the 
committee ends up being more diverse.  It becomes less likely that any one interest will 
be highly overrepresented on the committee.  Given that committees (1) are where bills 
are shaped and (2) are gatekeepers in ways that allow them to affect the forward 
movement of the policy agendas of particular groups, good government advocates might 
think hard about how to reorganize the committee system in ways that reduce bias in 
committee representation.   
 
Suggestions for Future Research on Unequal Allies and Ally Mobilization 
The theoretical framework and supporting evidence put forth in this dissertation 
also have the potential to be a catalyst for future research.  Its findings suggest that 
legislative allies are the primary conduit through which groups affect the legislative 
process.  There are several ways one could build on the results from this study.  First, 
interest group scholars could dedicate more time towards understanding factors related to 
ally generation and ally mobilization throughout the legislative process.  This project 
focused on the stage of the legislative process where many interest group scholars believe 
groups possess the most leverage over policy outcomes, but these findings should also be 
tested elsewhere.  Groups who have more legislative allies may find it easier to build 
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legislative coalitions, to win more advocacy for their positions on roll call votes, and as 
members advocate for their interests in committees.  All warrant further research.   
The importance of issue context to who wins and who loses in Congress also 
stood out throughout this project.  The results presented here indicate that the legislative 
process is essentially very different for some interests than others, given the types of 
issues that they are focused on.  Groups that are interested in one issue area will face a 
much easier pathway toward moving their policy agenda forward in Congress than 
groups in a different issue area.   
Policy issue areas affect which groups in the interest group universe participate 
and they dictate the level of competition that a group’s legislative allies will face for 
limited committee membership.  As issue areas change, so too does the unique 
constellation of participating groups.  The types of interests that compete with one 
another for policy outcomes shift, which affects the magnitude of representation that 
particular interests receive.  Financial reform legislation, for example, pits Wall Street 
interests such as commercial and investment banks against main street interests like 
consumers with foreclosed homes and credit unions.  Business interests with focused 
policy agendas that tend to fall under the jurisdiction of the Financial Services committee 
like commercial and investment banking interests received strong representation.  On the 
other hand, interests that lacked leverage over local jobs and investment and who tended 
to have policy agendas that fell under the jurisdiction of multiple committees received 
representation at or below what we should expect from their representation in the House 
at large.  Financial policy consistently pits Wall Street interests against main street 
interests in this way with little competition from groups seeking committee representation 
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related to other issues under the committee’s jurisdiction.  The result is that financial 
industry interests receive extraordinarily high levels of representation on the committee 
compared to the consumer interests that they compete with for policy outcomes. 
A different issue area, comprehensive energy reform, saw a different set of 
interests in competition for limited representation on the Natural Resources committee.  
Raw materials economic sectors had mixed levels of representation on the committee 
while environmental groups were highly overrepresented compared to their presence in 
the full membership of the House.  In this issue context nonbusiness interests had a larger 
share of their policy agenda before a single committee, their agenda was more focused, 
and they had a local presence in a greater number of districts, on average, than business 
interests.  As a result, they received representation that was competitive with business.  
Thus issue context can shape who participates in ways that systematically affect group 
competition and committee representation. 
Issue context is also important because legislation flows through committees that 
have issue related jurisdictions.  Committee jurisdictions can affect how much committee 
representation particular interests receive.  As the number of major issue areas under a 
committee’s jurisdiction increases, the number of group allies that compete for limited 
committee seats also increases.  This competition can make it more difficult for the allies 
of particular interests to win committee representation.  This effect of group competition 
via differences in the issue jurisdiction of particular committees was most apparent for 
the Energy and Commerce committee and the issue area healthcare reform.  As 
previously discussed, this committee had jurisdiction over many major policy issue areas.  
Each issue area relates to a unique constellation of interests whose allies seek placement 
194 
 
on the committee.  As the varied allies of whole constellations of interests compete for 
limited committee membership it becomes more difficult for any one interest to win 
strong representation on the committee.  Scholars should therefore also pay close 
attention to how the jurisdictional context of committees affects group participation and 
competition among groups.  Both can influence the magnitude of representation that 
groups receive in Congress. 
Lastly, this project found evidence for group influence precisely when past 
research suggests groups should have the least leverage over legislative behavior.  It 
studied three salient issue areas during a session of Congress with a strong anti-business 
political climate and a strong Democratic majority.  Yet even though this project yielded 
strong evidence for group influence during the 111
th
 Congress, the theory of ally 
generation and mobilization needs to be tested over other time periods and issue areas.  It 
may be that legislative allies are more likely to advocate for group interests when their 
policy agendas face major changes in Congress.  Thus, the theory of ally generation and 
mobilization should also be tested at different times and in different political contexts. 
 
Concluding Thoughts 
In a 2015 journal article several prolific interest group scholars were asked to 
describe their image of an unbiased interest system.  Marie Hojnacki described an 
unbiased system as “one providing interests a level playing field upon which they have 
some say about the matters that affect them” (Lowery et al. 2015, 9).  Frank Baumgartner 
explained that a hypothetical unbiased interest group system would “make the resources 
associated with each existing group be proportionate to the intensity of interest that the 
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group’s concerns elicit in society” (2015, 2).  In an unbiased interest system airline 
passengers and the airline industry, commercial banks and their customers, environmental 
interests and coal companies, and insurance companies and the insured would “each 
share an equal presence in the interest group world” (2015, 3).  Jeffrey Berry added that 
interests would also receive unbiased access and representation in Congress.  In the 
aftermath of the worst recession since the Great Depression, however, the representation 
of particular interests in Congress did not come close to these ideals.   
This dissertation has presented an image of interest representation that is far 
removed from these descriptions.  Commercial and investment banking interests were 
highly overrepresented on the committee with the most influence over their policy 
agendas, but consumers that had difficulty paying their mortgages were not.  Medical 
insurance providers and companies selling medical equipment and supplies received 
more representation on the committee with jurisdiction over their policy concerns than 
the uninsured, the elderly, labor unions, and people in poverty.  Electric utility 
companies, oil distributors, and environmental organizations all received strong 
representation on a committee with the power to affect legislation related to their policy 
agendas.  These are just a few examples of the systematic variation in interest 
representation documented throughout this project.  The evidence presents a picture of 
interest representation in Congress with substantial amounts of bias towards some 
interests and against others.  Specifically, the groups most affected by the policies under 
the jurisdiction of a given committee, groups with focused policy agendas, business 
constituencies, and interests with a presence in a larger number of House districts all tend 
to receive better representation on House committees. Future scholarship should therefore 
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continue to untangle the relationship between variation in legislative allies and ally 
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Table A.2: Model Testing Effect of Low Local Presence and Political Concentration 
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Table A.3 Model Testing Effect of High Local Presence and Geographic 
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